ENIGMA 2000 NEWSLETTER

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Morse Keyer used by Helen Kroger

Apparently up to ~240wpm

[Portland Spy Ring]

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Editorial

First of all a thanks to those members who have taken up the task of following E07/E11/S11a Fam 3 transmissions to fill the vacuum left by the passing of Malcolm, M8.

Over the years we have seen entire schedules disappear, such as E07a, XPA1c as well as other polytones. Those mentioned here have vanished within the life of the RUSvsUKR event yet E03, E03a, E05, E10 and others seemingly disappeared, perhaps due to a change in technology? Fiction authors such as Freddy Forsyth, Charles Beaumont, David McCloskey and Stella Rimmington have touched on Spy Comms but this little gem from Robert Morton firmly places the stamp of approval on what we already knew:

SPY STUFF! Satlink: The Secret Lifeline of CIA Ops

https://osintdaily.blogspot.com/2024/10/spy-stuff-satlink-secret-lifeline-of.html?m=1

When CIA operatives are out in the field on covert missions, they need to stay in touch with headquarters—without blowing their cover. That's where satlink, or satellite communication, comes into play. It's one of the key tools operatives use to transmit encrypted messages, voice comms, and real-time intel over long distances, no matter how remote or hostile their location.

You can think of it as a lifeline, connecting them back to Langley without relying on vulnerable, traditional networks. It's like their safety net in the world of espionage.

Take the case of Operation Jawbreaker right after 9/11. CIA operatives were deep inside Afghanistan, coordinating airstrikes against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They relied heavily on satlink to communicate from their remote positions back to headquarters. The terrain was rugged, communications were critical, and satlink made it all possible—real-time info that led to precision strikes and critical intel sharing that helped turn the tide.

That tech is at the core of my spy thriller Mission of Vengeance, too. CIA spymaster Corey Pearson is hunkered down in a safe house in the Dominican Republic, right in the thick of a dangerous op. His connection to Langley? You guessed it—satlink. Corey uses it to send updates, request intel, and stay one step ahead of the enemies closing in on him.

In the world of covert ops, a secure satlink connection can be the difference between life and death. It's all about staying connected—under the radar, out of sight, but always in the game.

Robert Morton is the author of SPY STUFF!, a series created for those who appreciate the art of real-world espionage and spycraft. With each post, he brings a professional yet engaging look into the tactics, tools, and operations used by intelligence agencies worldwide.

https://osintdaily.blogspot.com/2024/10/spy-stuff-satlink-secret-lifeline-of.html?m=1

So, SATLINK it is; whether being a standard satphone, BGAN, ZOLEO or modified kit to look like a water dispenser or leather wallet that's where they've gone. [But we already knew that]!

Here's an interesting image of the Spy Trawler 'Yantar' taken from the Daily Telegraph article: 'The Russian spy ship in Britain's waters preparing ground for war' A confrontation with Yantar may have looked peaceful but for Royal Navy, the fight is below the surface

Russia's spy ship 'Yantar'

1. Navigation and tracking other vessels, including Nato ships
2. Deep-sea submersibles, the Rus and the Konsul, can dive to 6000m
3. Poistioning system that allows the Yantar to loiter in the same place for prolonged periods of time
4. Transmitting data to Russian naval command, electronic jamming systems and communication intercepts
5. Helicopters can perform reconnaissance to back-up underwater operations

You can read the brilliant article: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/01/29/russian-spy-ship-british-waters-preparing-war/

Propagation has been fairly reasonable over the span covered by this Newsletter but as we move towards Spring some disappointment has been noted. Reports of poor conditions heard in the circles in which I attend.

I was not surprised when an officiado of WW2 clandestine messaging by wireless [not wifi for the younger generation] outlined problems facing the radio agents trying to raise the controllers on their particular circuit. Imagine having spent hours encrypting a 50 word message, checking it and coming up on air and finding conditions poor. You later try again and its worse. A very interesting chat and a book recommendation too.

MISSING SCHEDULES

Of immediate interest will be H-FD's notes re E11 schedules:



8180kHz 2000z 20/02/2024 © P Beaumont FEB2025

The sked of E11's 41# on Thursday 1730z (ex 5779 kHz) is missing since November 2024. The other 41# sked on Monday 0450z (ex 14753 kHz) is missing since January 2025. [*Let's see if we find the sked in March again, otherwise the sked is dead*].

Since February the E11 43# sked on Thursday/Friday 0820z on 11104 kHz was missing, **but today [Thu 20/02] the sked was found at 0720z on 8180 kHz.**

Tnx H-FD

The waterfall image shows 8180kHz as a reasonably clear and noise quiet frequency [S4].

Newsrounds:

Great Britain

GCHQ employee accused of damaging national security

18 December 2024

A former GCHQ employee accused of damaging national security by taking top secret data home is to go on trial partly in secret, a seniorjudge has ruled.

Hasaan Arshad, 25, is charged with an offence under the Computer Misuse Act after an investigation led by the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command. Mrs Justice McGowan confirmed his trial would take place on 31 March at the Old Bailey with some of the proceedings to be heard behind closed doors.

Mr Arshad, from Rochdale, Greater Manchester, who is currently on bail, has denied wrongdoing and was not required to attend the hearing.
Mrs Justice McGowan also ruled some witnesses would give evidence anonymously and parts of the trial would be heard behind closed doors.

GCHQ is the UK's intelligence agency focusing on communications data and areas such as cyber crime and infiltrating hidden messaging networks.

The charge relates to the defendant's alleged activities before going home on 24 August 2022. It is claimed he took his work mobile phone into a top secret area and connected the device to a top secret work station.

He is accused of transferring sensitive data from a secure, top secret computer to the phone before taking it home. Mr Arshad allegedly then transferred the data from the phone to a hard drive connected to his personal home computer.

'Top secret!' He was arrested and his home was searched on 22 September 2022, before he was charged under Section 3ZA of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, relating to "unauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious damage".

The charges state: "Between August 23 2022 and September 23 2022 (he) did an unauthorised act in relation to a computer and at the time of doing the act knew that it was unauthorised. "And the act caused, or created a significant risk of a material kind, this being damage to the national security of a country; and he intended by doing the act to cause serious damage of a material kind or was reckless as to whether such damage was caused."

"Top secret" is the classification for the government's most sensitive information, according to Ministry of Justice security guidance.

This includes material where compromise might cause widespread loss of life or threaten the security or economic wellbeing of the country or friendly nations.

GCHQ's headquarters is in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, but the intelligence agency also runs a smaller office in Manchester, as well as bases in Cornwall and North Yorkshire.

Many tnx to submitting member.

Noreen Riols: Tributes to WW2 spy school veteran

Noreen Riols joined the Special Operations Executive at the age of 18

8 January 2025

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c87895zdjnxo

One of the last-surviving veterans of the World War Two Special Operations Executive (SOE) has been remembered following her death at the age of 98.

Noreen Riols was posted to the SOE's school at Beaulieu in the New Forest, where agents were trained to carry out espionage missions behind enemy lines.

One of her roles was to act as a so-called honey trap in Bournemouth hotels to see whether the trainee spies would spill their secrets.

Dame Menna Rawlings, British Ambassador to France, where Ms Riols lived, said she was an "incredibly impressive woman" who led a "life well-lived".

In 1944, at the age of 18, Ms Riols applied to join the Women's Royal Naval Service, which she said appealed to her "because the hat looked most seductive".

However, she was sent to the SOE's secret headquarters in Baker Street, London, because of her proficiency in French.

She worked "passing on messages", before being posted to the Beaulieu Estate where the SOE conducted final training.

Future agents were schooled in one of 11 buildings, each for a different country, and taught to carry out sabotage, assassinations and other missions.

Ms Riols recalled: "I think they chose ones who they suspected might be liable to talk and that's where I came in.

"If it was a fine evening with the moon shining... I managed to winkle them out on to the terrace to look at the sea.

"It could get quite sentimental and then of course when their tongues are loosened, I'm afraid they could talk."

Those who revealed anything of their roles in the SOE were barred from service.

Ms Riols recalled: "I hated it. I almost prayed that they wouldn't talk... It was awful to have to betray them."

She kept her SOE role secret after the war, never telling her mother who died thinking she worked for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Her friend and former lodger, Paul Harris, only learned the truth when she appeared on a history programme on TV.

The retired Bournemouth vicar said: "I think she was very proud of what she did and once she could talk about it she became very much a figurehead for speaking for that generation.

"I will always remember Noreen as a fine example of someone who was prepared to deal with the most serious things in life, be a woman of faith and yet keep a wonderful sense of humour."

Dame Menna Rawlings presented Ms Riols with an MBE in 2023

Dame Menna Rawlings added: "She was just this incredible, sharp, sparkly, twinkly, humble, but incredibly impressive woman, even well into her 90s.

"She went round schools and talked about the role of the SOE and the role of women and how important it was to her to tell that story to new generations.

"If ever there was a life well-lived, it was Noreen's."

After joining the BBC World Service after the war, Ms Riols married and moved to France.

She became a writer, whose works include her wartime memoir The Secret Ministry of Ag. and Fish.

Awarded the Légion d'Honneur in 2014, she was also made MBE in 2023, only a year before her death.

Her funeral will be held on Monday near her home in Marly-le-Roi, west of Paris.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c87895zdjnxo

Andrée ‘Nadine’ Dumon, Comet line heroine who rescued Allied airmen but was betrayed to the Nazis

Under the chilling ‘Night and Fog’ decree she was beaten and spirited away to concentration camps including Ravensbrück and
07 February 2025 6:16am GMT

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2025/02/07/andre-nadine-dumont-comet-line-nazis-french-resistance/

Andrée “Nadine” Dumon, codename “Nadine”, who has died aged 102, was a Belgian courier on the Comet Escape Line, who helped save the lives of dozens of Allied airmen, taking evaders through checkpoints and to the South West of France before they were escorted across the Pyrenees.

She was born in Brussels on September 5 1922 and spent six years in the Belgian Congo, where her father was a physician. On return to Belgium she was educated at the Royal Athenaeum in Uccle.

As a 17-year-old student, Andrée was shocked and saddened at the rapid capitulation of Belgium following the German invasion on May 10 1940. Her family soon joined the emerging resistance movement, with Andrée beginning her underground work in a modest way by distributing leaflets. With the encouragement of her father, she joined her elder sister Micheline in the Comète in December 1941.

Le Réseau Comète was a resistance network that aided the escape of Allied airmen shot down behind enemy lines, resistance fighters in danger of betrayal or imminent arrest, and secret agents who had landed in occupied territory and accomplished their mission. The group was co-founded by another legendary Brussels resistance woman, Andrée de Jongh, alias Dédée. The escape line ran from Brussels to Paris and on foot across the Basque Pyrenees to San Sebastian. Those not interned by the Spanish were taken on to Gibraltar before being returned to Britain.

Andree Dumon (code name Nadine) with Herbert Spiller at Eden Camp in North Yorkshire: Spiller was shot down over northern France and escaped to Spain down the Comet Line

Travelling on false papers, Nadine guided dozens of British, Canadian, Australian and American airmen from Brussels to Paris, where she handed them over to the next escort. Her young and innocent appearance – some said she looked 15 – was an asset, but she still had to be extremely alert, ready with cover stories if questioned by police or customs officials, often explaining that her companions were deaf-mutes.

The Germans soon became aware that local people were assisting airmen who had baled out of their aircraft and the Gestapo increased its efforts to find the underground helpers. More than 700 Comète resistance fighters were arrested, often after betrayal. Nearly 300 of them died by execution, torture or ill-treatment in the concentration camps.

Fate struck on August 11 1942, when Nadine and several others were betrayed by an informant. The Secret Field Police knocked at her grandparents’ door, in the adjacent house. He shouted a warning, but Nadine and her parents were arrested. She was subjected to brutal beatings, threatened with execution and blackmailed with a threat to arrest her elderly grandparents.

She did not break, however, and was categorised under the Nacht and Nebel (Night and Fog) orders, a decree (alluding to a Wagnerian spell) issued by Hitler targeting political activists and resistance “helpers”. Families were not aware of their whereabouts and most died in captivity.

On the deportation train from Brussels Nadine suddenly had the chance to see her father for the first time since their arrest. He was also being transported as a Nacht und Nebel prisoner. They were able to speak briefly but their happiness was shortlived, as it was their last conversation. Eugène Dumon died on February 9 1945 in the Gross-Rosen concentration camp.

For Nadine, Nacht und Nebel marked the beginning of a dreadful ordeal. She was used as forced labour in the prisons of Trier, Cologne, Mesum, Zweibrücken and Essen. She was then transferred to the Gross-Strehlitz concentration camp, where she met Nina Vankerkhove, an acquaintance from the resistance. Together, they attempted an escape. But within just two hours, a local farmer discovered them and informed the camp guards, and they were soon back in prison.

For her unwavering courage and lifelong commitment, Andrée ‘Nadine’ Dumon is remembered as one of the great resistance heroines of Belgium

Nadine was subsequently deported to Ravensbrück, the concentration camp for women, and from there she was sent to Mauthausen in Austria. The journey lasted four days, in bitter cold and with hardly any food or drink. Upon arrival she was a shadow of her former self. Completely exhausted, she collapsed into the snow. With the help of fellow prisoners she managed to get back on her feet and limp onward, since exhausted prisoners were shot .

In early May 1945 Nadine was met by her mother Marie at Brussels station, their first meeting in three years. Both were shocked by each other’s appearance. Marie, dressed in black, was emaciated and looked years older. Nadine was so bad that she took two years to recover. Infested with typhoid and paratyphoid, she spent the first few months after returning home in the hospital.

After the war, she married Gustave Antoine; they built a successful textile company together and had two children. But the memories of the war and the resistance never left her. She became involved in the Royal Union of Intelligence and Action Services (RUSRA-KUIAD) and played an active role in the recognition and compensation of the Intelligence and Action Agents. Given the large number of women who were active in the Comète network, she also fought for the recognition of female resistance fighters.

For many years, Nadine rarely spoke of her wartime experiences and did not break her silence until she was 70. She started to speak in schools, took part in debates and television programmes and became actively committed to memorial projects. Until the age of 98 she continued to support the Belgian Intelligence Studies Centre.

More than 800 airmen and 300 soldiers owed their freedom to the men and women of the Comet Line. Among the many airmen Andrée “Nadine” Dumon assisted was the RAF pilot Robert Horsley. When his daughter Erica was born, she was given Andrée as her middle name. They remained in regular contact, and she was present at Nadine’s 100th birthday. Erica commented: “Today I am honoured to carry a name that is connected to such an important part of our history.”

Nadine remained in contact with many pilots and soldiers she saved and regularly invited them to Belgium. In turn, she travelled to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States to meet them. She was a regular visitor to Britain and to the annual reunions of the Royal Air Force Escaping Society and its successor, the Escape Lines Memorial Society.

With her unwavering courage and lifelong commitment, Andrée “Nadine” Dumon is remembered as one of the great resistance heroines of Belgium.

She was highly decorated by Belgium and by France. The British appointed her OBE and awarded her the King’s Medal for Courage in the Cause of Freedom. She was also decorated by the United States.

Andrée “Nadine” Dumon, born September 5 1922, died January 30 2025

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2025/02/07/andre-nadine-dumont-comet-line-nazis-french-resistance/

Thanks to Anon who notified E2k of this Obit

Home Office and IBM to partner on UK Emergency Services Network

January 15, 2025
Jason Davies

https://www.systemtek.co.uk/2025/01/uk-emergency-services-network/?fbclid=IwY2xjawH3S_VleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHa4kPcsVhWZv_xKsz_eBknnMie5251goviDqSI79-9ILZ6bhkig4a02vtA_aem_7LvWCpYQ34REw6gyywEF4A&sfnsn=scwspwa

Frontline emergency services in the UK will benefit from a new communications network that will modernise how they work together, as the government announces a new partnership with IBM following a series of delays by previous suppliers.

The Emergency Services Network (ESN) will support more than 300,000 emergency responders in Great Britain, providing them with better technology and faster access to data in emergency situations and frontline operations.

Police forces, fire services and ambulance trusts will be able to share live data and imagery, location reports and essential public safety information as they work on time-critical rescue and response efforts.

After several delays to the rollout of ESN over recent years, the government is committing to delivering the project as quickly as possible and help save lives as a result. The Policing Minister, Dame Diana Johnson, will chair regular meetings to ensure the project is running to time and cost.

Providing the emergency services with improved technology is a key part of the government’s drive to make the nation’s streets safer, which is a crucial part of the Prime Minister’s Plan for Change.

Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention, Dame Diana Johnson, said:

Every day our brave emergency services help members of the public facing life-or-death situations. We must do everything we can to maximise the chances of successful outcomes, and communications between frontline staff is critical to ensuring this.

This government is working tirelessly to support this project, making sure it is delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner, and IBM will be an important part of bringing the Emergency Services Network online.

Rahul Kalia, Managing Partner at IBM UK and Ireland, said:

We are proud to support the Emergency Services Network (ESN) in delivering a secure and resilient communications platform to empower frontline emergency services.

Working with our ecosystem partners, we will deliver mission-critical services for first responders to enhance safety in our communities across Great Britain.

We look forward to working with the government to deliver this in a timely and cost-effective manner.

Software for new handheld devices will provide data-sharing functions and real-time video features, providing personnel with the critical information they need to save lives, as well as a push-to-talk protocol for instant communications.

One real-world example of how the network could work is in a serious road traffic collision:

the first service to arrive would be able share their exact location using GPS data with the other services
fire services would be instantly updated with the make and model of vehicle, which can then be cross-referenced with data on how to best use cutting equipment, if someone was trapped, or where batteries are located on electric cars
they could also update paramedics with passenger details to check medical information and determine if there is anything they need to know such as prior medical conditions
this would greatly speed up dealing with the incident and the ability to aid the victims involved
Led by the Home Office, ESN will implement the next generation of fast, safe, and secure voice, video, and data communication, allowing emergency services to work in tandem and coordinate efforts when protecting and aiding members of the public. Similar technology has already been rolled out with success in countries including the USA, Canada and South Korea.

As the new user services supplier, IBM will be responsible for leading the design, build and system integration of the ESN platform. Key to achieving this will be IBM’s delivery of IT infrastructure, which will be fundamental to ensuring improved and more efficient communication capabilities for mission-critical services.

The news comes swiftly after EE was awarded the contract to provide the mobile communications infrastructure for the project, as the new government works towards deploying the new ESN and shutting down the current system, Airwave.

https://www.systemtek.co.uk/2025/01/uk-emergency-services-network/?fbclid=IwY2xjawH3S_VleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHa4kPcsVhWZv_xKsz_eBknnMie5251goviDqSI79-9ILZ6bhkig4a02vtA_aem_7LvWCpYQ34REw6gyywEF4A&sfnsn=scwspwa

“All Units M2MP, Out!” or for another member “All cars change to Channel 6, M2HJ over….”

Pictured: Inside alleged Russian spy ring's Great Yarmouth lair

Jury shown photos of 'surveillance equipment, fake IDs and phone tracking device' at Orlin Roussev's home in converted hotel

Patrick Sawer
Senior News Reporter

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/01/09/russian-spy-ring-great-yarmouth-lair-kremlin/

The alleged spy ring – led by Orlin Roussev, a Kremlin agent, from his home in a converted hotel in the seaside town – had gathered more than 3,000 items of surveillance equipment, worth hundreds of thousands of pounds, to use on espionage missions in the UK by the time police arrested them in February 2023, the court was told.

Roussev, 46, and Bizer Dzhambazov, 43, his second-in-command, have already admitted to conspiracy to spy with a Russian agent using the alias Rupert Ticz, who prosecutors allege is Jan Marsalek, the fugitive boss of the German payments processor Wirecard.

The jury was shown photographs of rooms in a converted hotel where Orlin Roussev allegedly ran a spy ring
Orlin Roussev allegedly operated a spy ring out of the converted hotel

Marsalek is wanted by Interpol in connection with an alleged £1.6 billion fraud at Wirecard, which collapsed in 2020.

Katrin Ivanova, Dzhambazov's 33-year-old girlfriend, Vanya Gaberova, his 30-year-old lover, and Tihomir Ivanchev, Gaberova's ex-boyfriend, 39, all deny being part of the conspiracy and are on trial at the Old Bailey.

'Fake IDs, drones and tracking device found'
The jury were shown several photographs taken by Metropolitan Police counter-terrorism officers inside the office from where Roussev masterminded the spying operation.

Among the devices physically passed around members of the jury for closer inspection was one described in court as a "law enforcement grade" eavesdropping device for phones, also known as an IMSI grabber.

The device, the size of a large shoe box, contained a software radio board "used in government and law enforcement telecoms intercept equipment".

Police photographs showed piles of equipment scattered around the room in the former hotel in Princes Road, which Roussev used as a headquarters.

Also seized from the rooms rented by Roussev were printers and scanners capable of producing fake IDs, a large number of mobile phones, drones and numerous fake British, Slovenian, Bulgarian, Italian and Greek passports and ID cards, including a fake Czech passport in the name of Jan Marsalek, the court heard.

The jury was also shown a mobile phone tracking device, also described as of the type used by law enforcement agencies, which the prosecution said could be used along with the IMSI grabber "to intercept and or disrupt specifically targeted mobile phone operations ... and identify an individual by their IMSI codes and locate them within five metres".

The 33-room Haydee guest house from where Roussev ran the spy operation – calling it in messages his "Indiana Jones warehouse" – was described by the prosecution as a "typical seaside hotel".

Roussev planned to use the surveillance devices outside a US military base in Stuttgart, Germany, to gather information from the phones of Ukrainian servicemen who were being trained to operate Patriot missile defence batteries.

The information would have allowed him to track the servicemen back to Ukraine and identify where the missiles were fired from but the plan was foiled in February last year.
'

Similar surveillance equipment is alleged to have also been found in the home shared by Dzhambazov and Ms Ivanova in Harrow, north-west London, including GPs trackers and radio frequency jammers.

Two fake rocks with cameras hidden inside were also allegedly found at their address, along with a camera hidden in a watch and others hidden in a car key and a lighter. One hidden camera was allegedly hidden inside a child's Minion toy.

Large numbers of mobile phones were also allegedly found by police, along with what the prosecution described as "a vast array" of computing equipment.

Dan Pawson-Pounds, prosecuting, told the jury: "A vast amount of surveillance devices which could be used to enable intrusive surveillance were recovered from the addresses which form part of this investigation."

Counter-terror officers who searched the Harrow address also found a safe hidden inside a wardrobe, inside of which was a pink decorated box with false ID documents and a Samsung mobile phone belonging to Ms Ivanova, the court was told.

A tracking device was allegedly found in Dzhambazov's bedside drawer, along with a radio jammer. Elsewhere in the property officers found a secret camera hidden inside a Coke bottle, the court heard.

The trial continues.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/01/09/russian-spy-ring-great-yarmouth-lair-kremlin/ [*Worth looking for the imagery]*

If you wish to know more about IMSI catchers and Cell Site Simulators you can read more here:
Understanding and Detecting IMSI Catchers around the World | Enea

Inside Russian spy's Norfolk guesthouse: Jurors are shown images of Great Yarmouth hotel rooms crammed with surveillance equipment as court hears he boasted about being like James Bond's 'Q'

By DUNCAN GARDHAM
20:50 09 Jan 2025, updated 20:53 09 Jan 2025

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14268025/amp/inside-russian-spy-guesthouse-gadgets-equipment.html

A Russian spy who boasted about being like James Bond's 'Q' was living in a Norfolk guesthouse where rooms were crammed with surveillance equipment, a court has heard.

Orlin Roussev, 46, boasted to his controller that he was becoming like the 007 character as he prepared his spying 'toys' for kidnap and surveillance operations across Europe.

Among the high-tech gadgets was a £120,000 'IMSI' grabber that could capture people's mobile phone numbers, a listening device hidden inside a computer mouse, and fake ID printers.

He is said to have taken instructions from a handler called Jan Marsalek, who is wanted in connection with a £1.6bn tech fraud linked to a company called Wirecard.

Roussev, a Bulgarian national, has pleaded guilty to running a spy ring on behalf of the Russians but other members of the group deny the charges.

The Old Bailey was told that a 'vast' amount of technical equipment for 'intrusive surveillance' was found at Roussev's address in Great Yarmouth, which he described in messages as his 'Indiana Jones warehouse'.

The Haydee guest house on Prince's Road was described by Dan Pawson-Pounds, prosecuting, as a 'typical seaside hotel'.

More equipment was found in the lounge at a North London flat shared by Katrin Ivanova and Bizer Dzambazov, two alleged members of the spy ring who were in a relationship.

In the flat, on the High Road in Harrow, was a black cap with a concealed camera, a one litre plastic Coke bottle with waterproof camera behind the label, and a surveillance camera and micro SD card hidden in a soft toy Minion character from the cartoon Despicable Me.

Orlin Roussev, 46, boasted to his controller that he was becoming like the 007 character 'Q' as he prepared his spying 'toys' for kidnap and surveillance operations across Europe

He was living in a Norfolk guesthouse where rooms were crammed with surveillance equipment

The Old Bailey was told that a 'vast' amount of technical equipment for 'intrusive surveillance' was found at Roussev's address in Great Yarmouth

The jury heard that Operation Skirp seized 3,540 exhibits from a number of addresses, including 1,650 digital exhibits.

The jury was shown a £120,000 'IMSI grabber' - a black metal box, the size of a large shoe box, capable of capturing mobile phone numbers from a nearby area.

The Razor II was made by an unknown manufacturer and had been modified to include a battery that allowed it to be deployed anywhere and a wi-fi interface to allow remote communication.

A smaller £40,000 system, marked 'Stealth', a black box the size of a pencil case, was designed to be carried around and concealed beneath outer clothing.

The devices were described as 'law enforcement grade' and could be used to intercept or disrupt targeted mobile phone communications.

They could also identify an individual phone by their IMSI and IMEI numbers in conjunction with a direction finding unit called a Jugular 4 which cost £15,000.

The spies planned to use them outside a US military base in Stuttgart, Germany, to gather information from the phones of Ukrainian servicemen who were being trained to operate Patriot missile defence batteries.

It had 33 rooms and inside three of them was a 'significant amount of IT and surveillance equipment'

The jury was shown a £120,000 'IMSI grabber' - a black metal box, the size of a large shoe box, capable of capturing mobile phone numbers from a nearby area

The court heard Roussev also had a number of wi-fi enabled audio and video transmitters and recorders, all variations of the same product disguised in a variety of different items to be used as 'covert technical surveillance devices'

The Razor II was made by an unknown manufacturer and had been modified to include a battery that allowed it to be deployed anywhere

The information would have allowed them to track the servicemen back to Ukraine and identify where the missiles were fired from but the plan was foiled when the men were arrested in February last year.

The court heard Roussev also had a number of wi-fi enabled audio and video transmitters and recorders, all variations of the same product disguised in a variety of different items to be used as 'covert technical surveillance devices'.

'Most of these were typical of the products the public can procure on e-commerce sites advertising "spying equipment"',' Mr Pawson-Pounds said.

Much of it was 'wearable technology' for recording video and audio such as wristwatches, pens, ties, sunglasses, a cigarette lighter, car key fob and jewellery.

The jewellery included pendant necklaces with hidden camera and microphone with SD card storage and earrings with audio recorders.

Some had SIM cards meaning they could communicate and stream directly to another member of the spy ring.

A large number of USB power banks with covert video cameras were also found.

Water bottles had mobile phone linked video surveillance capability and other 'designer' hydration vessels had devices hidden in the lid.

The Haydee guest house on Prince's Road was described by Dan Pawson-Pounds, prosecuting, as a 'typical seaside hotel'

Fake ID was also found at the address, including the above for Ivanchev which claimed he was a press photographer for the National Geographic

Biser Dzhambazov (pictured) and Roussev have accepted that they were involved in carrying out espionage

Bulgarians Katrin Ivanova, 32, Vanya Gaberova, 29 and her ex-boyfriend Tihomir Ivanchev, 38, all deny working for Russian intelligence services between August 2020 and February 2023. Pictured: Vanya Gaberova

Police also found a listening device in a computer mouse, a camera in a smoke detector, and an audio and video recorder in a coat hook.

Radio frequency audio transmitting devices included one concealed in a pen, some of which had voice activation to save on battery life.

Computer network exploitation devices - with names such as pineapples, coconuts, turtles, bash bunnies, rubber duckies, packet squirrels, key crocks, plunder bugs and shark jacks - could be used to intercept digital communications data on unsecured wi-fi networks.

There was also a Pandora car key cloning device, a Russian-made car unlocking device and radio frequency identification cloning equipment, which would allow the spies to capture hotel or building access cards and to clone them.

Earpieces allowed the spies to listen in to inductive hearing loops used in public spaces, such as conference rooms, and could also be used for the spies to communicate with each other.

There were numerous GPS tracking devices with magnets which showed scratches and markings to suggest they had been used in previous deployments.

More traditional surveillance equipment included night vision binoculars and monoculars and mobile radios as well as scanners that could be used to listen to mobile radios used by security guards.

UK-based Bulgarian national Katrin Ivanova (pictured), 33, is one of the defendants who allegedly carried out surveillance on individuals and places of interest to Russia
Several RF jammers which plugged into a cigarette lighter socket in a car could be used to disguise the GPS locator system in cars used by the spies and showed wear and tear to their outer casing, suggesting they were 'likely to have been in use at some time,' Mr Pawson-Pounds said.

Other technical surveillance counter measures included radio frequency scanners known as 'bug detectors' and a basic camera lens detector.

There were said to be an 'extraordinary' number of mobile phones both traditional and smart phones, including low-cost Chinese manufactured Cubot smart phones that allowed the user to illegally modify the phone's IMEI number.

Roussev also had two 100w high frequency transceivers and numerous 25w transceivers which could transmit hundreds of kilometres to avoid monitoring by law enforcement.

The spy ring's members allegedly included Ivanova, 33, a lab assistant from Harrow north London, Vanya Gaberova, 30, a beautician from Acton, West London, and Tihomir Ivanchev, 39, a painter and decorator from Enfield.

Roussev and Dzhambazov have both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to collect information useful to an enemy.

Gaberova, Ivanova and Ivanchev, all deny the charges and the trial continues.

All five are Bulgarian nationals with 'settled status' in the UK.

Share or comment on this article: Inside Russian spy's Norfolk guesthouse: Jurors are shown images of Great Yarmouth hotel rooms crammed with surveillance equipment as court hears he boasted about being like James Bond's 'Q'

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14268025/amp/inside-russian-spy-guesthouse-gadgets-equipment.html

About this new Chinese Embassy in London's East End:

Dave v People's Republic of China: Chairman of small residents' association spearheads campaign to stop China building huge embassy on his doorstep after Hong Kong dissident was dragged into consulate and beaten by officials

By STEVE BOGGAN FOR THE DAILY MAIL

Published: 01:21, 10 December 2022 | Updated: 01:52, 10 December 2022

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11523081/Chairman-residents-association-campaigns-stop-China-building-embassy-doorstep.html?ito=native_share_article-nativemenubutton

As chairman of a small residents' association, the 68-year-old retired engineer was spearheading a campaign to stop the People's Republic of China building a massive and intimidating embassy on his doorstep.

But he hadn't realised the stakes would be so high.

'I bumped into a friend in the street after that and he said, "Watch out for people coming towards you with umbrellas",' says Dave.

David Lake, 68, a retired engineer, has been leading a campaign to stop a £750million Chinese embassy being built on his doorstep

'I think he was joking. At least, I hope he was.'

The warning actually related not to China, but the assassination by the Russian KGB and Bulgarian secret service of the anti-communist dissident Georgi Markov, who died in London in 1978 after being injected with ricin thought to have come from the tip of an umbrella.

But the reference wasn't lost on Dave. 'I'm not saying I'm having sleepless nights, but comments like that do make you think,' he says.

‘And when I watched the Chinese consular staff beating up that dissident in front of the police, it was worrying. They think they’re above the law.’

The proposed development being opposed by Dave’s Royal Mint Court Residents’ Association is for a £750 million embassy on the 5.5-acre site of the former Royal Mint, opposite the Tower of London.

Coins were minted there for 160 years, until 1967. It was sold by the Crown Estate in the late 1980s and acquired by property firm Delancey — owned by Tory donor Jamie Ritblat — in 2010 until its purchase by China in 2018 for £255 million.

Plans for the site — also home to a Black Death burial plot — drawn up by architect David Chipperfield involve demolishing sections of the Grade II-listed building, renovating some of the structures and building housing for more than 250 embassy staff.

If completed, it would be one-third bigger than the new American embassy opened in London in 2018, making it the largest in western Europe.

Dave and his fellow campaigners scored a major but potentially short-lived victory this month when Tower Hamlets borough councillors unanimously rejected the plans at an impassioned planning meeting that went on into the night.

The decision was unexpected as council officials had recommended the application be approved, but moving speeches from residents, councillors, Hong Kong expatriates and supporters of Uyghur muslims, who are being rounded up and ‘re-educated’ in Chinese prison camps, won the day.

Councillor Peter Golds said the victory, so far, was a ‘triumph for local democracy’ and said he believed the Chinese plans were ‘all about prestige’. ‘Every person coming out of the Tube, looking to see the Tower of London and Tower Bridge, would turn left and see the flag of the Chinese Communist Party flying,’ he says.

‘It would look ridiculous. Can you imagine President Macron permitting this next to the Arc de Triomphe or Eiffel Tower? It’s like flying the flag of the Chinese Communist Party on the site of the Vatican.’

London Mayor Sadiq Khan has six weeks to decide whether to endorse Tower Hamlets’ decision or overturn the rejection, which was made on the grounds of residents’ safety and the prospect of demonstrations outside the embassy causing traffic chaos.

The final decision on the £750million embassy could be 'called in' by Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for Housing

The timing couldn’t be worse, with diplomatic relations between China and the UK at an all-time low, but the Royal Mint Court Residents’ Association is already preparing for the next stage of their fight.

‘We didn’t celebrate,’ says Dave. ‘The first thing we did was to set up a project on crowdfunder.co.uk to raise £8,000 for legal representation. We think we’re going to need it.’

The 100 or so residents objecting to the plans live in St Mary Graces Court on Cartwright Street, which backs on to the site of the Mint.

According to Dave, this makes them ‘human shields’ for the embassy.

‘There are so many groups who oppose what the Chinese are doing to the Uyghurs and the oppression in Tibet and Hong Kong that we feel it isn’t a matter of if the embassy will face some kind of terrorist attack, but when,’ he says.

‘We asked Tower Hamlets to conduct a bomb threat evaluation to assess the impact of an explosion on our homes. One was carried out, but we were told by the police that the results were “sensitive” so we haven’t been allowed to see them.’

I asked Tower Hamlets, the Metropolitan Police and Arup, the design and engineering consultants thought to have conducted the assessment, what the findings said about residents’ safety.

The police and Arup declined to comment. The council did not reply.

St Mary Graces Court estate was opened by the Queen in 1989. It featured affordable, part-owned properties intended for key workers and was built on Crown Estate land, with the Crown being the freeholder.

Dave is waiting for a response from several senior politicians, including Lisa Nandy, Shadow Housing Secretary

However, with the sale to China, residents found the freehold had been sold, too — giving the Chinese unfettered access to their homes.

‘There is a clause in the lease that gives the freeholder the right of entrance in case a leaseholder is doing something that causes the freeholder concern,’ says Dave.

‘That was alright when our freeholder was the Crown. But what if someone wanted to put up a poster in support of the Uyghurs or a free Tibet?

‘Would they have a bunch of Chinese officials bursting into their home and pulling it down? Will they have us under surveillance, listening to our phone calls and watching what we’re doing on the internet? It’s really rather frightening.’

Dave is so concerned that he’s written to King Charles to ask him to negotiate a return of the freehold to the Crown Estates. He’s awaiting a reply.

He’s also awaiting replies to three messages he has sent to Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, two to Yvette Cooper, the Shadow Home Secretary, and two to Shadow Housing Secretary Lisa Nandy.

‘It’s very disappointing. We feel like we’re on our own and are being ignored,’ he says.

The one politician who has supported the ‘David’ in this David and Goliath contest has been Lord Alton of Liverpool.

Lord Alton said the site would give the Chinese a 'great deal' of prestige and it would be wrong to allow the former Royal Mint to be used as promotion for the CCP

He says: ‘The idea that the Royal Mint should become a prime site for the promotion of the Chinese Communist Party is wrong. It will give them a great deal of prestige and I am sympathetic to the security issues and the concern from nearby residents. I think the secretary of state [Michael Gove] should call it in.’

Campaigners claim the embassy will be used for espionage, electronic surveillance and the identification and harassment of critics of the communist regime.

After the Tower Hamlets decision, Simon Cheng, founder of Hongkongers In Britain, who was detained by the Chinese authorities while working for the British Consulate in Hong Kong in 2019, said: 'We should not compromise and grant an authoritarian state the power to upgrade their facilities to suppress dissenting thoughts in the UK.'

But are residents and dissidents right to be afraid?

According to China watchers, intelligence experts and human rights groups, they are.

We should not compromise and grant an authoritarian state the power to upgrade their facilities to suppress dissenting thoughts in the UK.
'China has been building huge and disproportionate embassies in various countries and staffing them with large numbers of "diplomatic" and consular officials,' says Clive Hamilton, co-author of Hidden Hand: Exposing How The Chinese Communist Party Is Reshaping The World.

'Many of these have no apparent function but are actually used to monitor, intimidate and report on local Chinese communities, and to house Ministry of State Security officers whose job is spying. It's mystifying that Western governments permit these Chinese fortresses in their cities. They are imposing, secretive and often sinister in construction and purpose.'

Dr Paul Lashmar, author of Spies, Spin And The Fourth Estate, says the Chinese Communist Party has been imposing ever-growing pressure and threats on expatriates who don't toe the party line.

Most recently, he says, the Spanish civil rights group Safeguard Defenders said it had identified more than 100 unofficial Chinese police stations in 'dozens' of countries — including three in the UK (two in London and one in Glasgow) — thought to be keeping dissidents under surveillance.

'The behaviour of Chinese officials overseas has become more and more aggressive in recent years under the authoritarian dictatorship of President Xi Jinping,' says Dr Lashmar.

'They've put a high premium on spying and industrial espionage, and have put into place a wide range of mechanisms to clamp down on Chinese students or any Chinese person who's living abroad, if they think they are acting as some kind of dissident.

'The most recent evidence suggests they've set up their own secret police stations and courts around the Western world, where if a Chinese citizen is suspected of acting against the Chinese government, they are summarily brought in and then prosecuted. They have no right to do this in these countries, but they are, and Chinese people overseas are aware that if they misbehave, their families back home could be threatened.'

Asked what he thought of the proposed location, Dr Lashmar says: 'They'll be smack in the middle of London, and that's significant. Until recently, the Chinese were thought to be technologically backward, but now they are worldwide leaders in the production of batteries for electric vehicles, in solar panel technology and electronic surveillance.

'If they can find a way of tapping into the flow of the City of London's business data, they could gain great economic opportunities. And at some point, it seems likely that tensions with the West will be ratcheted up when — rather than if — they make a move on Taiwan.

'The Chinese Communist Party will want to know what the British Government and the Ministry of Defence are thinking, and what their next moves might be, so having your embassy bulging with intelligence people and electronic equipment, right on the doorstep, would give you a huge advantage.'

What happens next is in the hands of Sadiq Khan and Michael Gove.

I asked the People's Republic of China's representatives in London to comment and address whether the residents of St Mary Graces Court had reason to fear their homes being invaded by embassy staff.

It didn't address the questions but issued this statement: 'To improve the working and living conditions of the diplomatic personnel at the Chinese Embassy in the UK, the Chinese side purchased the new Embassy premises in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.

They've put a high premium on spying and industrial espionage, and have put into place a wide range of mechanisms to clamp down on Chinese students or any Chinese person who's living abroad, if they think they are acting as some kind of dissident.
'This has been conducted in line with international norms and received consent from the UK side. The planning application for the new Embassy premises has been carried out on the basis of local laws and regulations, which includes thorough technical analyses on security and other issues.

'It should be pointed out that host countries have the international obligation to facilitate and support the building of premises of diplomatic missions. The Chinese side urges the UK side to fulfil its relevant obligation.'

When campaigners against the embassy raised the treatment of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang province, the embassy demanded that the UK government observes this convention and protects the project.

'A handful of anti-China elements use so-called Xinjiang-related issues to harass the Chinese diplomatic mission in the UK and disrupt local public order. This must not be allowed,' it said.

'According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the British government has the responsibility to take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of foreign diplomatic missions and personnel.'

But according to Andrew Sangar, Associate Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge, while this is true, it does not extend to automatically allowing a country to open an embassy anywhere it chooses.

'The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations — and international law generally — does not prevent the local government from refusing permission for an embassy at a specific location, provided that it is not acting in a discriminatory or arbitrary way,' he says.

So, while Dave Lake and his fellow residents aren't taking their victory for granted, at least they know that there is nothing, legally, preventing Sadiq Khan and Michael Gove from upholding the Tower Hamlets decision to refuse permission for China's new diplomatic fortress.

Politically, however, the decision might not be so clear cut.

And if the development is approved out of a desire to kowtow to China, then the victor won't be David. It will be Goliath.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11523081/Chairman-residents-association-campaigns-stop-China-building-embassy-doorstep.html?ito=native_share_article-nativemenubutton

THE SAGA CONTINUES:

The battle to stop super-sized Chinese 'spy hub' in Tower Hamlets: Locals fighting plans for Beijing's biggest embassy in Europe reveal fears Labour will push it through

Are you a local resident affected by the 'super embassy' plan? Email noor.qurashi@mailonline.co.uk
By NOOR QURASHI

Published: 09:37, 13 January 2025 | Updated: 11:19, 13 January 2025

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14277761/locals-fight-china-super-embassy-plans-fears-base-magnet-attacks.html?ito=native_share_article-nativemenubutton

Locals are embroiled in a 'David and Goliath fight' with China after the country announced plans to build Europe's largest Chinese embassy on their carpark.

China bought the 18-century, grade II listed Royal Mint Court near Tower Bridge six years ago and is awaiting planning permission for a new 'super embassy'.

Proposals were previously rejected by Tower Hamlets council but have now been re-submitted and will be considered by Labour housing chief Angela Rayner.

There are fears the application could now go in China's favour as the state waited until August to put in its plans under a potentially more sympathetic government.

David Lake is among the east London residents taking a stand against the proposal.

The decision will be made in the wake of Rachel Reeves' diplomatic trip to China.

Speaking to The Times, 62-year-old Mr Lake said he had been 'disgusted' at Keir Starmer asking ministers to examine the plans for the 62,000 sq ft site after President Xi raised the matter with him.

Royal Mint Building. The dispute comes after China bought the 18-century, grade II listed Royal Mint Court near Tower Bridge six years ago and is awaiting planning permission for its new 'super embassy'

View of the building architecture of the site of the former Royal Mint in London on December 6, 2024, a site favoured by the Chinese authorities as a home for it's new embassy

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer during a bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping of China, at the Sheraton Hotel, as he attends the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Originally from Manchester, Mr Lake, who has lived in the area for 40 years, suggested he was concerned the base could become a magnet for attacks, spying and traffic.

It comes as the car park of his flat, in a small development called St Mary Graces Court, has been marked as part of the area that would form the new embassy.

He said: 'It's about the security - if there's an attack we'd get flattened.'

Chief Executive of Crilly Consulting, Andy Williams, said he thought the choice of the Tower Hill location was 'wholly inadequate and inappropriate from both potential terrorism and activism standpoint'.

He added: 'Any activist will be rubbing their hands with glee, as would any terrorists, at the fact they've got 200 residential apartments in the embassy with a footbridge across.'

The comments follow counter-terrorism police objecting to the scheme in light of the resources required to ensure public safety.

Proposals were previously rejected by Tower Hamlets council but have now been re-submitted and will be considered by Labour housing chief Angela Rayner

If the development were to go ahead, red flags of the People's Republic of China would be flown opposite the Tower of London.

Concerns are also being voiced the embassy could be a base for spying.

Chief Inspector Dave Hodges, of the Metropolitan Police, suggested protests related to the scheme could also have a major impact on traffic in the area.

Not all residents opposed the development outright, with one, Barry Harris, saying he thought people were being prejudiced against the Chinese.

In November, Starmer was called 'weak, weak, weak' after he revealed ministers took over decision-making for the embassy when Xi raised it with him.

'You raised the Chinese embassy building in London when we spoke on the telephone,' Sir Keir told Mr Xi during their meeting in Rio de Janeiro.

Protesters from the London Uyghurs, Tibetans and Hongkongers communities gather outside the proposed relocation site of the Chinese Embassy in London to oppose the plan (September 2021)

'And we have since taken action by calling in that application. Now we have to follow the legal process and timeline.'

In response to Sir Keir's words to Mr Xi, which were recorded as broadcasters were being ushered out of the room in Rio, top Tory MP Robert Jenrick branded the PM 'weak'.

The shadow justice secretary said: 'Starmer openly admits Labour intervened in the application to build the new Chinese embassy (massive spy hub) after Xi Jinping pressured him. Weak. Weak. Weak.'

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14277761/locals-fight-china-super-embassy-plans-fears-base-magnet-attacks.html?ito=native_share_article-nativemenubutton

The best comment left in answer to the development [well. I think so]!

Every Chinese Embassy I've seen, London, Guyana, Hungary, Czech, Germany and others have antennas all over them. SIGINT at its best.

My house has a number of antennas; long wire, dipoles, colinears and planar disc. I like to listen from 4 to 1800MHz, no gaps. I'd love to have Chinese Embassy opposite me for intercept purposes of its electronic emissions.
I could even put up a Cell Site Simulator to intercept their mobile phone use. Oh yes! With 250 dwellings somebody would let something slip,
China, if you don't succeed with Tower Hamlets approach Croydon Council (with a decent sized bung - bankrupt - to grease application approval) for Embassy in SE19.

Honeytrap for me? Must wear full length red Cheongsam, high heels, non smoker, be capable of intelligent conversation concerning Geopolitics (Guyana as oil rich/Chinese influences in CARICOM) and like Chinese food. Long black hair in a bun and pinned with decorated pins. Tnx!(There's a story here too, if you call yourself Chi and happened to be on an almost empty tube train carriage, sat next to me and engaged me in personal chat……..).

Royal Navy tracks Russian 'spy ship' closely after it enters UK waters

Story by Dan Sabbagh Defence and security editor •

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknews/royal-navy-tracks-russian-spy-ship-closely-after-it-enters-uk-waters/ar-AA1xFi4H?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=b037d468e7294338912f4000d3ffe13c&ei=20#

A Russian "spy ship" was tracked closely by the Royal Navy this week after it entered UK waters on Monday and passed through the Channel at a time of heightened concern about the safety of undersea cables.

The defence secretary, John Healey, told the Commons on Tuesday that the Yantar, a Russian vessel engaged in "mapping the UK's critical underwater infrastructure", had passed through British waters for the second time in less than three months.

Healey accused the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of trying to threaten European security by targeting undersea infrastructure carrying oil, gas, electricity and the internet. "We see you. We know what you're doing," he said before MPs.

The Yantar, officially an ocean research vessel, was first picked up 45 miles (70km) off the British coast, well inside the UK's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on Monday. "Let me be clear, this is a Russian spy ship," Healey told MPs.

It had previously sailed through UK waters in November, when Healey said it had been "detected loitering over UK critical undersea infrastructure". It then sailed into Irish waters east of Dublin, raising concern it was spying on internet connectors running between the UK and Ireland.

Healey said it had been tracked at the time by a submarine, warships and patrol aircraft. The submarine had been ordered to surface close to the Yantar "to make clear that we had been covertly monitoring its every move", he said.

This time the vessel did not loiter and was followed by the frigate HMS Somerset and patrol ship HMS Tyne, which had been authorised to get closer to better track it, Healey said.

Cables under the Baltic Sea have been damaged in unclear circumstances three times in the past 18 months. An oil tanker dragging its anchor damaged a power cable running between Finland and Estonia on Christmas Day, prompting Nato allies to step up patrols of the region.

It is unclear who was responsible for the incident, which involved the Cook Islands-registered Eagle S, but Healey told MPs that "many analysts believe this was caused by a vessel in Russia's shadow fleet".

Britain and other Nato countries are anxious about threats to undersea infrastructure, which are often critical to a nation's needs but are hard to defend. They believe the threat from Russia has stepped up since its invasion of Ukraine.

The Yantar is officially an oceanographic research vessel with underwater rescue capability, but it is also a member of the Russian navy. It is operated by the country's Main Directorate Deep-Sea Research, which is part of the defence ministry.

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknews/royal-navy-tracks-russian-spy-ship-closely-after-it-enters-uk-waters/ar-AA1xFi4H?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=b037d468e7294338912f4000d3ffe13c&ei=20#

Former government intelligence contractor charged under Official Secrets Act over 'damaging' disclosures

Juan Joseph, 42, was arrested after an investigation by counter-terrorism police from the Metropolitan Police.

Friday 7 February 2025 12:59, UK

https://news.sky.com/story/former-government-intelligence-contractor-charged-under-official-secrets-act-over-damaging-disclosures-13303948

A former government contractor who worked in the intelligence community has appeared in court charged with making "damaging" disclosures under the Official Secrets Act.

Juan Joseph, 42, was arrested after an investigation carried out by the Metropolitan Police's counter-terrorism unit.

He appeared at Westminster Magistrates' Court on Friday facing two charges under the Official Secrets Act relating to his former role as a "government contractor".

Joseph, from Sutton, south London, is accused of making a "damaging disclosure relating to security or intelligence" on 19 November last year and 13 January this year.

The court heard "he worked within the UK intelligence community and on parts of its estate", but the specific organisation he worked at was not disclosed.

Prosecutors said the disclosures are said to be "damaging to the work of the organisation within the UK intelligence community that the defendant worked in".

Joseph, who was representing himself at the hearing, indicated not guilty pleas to both of the charges.

He was remanded in custody by District Judge Michael Snow ahead of his next appearance at the Old Bailey on 14 February.

Joseph first appeared in court on Saturday but the case was adjourned as the charges needed the consent of Attorney General Lord Hermer, which the court heard was granted on Thursday.

https://news.sky.com/story/former-government-intelligence-contractor-charged-under-official-secrets-act-over-damaging-disclosures-13303948

Tnx AnonNI

Israel

IDF reservist charged in PM's office leak sharing prison cell with Navy soldier convicted of spying for Iran

7 January 2025, 9:38 pm

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-reservist-charged-in-pms-office-leak-sharing-prison-cell-with-navy-soldier-convicted-of-spying-for-iran/

Ari Rosenfeld, the IDF reservist charged in the Prime Minister's Office security documents theft and leak scandal, is sharing a prison cell with an Israeli Navy soldier convicted of spying for Iran, Channel 12 reports.

The Navy soldier was sentenced to 33 months in prison for sharing classified information with an Iranian agent, in a case that had not previously been cleared for publication.

The Navy soldier-turned-spy requested to be moved to a cell with Rosenfeld after growing concerned that the reservist would try and harm himself, according to the report, which added that he did so despite the conditions of the shared cell being considerably worse than those of the cell the Navy soldier was previously assigned to.

Channel 12 says that it received a copy of a letter written by Rosenfeld about the imprisoned Navy soldier, in which he expressed appreciation for "moving to those conditions with me, so that I wouldn't be alone, without the opportunity to cook or watch television."

"He constantly acted in my best interests even when it was at his own expense," Rosenfeld wrote.

While Rosenfeld is said to have appreciated the Navy soldier's decision to share a cell with him, not everyone is, Channel 12 reports, as his lawyer is concerned that her client's case been made public due to his proximity to Rosenfeld.

Speaking to the news outlet, attorney Hen Meiri says that until recently, "only three judges at the Haifa District Court were exposed to his case," she says. "It's not clear why the Israel Prison Service, with criminal negligence, decided to put this prisoner with the most publicized prisoner in the country."

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-reservist-charged-in-pms-office-leak-sharing-prison-cell-with-navy-soldier-convicted-of-spying-for-iran/

Philippines

Philippines' arrest of Chinese 'sleeper agent' sparks fears of widespread spying
A group comprising Deng Yuanqing and two Filipinos is accused of spying on Philippine military bases, including where US troops have access

The Philippines
Sam Beltran
Published: 3:00pm, 21 Jan 2025

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3295612/philippines-arrest-chinese-sleeper-agent-sparks-fears-widespread-spying?utm_source=whatsapp&utm_campaign=3295612&utm_medium=share_widget

Philippine authorities have arrested a Chinese national suspected of conducting espionage operations, recovering equipment in his possession that they believe might have been used for spying on military facilities.
Law enforcers and military officials presented the suspect, identified as Deng Yuanqing, at a press conference in Manila on Monday, and two Filipinos who were allegedly also involved in the case.

Officials from the Philippines' National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) said Deng was a "control engineering" specialist and was arrested with his Filipino companions in Makati City on January 17.

Authorities added that Deng was affiliated with the Army Engineering University of PLA (People's Liberation Army), a military university based in Nanjing.

NBI Director Jaime Santiago said local authorities received intelligence information about Deng and his group in December, indicating they had arrived in the Philippines to conduct surveillance on critical structures such as military bases and police camps.
Cybercrime chief Jeremy Lotoc said Deng, whom he dubbed a “sleeper agent”, might have been in the Philippines for about five years based on his passport.

Deng’s group had even managed to visit sites under the Philippines’ Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States, Armed Forces of the Philippines chief Romeo Brawner warned. US troops are allowed access to selected military bases in the Philippines under EDCA.

Authorities found data-gathering devices in their possession capable of sending sensitive information, such as exact coordinates and topographic details, which could be used for military targeting or drone operations.

They added that Deng and his group were also found surveying other locations such as airports, seaports, power facilities, and shopping malls.

The Chinese embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to a request from This Week in Asia for comment.

‘Expect weaknesses to be exploited’

Analysts said Deng’s arrest was unsurprising, with Beijing seeking to exploit Manila’s vulnerabilities as both sides remained embroiled in tensions over the disputed South China Sea.

The development happened just days after Chinese and Philippine diplomats met in Xiamen for the two countries’ 10th bilateral consultation mechanism (BCM) meeting, during which Manila pushed back against what it believed were rising incursions by China’s vessels in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Julio Amador, interim president of the Foundation for the National Interest and a trustee at the non-profit organisation Facts Asia, said the arrests confirmed that China could run covert operations in the Philippines, including “targeting our security infrastructures”.

Amador said Manila should summon Beijing to demand an explanation of the activities of Deng’s group and raise the matter in the next BCM.

Chester Cabalza, president of the Manila-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation, said the investigations showed sleeper agents “have faces, which tell us to even be more wary of hybrid warfare in a hyperconnected world”.

“Cyber warriors look like any ordinary people with an extraordinary mission to gather information, scan and send data, and plot future scenarios to weaken our institutions,” he said, adding that the incident would deepen Manila’s doubts about Beijing’s sincerity in establishing a credible BCM.

Sherwin Ona, an international fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan, said malign actors in China were long aware of ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of security and other systems in the Philippines, such as through the now-banned offshore gaming operators (Pogos), which had been suspected of carrying out espionage activities.

“In the past, we were complacent in accepting development assistance and loans [from Beijing], whose onerous terms can also be used to influence local officials. Plus, China knows the country has limited maritime domain awareness and cyber abilities,” Ona said.

The presence of EDCA sites in the Philippines posed a “direct threat to the PRC’s intention in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait”. “Therefore, surveillance of these sites is crucial,” he added.

Analysts believe such espionage cases will continue alongside other China-led cyber and disinformation acts. As such, Cabalza called for a robust national ID system in the Philippines to counter such activities.

Last year, over 1,000 Chinese nationals were found to have acquired fraudulent identity documents in the Philippines, such as birth certificates and national IDs.

“The government should hasten a flawless system and legal remedy to include cyber espionage, severely punishable under our domestic laws,” Cabalza said.

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3295612/philippines-arrest-chinese-sleeper-agent-sparks-fears-widespread-spying?utm_source=whatsapp&utm_campaign=3295612&utm_medium=share_widget

Russia

How Russia trains its deep undercover spies
Moscow's elite 'illegal' sleeper agents pose as foreigners and live under false identities known as 'legends', often for decades

By Harriet Marsden, The Week UK
published 7 August 2024

https://theweek.com/defence/how-russia-trains-its-deep-undercover-spies

The Russian plane that landed in Moscow last week carried an "assortment of spies, assassins and criminals" – half of the biggest prisoner exchange between Russia and the US since the Cold War.

But the prisoner-exchange flight, greeted on the tarmac by Vladimir Putin, also carried two "wide-eyed and confused" children, said The Guardian. Sofia, 11, and Daniel, eight, were born in Argentina and then moved with their parents to a suburb of the Slovenian capital Ljubljana. The children spoke Spanish at home and studied English at an international school, while their mother ran an online art gallery.

The gallery though was a "front for Russian intelligence", said The New York Times. It was part of "an elaborate network of deep-cover sleeper spies" trained by Russia. The children had no idea that their parents, Maria Mayer and Ludwig Gisch, were Anna Dultseva and Artem Dultsev, caught in December 2022: one of the most high-profile cases of famed Russian "illegals" since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

What are 'illegal' sleeper spies?

Spies broadly fall into two categories. Most are "legals", sent to foreign embassies to work at diplomatic jobs while secretly gathering intelligence. So-called "illegals" are elite spies who live under false identities known as "legends" – sometimes for decades, like the Dultsevs.

Illegals spend years "infiltrating the target region, building complete false lives which enable them to move about freely", said The Daily Telegraph. It's "costly, time-consuming and fraught with risk". But the advantage of an illegal is that "they can go places where a Russian can't", said Gordon Corera, author of "Russians Among Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories and the Hunt for Putin's Agents".

It is "almost impossible for counterintelligence services to uncover illegals", John Sipher, formerly deputy director of the CIA's Russia operations, told The Guardian last year. It's "almost always a human source" that passes information from Western intelligence which allows illegals to be uncovered. The Dultsevs, for example, were arrested in December 2022 after a tip-off from a source in Britain.

Marjan Miklavcic, the former head of Slovenia's military intelligence, told The New York Times that sleeper agents were often planted with "no clear mission": a "hidden reserve force" that could be activated in a crisis. That makes them Russia's "most prized assets", said The Guardian.

How does Russia create and train them?
During the Spanish Civil War, Soviet agents stole passports from foreigners who had enlisted to fight Franco's fascist regime, and used these to create "deep cover" identities. Russia could be using the same tactics now, former FBI counterintelligence officer Kevin Riehle told Business Insider. Thousands of foreigners from all over the world have signed up to fight in Ukraine – both for Kyiv and for Russian mercenary groups.

Russian intelligence might also comb newspapers for death notices of children, and those identities can then be used to obtain passports for agents. But post-9/11 technology, such as biometric passports, has made it more difficult to fake identity papers. Traditionally illegals train for about six years – an "expensive and detailed process", said Business Insider. But one detail is "almost impossible to eliminate": accents.

The Dultsevs reportedly spoke perfect, largely accent-free Spanish. But US student Richard Murphy – later revealed to be Vladimir Guryev, and arrested for espionage in 2010 as part of the group that inspired "The Americans" – "looked like Boris Yeltsin and had a heavy Russian accent", his teacher told The New York Times.

What has changed in the past few years?
"The past few years were awful for Russian spies," said The Economist. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service's presence in Europe was "eviscerated" after the beginning of the Ukraine war, with about 600 diplomats and officers – "legals" – expelled from embassies across the continent. In November 2022, the head of MI5 called the mass expulsion "the most significant strategic blow against Russian intelligence services in recent European history".

Several cases of illegals being uncovered last year have led experts to believe that Russia is "gearing up" its deep-cover programme, said Business Insider. They also believe that Russia has evolved "new techniques" and has turned to a new region of the world to obtain fake identities: South America. There, corruption is "rife" and the Kremlin can "count on the support of decades-old allies".

Putin, a former KGB foreign intelligence officer, has "thrown huge resources at this quite eccentric priority", said Calder Walton, the director of research for the Intelligence Project at Harvard's Kennedy School. He has a "real fetish" for illegals, Walton told The New York Times. He publicly praises Russia's "courageous" spies, characterising becoming an illegal as a patriotic act of self-sacrifice and heroism.

"Artem and Anna Dultsev have returned to Russia to a hero's welcome," said The Telegraph. "For their blameless children, however, the struggle to understand what has happened to them has only just begun."

https://theweek.com/defence/how-russia-trains-its-deep-undercover-spies

Taiwan

7 Taiwanese retired military officers charged with spying for China
Indicted for breaking National Security Act and Anti-Infiltration Act

Jan. 8, 2025 16:50

Keoni Everington
Taiwan News, Staff Writer
3027

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6010285

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Seven retired military officers have been indicted for allegedly receiving funds to conduct espionage for the PLA.

On Wednesday, the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office Taichung Branch said the case originated in 2022. Miaoli District Prosecutors Office investigated Miaoli County Councilor candidate Huang Kuei-kun (黃桂坤) for allegedly receiving funds from China, in violation of the Anti-infiltration Act (反滲透法).

Miaoli prosecutors traced the matter to the Rehabilitation Alliance Party and suspected the National Security Act (國家安全法) was being flouted. This prompted them to transfer the case to the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office in Taichung.

Prosecutors found that 62-year-old Chu Hung-i (屈宏義), a retired Army officer, worked for China following his retirement. In 2019, he was in touch with a PLA intelligence agency, which promised money to recruit retired military personnel in Taiwan.

Hsu recruited six retired officers, including Huang Kuei-kun (黃桂坤). Chu then began drafting plans such as the “Rehabilitation Alliance Plan” and the “China Unified Rehabilitation Alliance Operation Plan.”

They included forming a political party, and establishing internal armed forces.

In 2023, Chu established the Rehabilitation Alliance Party and served as its chair. He recruited three candidates, including 71-year-old actor Liu Shang-Chien (劉尚謙) and local figures, to run for legislative seats.

Chu requested funds from his contacts at the PLA intelligence agency. The agency transferred nearly NT$2 million (US$60,000) through the messaging app WeChat and an additional 150,000 yuan (NT$670,000) via underground banking channels. However, none of the candidates were elected.

Chu instructed his organization's leaders to collect a list of military officers at the rank of major general and above. They were also directed to photograph the exterior of the American Institute in Taiwan and four important military sites, including Alishan Radar Station, Jialutang Beach, and the Joint Operations Training Base Commands in Hengchun and Baoli.

Chu and his accomplices were to create maps and coordinates and deliver them to their Chinese contacts via WeChat and other methods.

When questioned by prosecutors, Chu and the other defendants claimed the funds were for business expenses related to appraising antiques for "Chinese friends." They claimed to be unaware of the purpose when asked by the Chinese to photograph the exterior of military bases.

After the case was investigated by the Taichung Branch of the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office, in August, Chu and six others were indicted on charges of breaking the National Security Act, the Anti-Infiltration Act, and other offenses. Chu was detained after the prosecution's request was approved and has been in custody since then.

The other defendants have been restricted from leaving the country. The case is being tried by the Taichung Branch of the Taiwan High Court.

The defendants face prison sentences of at least seven years and fines ranging from NT$50 million to NT$100 million.

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6010285

A cut undersea internet cable is making Taiwan worried about 'gray zone' tactics from Beijing

Simone McCarthy
Analysis by Wayne Chang and Simone McCarthy, CNN

Updated 12:48 AM EST, Fri January 10, 2025

https://edition.cnn.co m/2025/01/09/china/undersea-cable-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

When a Taiwanese telecoms company detected that an international undersea cable was damaged earlier this month, it worked to divert internet traffic from the broken line to keep customers on the island connected.

But the company, Chunghwa Telecom, also went to Taiwan's Coast Guard to report the incident – and a "suspicious vessel" observed on the same route as the affected cable, according to a statement from the company, a major local internet provider.

Taiwan Coast Guard officials in the days since have said they suspect that the Shunxin39 – a Chinese-linked cargo vessel – could have cut the cable, in an incident that has spotlighted the island's growing concerns about vulnerabilities that could be exploited by Beijing.

Taiwan officials have not cited direct evidence that the ship damaged the cable, and the Taiwan Coast Guard said in a statement Monday that it could not determine the vessel's intentions. It called for South Korea, the ship's destination, to help with further investigation.

But the situation has raised concerns among Taiwanese authorities of potential "gray zone operations," or acts that fall below the threshold of war – in particular those that could hamper the island's internet and communications with the outside world.

Those concerns come as Taiwan has faced increasing intimidation from Beijing, which claims the self-ruled democracy as its own territory and has vowed to take control of it, by force if necessary.

They also follow a string of incidents in recent years of damage to undersea infrastructure worldwide, including communications cables. Two high-profile incidents in the Baltic Sea involved Chinese ships and remain under investigation.

Taiwan's Coast Guard said in a statement Monday that the ship suspected of damaging the cable off its northeastern coast last Friday was a Cameroon- and Tanzania-flagged vessel, crewed by seven Chinese nationals.

The vessel is owned by Hong Kong company Jie Yang Trading Limited, which is directed by a Chinese national, a senior Coast Guard official confirmed separately to CNN. While there was no direct evidence the vessel sabotaged the submarine cable, radar showed the vessel passed by when the cable was cut, the official said.

"As of now we cannot ascertain its real intentions, but based on what we see so far, we won't rule out the possibility of China destroying the cable through 'gray zone operations,'" the senior official told CNN.

Such an act could be part of Beijing-backed efforts to use "ships with flags of convenience to cut Taiwan's international communication as a form of preparation for future blockade and quarantine," according to the official.

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said on Wednesday that submarine cable damage is a "common maritime incident," and balked at Taipei's "conjecturing" and "deliberate framing of gray zone threats."

Two independent analysts told CNN that tracking data on the Shunxin39 showed atypical behavior for a cargo vessel, describing a meandering or erratic path. The ship was also found to be using two different positioning system numbers, according to the Taiwan Coast Guard, which is also seen by experts as unusual for standard cargo operations.

Chinese national Guo Wenjie, director of the company operating the vessel, denied in a statement to news agency Reuters on Wednesday that the ship was responsible for the damage.

"There's no evidence at all," he told Reuters by telephone. "I spoke to the ship captain and for us it was a normal trip." CNN was unable to independently reach Guo, but public records list him as the sole shareholder of Jie Yang Trading Limited.

A new 'gray zone' tactic?

In 2023, Taiwanese authorities blamed two Chinese ships for damaging two submarine internet cables linked to Taiwan's outlying island of Matsu in incidents days apart causing an internet blackout, but stopped short of saying they were deliberate acts.

Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said more evidence is needed to say whether the latest incident was intentional.

But he said Taiwan needs to bolster maritime surveillance and defense of submarine cables.

"Once submarine cables are sabotaged, Taiwan's connectivity to the international community will be severed; we can then only rely on bandwidth provided by satellites, which would then affect our digital economy, international trade and banking," he said, calling such potential sabotage a form of "psychological warfare."

Other observers have suggested the recent incident could be part of a trial of such tactics.

"While it doesn't look to me like part of an effort to seriously impede Taiwan's connectivity with the world … it could be consistent with either a campaign to apply low-level harassment, or as a test run for something that could be done at a larger scale at a later date in conjunction with other coercive operations," said Tom Shugart, a retired US Navy captain and adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington.

A Taiwanese flag flies at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei on October 15, 2024.
Related article
Taiwan's presidential office runs first 'tabletop' simulation of Chinese military escalation

Taiwan has seen a surge of Chinese military activities in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific in recent months, in line with a ramping up of intimidation over the past few years. Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have plied regional waters, and there has been an increase in Chinese aircraft operating around the island.

But Taiwan officials and defense experts have increasingly focused on the potential for Beijing to use gray zone tactics and non-military actors like China Coast Guard and various police and maritime safety agencies – as well as a so-called maritime militia of civilian ships – to quarantine the island or play a role in a blockade if it wanted to move to take control.

In a first-of-its kind "tabletop" exercise simulating military escalations by China late last month, multiple government agencies were tasked with responding to a broader base of threats than an armed invasion, including information warfare.

One official highlighted then how government agencies struggled to clarify falsehoods during electricity or internet outages, highlighting the need for Taiwan to have a backup mechanism to ensure the flow of information.

Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs earlier this week said it has been working on initiatives aimed at strengthening Taiwan's communications by exploring alternative internet options including low-Earth-orbit satellites and adding new submarine cable stations.

Last month, Taiwan's tech tzar Wu Cheng-wen told reporters in a briefing that in addition to working with LEO satellite company OneWeb, the island is also in talks with Amazon's Project Kuiper for satellite collaborations.

A spate of sabotage?
Those efforts may only appear more urgent to observers amid a spate of incidents where Chinese and Russian vessels have come under scrutiny.

Swedish police have sought to investigate the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 in relation to its possible role in the breach of two undersea fiber-optic cables in the Baltic Sea in November. The incident had echoes of a 2023 case in which Chinese ship NewNew Polar Bear was suspected of damaging undersea cables as well as a gas pipeline in the Baltic.

Finnish investigators late last month seized a tanker carrying Russian oil and said they suspected the vessel had damaged the Finnish-Estonian Estlink 2 power line and several internet cables by dragging its anchor across the seabed.

Damage to submarine cables in the Red Sea last March disrupted telecoms networks in the region weeks after the official Yemeni government warned of the possibility that Houthi rebels would target the cables, though the group denied involvement.

While damage to cables is not rare and is often seen as accidental, analysts warn that the recent cases also underscore vulnerabilities.

Shugart of CNAS said that there does seem to be a number of breakages recently that seem to have been deliberate, including those done "by or for Russian or Chinese interests."

"This is going to be a quite challenging issue to police, as most of these cables run through international waters where traditional international law allows enforcement only in very narrow areas," he said.

https://edition.cnn.co m/2025/01/09/china/undersea-cable-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html

United States

Chinese spy balloon contents revealed two years after it was shot down over US

Story by Tim Hanlon

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/chinese-spy-balloon-contents-revealed-two-years-after-it-was-shot-down-over-us/ar-AA1yPtGq?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=2ea8b8ac097b4311931b33df99d451e2&ei=14

Mystery over a Chinese spy balloon that was shot down after the crossing the United States has taken another twist.

The massive white orb led to a diplomatic crisis in 2023 between the US and China as well causing a storm on social media with debate about what it was doing.

It flew over sensitive airbases and nuclear missiles in underground silos during its path across the country with the United States saying it was a Chinese spy balloon without doubt.

And it led in February, 2023, to then Secretary of State Antony Blinken to cancel a weekend trip to China that was aimed at dialing down tensions that were already high between the countries.

The Pentagon said the balloon, which was carrying sensors and surveillance equipment, was manoeuvrable and showed it could change course. It loitered over sensitive areas of Montana where nuclear warheads are siloed, leading the military to take actions to prevent it from collecting intelligence.

A US Air Force fighter jet shot down the balloon off the Carolina coast. Television footage showed a small explosion, followed by the balloon slowly drifting toward the water. An operation is underway to recover the remnants. And now two years on, two military sources told Newsweek that the giant orb was packed with US technology which may have aided the Chinese to spy on the US.

Officials found that the balloon had US-made satellite communication modules and sensors from at least five US companies. And a classified report has shown that technology helped the spy balloon to take photos and store sensitive information, states the outlet. At the time China insisted the balloon was just an errant civilian airship used mainly for meteorological research that went off course due to winds and had only limited "self-steering" capabilities. It also issued a threat of "further actions."

In a statement after the craft was shot down, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the use of force by the US was "an obvious overreaction and a serious violation of international practice. It added: "China will resolutely uphold the relevant company's legitimate rights and interests, and at the same time reserving the right to take further actions in response."

The Pentagon said that the balloon, about the size of three school buses moved at an altitude of about 60,000 feet and first entered US air defence north of the Aleutian Islands on January 28.

It was shot down on February 4 about six nautical miles off the coast of South Carolina, a single F-22 fighter jet from Virginia's Langley Air Force Base — flying at an altitude of 58,000 feet — fired an AIM-9X Sidewinder into it. The Sidewinder is a short-range missile used by the Navy and Air Force primarily for air-to-air engagements, the missile is about 10 feet long and weighs about 200 pounds.

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/chinese-spy-balloon-contents-revealed-two-years-after-it-was-shot-down-over-us/ar-AA1yPtGq?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=2ea8b8ac097b4311931b33df99d451e2&ei=14

Morse Stations

All frequencies listed in kHz. Freqs are generally +- 1k
This is a representative sample of the logs received, giving an indication of station behaviour and the range of times/freqs heard. These need to be read in conjunction with any other articles/charts/comments appended to this issue.

UNID CW

UM05 – The Mystery French Station

The station was not reported after 29 November 2024 & having not reappeared in December, there was speculation as to whether the station had moved, once again, to another new frequency or had ceased completely. However, on 06 January 2025 we were greeted with this posting from Ary, (AB):-

It's back! Indeed, UM05 was back operating on the same frequency of 7542.8kHz.

7542.8	1328z	06 Jan	UM05	CTE, G, Vert, Portecles	AB	MON

Hugh Stegman from Utility World confirmed the station's return using a French SDR:-

7542.8	2025z	06 Jan	UM05	Repeating "MESSAGE,"	Hugh Stegman	MON

With these additional logs from Hand-Friedrich, (HFD):-

7542.8	1314z	07 Jan	UM05	SOLEIL	HFD	TUE
	2025z	09 Jan	UM05	CONCLUSION	HFD	THU
	1004z	12 Jan	UM05	NAGER	HFD	SUN

1727z	13 Feb	UM05	POMME	HFD	THU	

Ary, (AB), noted that the station went silent from Wednesday, 15 January but he was able to report its return to the frequency on Friday, 31 January.

7542.8	1700z	31 Jan	UM05	Serpent (R), Eruption (R), *etc.*	AB	FRI

UM05 – Report from PoSW

Peter, (PoSW), had also been monitoring UM05 on a regular basis & sends us this report:

UM05 CW on 7542.8 returned for a while but has not been heard in the last days of February.

Return of UM05 CW to 7542.8 kHz:-
This Morse station had been active on 7542.8 in the later months of 2024 and had vanished in early December but was back in mid-February of this year - and perhaps before that:- A chance discovery on my part; while waiting for a possible S06 transmission on 6792 at 1630 UTC I was idly stepping through the memories on the receiver at around 1624 UTC - into one of which the UM05 frequency was stored and was surprised to find this station back again. Perhaps it had been back for some time.

15-Feb-25, Sat:- 1624 UTC, Sending “COLLEGE”. Checking the frequency at 1823 UTC, “ASSIETTE”.

16-Feb-25, Sun:- 0818 UTC, “ROUGEGORGE”. 1909 UTC, “PAPILLON”.

Was heard on the following days but appeared to cease activity again at some time after the 24-Feb. A few observations:-

19-Feb-25, Wed:- “0904 UTC, “ETOILES”.

20-Feb-25, Thu:- 0900 UTC, “CIEL”.

23-Feb-24, Sun:- “1004 UTC, “CISEAUX”.

24-Feb-25, Mon:- 0720 UTC:- Sending “F”. Paused around 0722 then came back with “RECHERCHE”.

Nothing heard when this frequency was monitored on 26-Feb at approx.. 0725, 0850 and 1635 UTC and not heard in the remaining days of February.

[Thanks Peter]

Morse - Number Stations

M01/ 1 XIV MCW, hand (197 sched for Nov - Feb). Will change to M01/2 sched ID 463 for Mar - Apr.

From the beginning of October 2022, all M01 transmissions sent have used a single carrier vs usual 'Two-Tone' transmission mode.

January 2025:

4490	2000z	07 Jan	'197' 808 30 80808 34299 … 84732 86533	Weak, fast. No = = otherwise no errors. Excellent Morse	BR/Gert TUE
	2000z	09 Jan	'197' 886 30 = = Very weak. Very poor copy – Unusable		BR THU
	2000z	14 Jan	'197' 215 30 = = 82736 47829 … 38293 10290 = =	Fair with QSB, fast. Good Morse. No errors	BR TUE
	2000z	16 Jan	'197' . . . . 37654 37853 … 90374 37654	Weak/Fair. Very poor copy at start. = = missing at end	BR THU
	2000z	23 Jan	'197' 897 30 = = 58472 19853 … 58731 48712 = =	Fair, Noisy with QSB. Excellent Morse. Errors noted	BR THU
	2000z	28 Jan	'197' 788 30 80320 58439 … 85439 19284	Good, fast. Excellent Morse. = = missing at start & end	BR TUE
	2000z	30 Jan	'197' 312 30 = = 37645 64532 … 65574 65344 = =	Fair with QSB. Difficult copy in places. Errors noted	BR THU
5320	1800z	07 Jan	NRH UK - Very weak via SDR Finland. No useful copy		BR TUE
	1800z	09 Jan	'197' 123 30 = = 56784 17263 … . . . . = =	Good until grp15,then QSB, faded, unusable from grp18	BR THU
	1800z	14 Jan	'197' 355 30 = = 82736 74658 … 83702 73648 = =	Fair with QSB, fast. Good Morse. Corrected error Grp05	BR TUE
	1800z	16 Jan	'197' 340 30 = = 34657 12341 … 36754 98873 = =	Good, fast. Errors in Grps09 & 12	BR THU
	1800z	28 Jan	'197' 456 30 49032 48392 … 17439 84377	Good, fast. Excellent Morse. = = missing at start & end	BR TUE
	1800z	30 Jan	'197' 832 30 = = 47536 12036 … 56231 56334 = =	Fair with QSB. Hesitant in places. One error noted grp13	BR THU
5465	0700z	05 Jan	'197' 162 30 = = 54639 40938 … 20917 19584 = =	Fair, fast. Excellent Morse. Perfect send with no errors	BR SUN
5810	1500z	25 Jan	'197' 192 30 = = 19234 58192 … 57491 48392 = =	Fair, fast. First 20 grps good followed by string / errors	BR SAT

February 2025:

4490	2000z	04 Feb	'197' 421 30 = = 62344 45672 … 56712 46754 = =	Good, fast. Errors noted in call up & grps 13 & 14	BR TUE
	2000z	06 Feb	'197' 644 30 68798 15423 … 48789 49090	Good, fast. Excellent Morse. No errors = = missing	BR THU
	2000z	18 Feb	'197' 887 30 = = 68755 23433 … 48765 12344 = =	Fair, fast. Excellent Morse. One error & one DK at end	BR TUE
	2000z	20 Feb	'197' 427 30 90901 85493 … 84230 85434	Fair/Good with QSB. Excellent Morse = = missing	BR THU
	2000z	25 Feb	'197' 430 30 = = 82930 94873 … 20192 29384 = =	Good, fast with QSB. Excellent Morse. Perfect sending!	BR TUE
5320	1800z	04 Feb	'197' 617 30 = = 45632 12937 … 12388 36745 = =	Fair, fast with QSB. Difficult copy in places. No errors	BR TUE
	1800z	06 Feb	'197' 357 30 44756 22431 … 79809 23354	Weak/Fair with QSB. Excellent Morse. QRM from QSO	BR THU
5810	1500z	01 Feb	'197' 142 30 = = 47398 18716 … 16524 01756 = =	Weak/Fair with QSB. Good Morse. No errors. Perfect	BR SAT
	1500z	08 Feb	'197' 298 30 = = 75612 93013 … 34155 76431 = =	Fair, fast. Excellent Morse. Errors in grps 27 – 28	BR SAT

M01/1 5465kHz 0700z 05 January 2024

197 (R4m) 162 162 30 30 = =

54639 40938 39847 13151 10487 33091 60387 15261 20918 39018
83101 31426 20187 10338 30947 49503 11094 66047 40917 17648
20937 38716 29817 16527 98473 29487 29817 80631 20917 19584

= = 162 162 30 30 000

Courtesy BR

M01/1 4490kHz 2000z 07 January 2024

197 (R4m) 808 803 30 30

80808 34299 10293 75432 85492 39284 19230 85430 82367 86759
38274 23489 10239 75643 83721 86549 20394 75634 86590 74325
57483 89023 86754 83249 94382 88543 94830 83212 84732 86533

808 808 30 30 0 0 0

Courtesy Gert

M12 IB ICW, some MCW / CW, short 0. Reuses many freqs year on year.

New ID's may be only for the month/sched shown, but not necessarily unknown. The reason for their reuse, some after long periods of time is unknown.

Asiatic M12 Logs

16253/15953/14453	0010/30/50z	03 Jan	294 1	(Via SDR Japan)	HFD	FRI
14673/13373/12173	0300/20/40z	07 Jan	641 1	(Via SDR Japan)	HFD	TUE
17461/16161/15861	0010/30/50z	03 Feb	418 1	(Via SDR Japan)	HFD	MON
17437/15937/14537	0300/20/40z	04 Feb	495 1	(Vis SDR Japan)	HFD	TUE

European M12 Logs

January 2025: **New scheds in bold type**

5778/6778/8178	2200/20/40z	03 Jan	771 000		HFD	FRI
	2200/20/40z	04 Jan	771 000		BR	SAT
	2200/20/40z	10 Jan	771 000		BR	FRI
	2200/20/40z	11 Jan	771 000		BR	SAT
	2200/20/40z	17 Jan	771 1 (8269 156)	90856 88989…. 65656 79697 000 000	Gert	FRI
	2200/20/40z	18 Jan	771 1 (8269 156)	90856 88989….	BR	SAT
	2200/20/40z	24 Jan	771 1 (8269 156)	90856 88989 … 65656 79697 000 000	Gert	FRI
	2200/20/40z	31 Jan	887 1 (711 201)	73958 75504….	BR	FRI
6782/5882/5182	2000/20/40z	01 Jan	781 000		HFD	WED
	2000/20/40z	03 Jan	781 000		BR	FRI
	2000/20/40z	08 Jan	781 1 (5102 90)	02217 31374….	BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	15 Jan	781 1 (5102 90)	02217 31374….	BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	17 Jan	781 1 (5102 90)	02217 31374….	BR	FRI
	2000/20/40z	24 Jan	781 000		BR	FRI
	2000/20/40z	29 Jan	781 1 (543 43)	68802 77479….	BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	31 Jan	781 1 (543 43)	68802 77479….	BR	FRI
11079/10279/9179	2300/20/40z	06 Jan	136 1 (772 51)	37672 14921….	BR/HFD	MON
	2300/20/40z	09 Jan	136 1 (772 51)	37672 14921….	BR	THU
	2300/20/40z	13 Jan	136 000		BR	MON
	2300/20/40z	20 Jan	136 1 (2659 89)	09255 01794….	BR	MON
	2300/20/40z	23 Jan	136 1 (2659 89)	09255 01794….	BR	THU
	2300/20/40z	30 Jan	136 1 (2659 89)	09255 01794….	BR	THU
11161/10461/9261	2310/30/50z	01 Jan	142 1 (9953 137)	98823 38275….	BR	WED
	2310/30/50z	05 Jan	142 1 (9953 137)	98823 38275….	BR/HFD	SUN
	2310/30/50z	08 Jan	142 1 (580 236)	31662 9 .441…. [Note 1]	BR	WED
	2310/30/50z	12 Jan	142 1 (580 236)	31662 98441….	BR	WED
	2310/30/50z	15 Jan	142 1 (3279 281)	32531 79021….	BR	WED
	2310/30/50z	19 Jan	142 1 (3279 281)	32531 79021….	BR	SUN
	2310/30/50z	22 Jan	142 1 (165 141)	65673 98833….	BR	WED
	2310/30/50z	29 Jan	142 1 (576 98)	06885 07621….	BR	WED
11435/10598/9327	1800/20/40z	09 Jan	938 1 (2729 76)	51803 30257….28436 95845 000 000	Gert	THU
	1800/20/40z	16 Jan	938 1 (6033 80)	28489 85333….	BR	THU
	1800/20/40z	23 Jan	938 1 (8910 80)	31924 08161….	BR	THU
	1800/20/40z	30 Jan	938 1 (4521 80)	33729 92660….	BR	THU
11519/12194/13407	1100/20/40z	21 Jan	289 1 (6701 61)	76661 50194….	BR	TUE
	1100/20/40z	28 Jan	289 1 (4808 55)	54019 46642….	BR	TUE

[Note 1 – 11161kHz NRH in UK. Monitored via SDR Finland with fair signal]

February 2025:

5832/6832/7732	2200/20/40z	01 Feb	887 1 (711 201)	73958 75504….	BR/HFD	SAT
	2200/20/40z	08 Feb	887 1 (711 201)	73958 75504….	BR	SAT
	2200/20/40z	14 Feb	887 1 (5932 246)	00303 01968….	BR	FRI
	2200/20/40z	21 Feb	887 1 (5932 246)	00303 01968….	BR	FRI
	2200/20/40z	21 Feb	887 1 (5932 246)	00303 01968….	BR	SAT
	2200/20/40z	28 Feb	887 1 (3054 93)	16737 40643….	BR	FRI
7674/6874/5774	2000/20/40z	05 Feb	687 1 (6162 39)	84914 43037….	BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	07 Feb	687 1 (6162 39)	84914 43037….	BR/HFD	FRI
	2000/20/40z	12 Feb	687 1 (378 77)	14874 91005….	BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	14 Feb	687 1 (378 77)	14874 91005….	BR	FRI
	2000/20/40z	19 Feb	687 1 (378 77)	14874 91005….	BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	21 Feb	687 1 (378 77)	14874 91005….	BR	FRI
	2000/20/40z	26 Feb	687 000		BR	WED
	2000/20/40z	28 Feb	687 000		BR	FRI

9362/8062/7462	2300/20/40z	03 Feb	451 000			BR	MON
	2300/20/40z	06 Feb	451 000			BR	THU
	2300/20/40z	10 Feb	451 1			HFD	MON
	2300/20/40z	13 Feb	451 1 (5388 43)	96830 27282….		BR	THU
	2300/20/40z	17 Feb	451 000			BR	MON
	2300/20/40z	20 Feb	451 000			BR	THU
	2300/20/40z	24 Feb	451 1 (2976 73)	64198 90936….		BR	MON
	2300/20/40z	27 Feb	451 1 (2976 73)	64198 90936….57671 15950 000 000		Gert	THU
11435/10598/9327	1800/20/40z	13 Feb	938 1 (9741 84)	64094 01633….		BR	THU
11519/12194/13407	1100/20/40z	04 Feb	289 1 (8879 57)	06256 19275….		BR	TUE
1100/20/40z	11 Feb	298 1 (8095 56)	80994 05987….		BR	TUE	
1100/20/40z	18 Feb	289 1 (6403 61)	95143 17678….07162 05035 000 000		AB	TUE	
1100/20/40z	25 Feb	289 1 (3035 61)	38957 38480….		BR	TUE	
12137/10937/10237	2310/30/50z	02 Feb	192 1 (576 98)	06885 07621….		BR/HFD	SUN
	2310/30/50z	09 Feb	192 1 (6179 174)	. . .96 11793….	Poor copy	BR	SUN
	2310/30/50z	12 Feb	192 1 (995 . 5)	. . . .	Very poor copy	BR	SUN
	2310/30/50z	16 Feb	192 1 (785 265)	83541 22072….		BR	SUN
	2310/30/50z	19 Feb	192 000			BR	WED
	2310/30/50z	23 Feb	192 000			BR	SUN
	2310/300/50z	26 Feb	192 000			BR	WED

M12 11435/10598/9327kHz 1800/1820/1840z 09 Jan 2025

938 938 938 1 (R2m) 2729 76 2729 76

51803 30257 50338 41496 32982 66129 20944 42749 80758 96153
91548 02345 36258 80789 68329 01674 91682 79183 40750 00920
28741 19605 57500 23869 23034 13816 94337 02335 06402 85943
12819 24715 87564 83760 46715 31154 80932 92265 69670 70432
72482 32895 54499 91386 55569 00021 34127 44379 48979 56626
11701 86936 82567 18460 90352 32197 72756 26468 18461 19166
71790 18608 36347 94814 83333 66833 14779 52497 34074 37175
20740 99415 09512 70316 28436 95845 000 000

Courtesy Gert

M12 11519/12194/13407kHz 1100/1120/1140z 18 Feb 2025

289 289 289 289 1 (R2m) 6403 61 6403 61

95143 17678 92698 10702 72129 16892 86750 87532 65852 45462
19206 45532 25128 02921 48601 22167 07522 06182 06696 15211
88293 57122 21132 75934 86371 64966 11856 22286 48304 18993
22136 28546 18647 14184 00592 30184 89057 97149 50626 31860
67412 40991 38339 58786 41034 90231 94319 43258 62369 64712
58275 02462 04660 88219 71774 38021 96544 16764 24329 07162
05035 000 000

Courtesy AB

M12 5778/6778/8178kHz 2200/2220/2240z 17 Jan 2025

M12 5778/6778/8178kHz 2200/2220/2240z 24 Jan 2025

771 771 771 1 (R2m) 8269 156 8269 156

90856 88989 29797 94016 36345 28778 33515 00179 84499 28445
43928 99842 80559 26430 45885 22706 91353 60175 07485 23058
12880 59307 34422 20812 66971 43232 81819 67132 29575 67260
38111 04489 24881 82152 46463 26041 92875 38305 00438 17676
30638 97660 89133 81344 50009 13173 84448 33433 70304 44892
79544 15064 04995 41072 22054 24715 29157 22979 08349 91181
71699 29972 95096 42241 92192 42487 18459 24504 79457 39533
60398 67427 10786 09600 50754 96997 28728 66384 51841 93788
45289 43964 68877 01609 71174 40459 69520 19636 83989 54317
11215 17643 51115 12757 37933 05037 70877 87979 53023 83830
24751 25250 17320 49135 45213 78901 31542 00723 23997 00372
58203 41906 51647 18056 37981 78657 38819 89966 00917 91976
54173 65810 88286 46509 64323 42993 30661 64999 51428 75300
84947 03477 78299 86887 44812 25829 51763 45287 15961 48315
51292 69232 77280 47414 47986 41683 37926 52332 24380 40484
27371 69694 31830 59740 65656 79697 000 000

Courtesy Gert

M14 IA MCW / ICW Short 0

17458	0930z	10 Jan	617 00000	Gert	FRI

M23 O ICW

No Reports

Morse Stations - Not Number Related

M51 XlX

3881//6825 100 grp 5-ltr messages with headers

No reports – M51b format in use

M51a (FAV22) Daily Mon - Fri, Sun & some Sats. See NL 72 for details

Noted as frequently missing from the usual two frequencies during February, including for some of the daily Morse lessons.

3881//6825

1230 - 1318z	03 Feb	Lundi-Leçon	11-2/1 Codé	11-2/2 Clair,	11-2/3 Codé,	11-21/4 Clair (420 grps/hr)	BR	MON
1230 - 1254z	20 Feb	Jeudi- Leçon	04-2/1 Codé,	04-2/2 Clair,	04-2/3 Codé,	04-2/4 Clair (840 grps/hr)	BR	THU

M51b Non-stop 5-character groups composed of M51a messages on 3881//6825kHz

3881//6825

1250z 20 Feb Following Morse lesson called V V V DE F9TM followed by QSO with unheard stn. BR THU

Peter (PoSW), also noted the breaks in M51b activity on their two home frequencies, but still managed to catch the station on a number of occasions & sends us this detailed report:-

M51b - Report from PoSW

French Morse Station M51b on 6825//3881 kHz:-

This station sending fast groups of five characters seems to be working to a somewhat variable schedule although no doubt propagation plays a part, sometimes a very strong signal and sometimes much weaker or nothing heard at all. A few observations from the last couple of months:-

08-Jan-25, Wednesday:- 0753 UTC, 3881 kHz, strong CW, nothing audible on 6825 but might be due to propagation because there was a good signal on this frequency when checked at 0824.

14-Jan-25, Tuesday:- 0656 UTC, 3881 kHz, strong CW, nothing on 6825.

16-Jan-25, Thursday:- 0710, 3881 kHz, nothing on 6825 but was there when monitored at approx.. 0755 UTC. Sunrise at 0801 today.
0924 UTC:- 3881 weak, 6825 stronger, stopped around 0930 UTC then went into slow "VVV VVV VVV DE FAV22 FAV22 FAV22 QLH 3881/6825 kHz" routine.

17-Jan-25, Friday:- Nothing heard on either frequency when monitored at 0706 UTC but both running with fast CW at 0839, 6825 strong signal, 3881 weaker.

26-Jan-25, Sunday:- 1612 UTC, good signal on 6825, nothing audible on 3881.

11-Feb-25, Tuesday:- 0751 UTC, strong signal on 3881, 6825 weaker.
12-Feb-25, Wednesday:- Nothing heard on either frequency when monitored several times during the day.

19-Feb-25, Wednesday:- 0749 UTC, fast CW, strong signal on 6825, weaker on 3881. Checked again at around 1230 UTC, was going into the slow "VVV DE FAV22...." routine on 6825.
1940 UTC, strong signal on 3881, 6825 weaker.

24-Feb-25, Monday:- 0717 UTC, 6825 kHz, 3881 weaker.

Also the related radio amateur organisation has been active in January and February, translates as "French National Network", in the past has been heard on Thursdays using call-sign F9TM sending on 6825 and a frequency in the 80 metre amateur location exchanging RST reports with French amateur operators .In the first months of this year has been heard on what appears now to be a weekly Thursday schedule:-

09-Jan-25:- 1855 UTC:- 3536 kHz F9TM CW working F call-sign stations, very strong signal, by far the strongest signal on 80 metres at this time, stations in QSO much weaker. Appeared to be on 3536 only, nothing on 6825. Similar activity noted on Thursdays 16th, and 30th of January around 1900 UTC.

Tuned in a bit earlier on Thursday 06-February, 1800 UTC approx. starting up in both French and English, sending - something like - "CQF CQF DE F9TM F9TM. 1930 LOC QRG LIBRE APPRECIEE CQF CQF DE F9TM F9TM FRENCH NATIONAL NETWORK 1930 LOC CLEAR FREQUENCY APPRECIATED 73"

Also heard on Thursday the 13th at 1835 UTC and on the 20th tuning in a bit later, just after 2000 UTC was the usual S9+ on 3536 but was sending fast groups similar to those usually heard on 6825. Had gone when checked just before 2100 UTC.

[Thanks for an excellent report, Peter]

M89 O

This is a summary of activity from the M89 stations. We welcome back Jean-Paul, (JPL), after a break from monitoring, who has identified a number of new schedules, call signs & frequencies for both the M89 & M95 stations.

Traffic & Operator Chat from M89

Traffic & Op. chat reported on the following freqs. (All in kHz).

3703 9927

New Scheds for Jan / Feb 2025: From logs submitted from JPL

3903	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 01 February	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)
6886	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 01 February	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)
4357	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 05 January	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)
5742	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 05 January	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)
8375	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 11 January	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)
12123	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 01 February	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)
12124	New Call Sign & Round Slip	First heard 18 January	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)
4846	New Call & Round Slip	First heard 09 January	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)
6986	New Call & Round Slip	First hears 09 January	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)

Chart of M89 Freq & Call signs heard in Jan/Feb 2025 New Scheds shown in Bold Type From logs submitted from JPL

Freq in KHz	Call Slip
3903	**V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)**
4357	**V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)**
4846	**V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)**
4860// NRH	V (x3) Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)
4860// 6840	V Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)
5742	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)

Freq in kHz	Call Slip
6840//NRH	VVV (x3) Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)
6886	**V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)**
6986	**V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)**
8375	**V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)**
12123	**V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)**
12124	**V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)**

Courtesy JPL

Logs:

3703		1900z	09 Jan	In Tfc	A6U3 TD3T TBTA – Cont'd AR K 1905Z R RPT K R SK 1906Z	(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	THU
3903		0045z	01 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)		(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SAT
4357		1935z	05 Jan	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SUN
		1932z	03 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	MON
1915z	13 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)				(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	THU
1715z	15 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)				(Remote tuner Taiwan)	JPL	SAT
4846		1929z	09 Jan	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SUN
		1917z	28 Jan	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	TUE
		1928z	03 Feb	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	MON
1910z	13 Feb	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)				(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	THU
4860		1925z	09 Jan	V Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	THU
		1825z	21 Jan	V Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)		(Remote tuner Japan)	JPL	TUE
4860//6840		1923z	17 Feb	VVV Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)	In progress – Ended 1925z	(Remote tuner Twente)	BR	MON
5742		1935z	05 Jan	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SUN
1901z	13 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)				(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	THU
1800z	15 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)				(Remote tuner Taiwan)	JPL	SAT
6840		1825z	21 Jan	V Q2M (x3) DE NYZ (x2)		(Remote tuner Japan)	JPL	TUE
6886		0045z	01 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)		(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SAT
6986		1929z	09 Jan	V 4DFK (x3) DE M7KQ (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SUN
8375		0150z	11 Jan	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT
		0025z	01 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT
0123z	15 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)				(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT
9927		0127z	11 Jan	In Tfc	7UNN 7T7B - Cont'd – AR R QSL 0933K R OK K R SK K SK 0133Z	(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT
12123		0025z	01 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT
12124		0109z	18 Jan	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSV9 (x2)		(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT
0123z	15 Feb	V 3JWV (x3) DE QSVP (x2)				(Remote tuner Khabarovsk)	JPL	SAT

M95 O XSV, XSV70, XSV85

M95 Morse Logs **(Bold type indicates new logging)**

3642//NRH Call Sign 3A7D (Active daily - only first marker log has been included)

3642//7602 Call Sign 3A7D (Active daily - only first marker log has been included)

3903 **Call Sign V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)** **Replaced YHXD DE SAQC on 3968, 6936, 5479 & 10722kHz**

1935z	05 Jan	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SUN
1905z	21 Jan	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	TUE

	1938z	03 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	MON	
1840z	13 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	THU		

4243//NRH Message number differs from current XSV70 and XSV85 message numbers.

6557 **Call Sign V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2) Replaced YHXD DE SAQC on 3968, 6936, 5479 & 10722kHz**

1935z	09 Jan	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SUN

6886 **Call Sign V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2) Replaced YHXD DE SAQC on 3968, 6936, 5479 & 10722kHz**

1935z	05 Jan	WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SUN
1905z	21 Jan	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	TUE
2032z	23 Jan	WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	Good via Twente SDR	BR	THU
1938z	03 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	MON
1840z	13 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2) M95	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	THU

10180 Call Sign 3A7D (Active daily - only first marker log has been included)

11475 **Call Sign V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2) Replaced YHXD DE SAQC on 3968, 6936, 5479 & 10722kHz**

	1935z	09 Jan	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)	(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SUN
0128z	15 Feb	V WCJJ (x3) DE HBDD (x2)		(Remote tuner Novosibirsk)	JPL	SAT

Marker Beacons (MX MXI)

3657	2103z	19 Jan	MX CW Beacon "V" Khiva			BR	SUN
	2101z	16 Feb	MX CW Beacon "V" Khiva			BR	SUN
4557.7	2105z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
	2103z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
5153.7	2107z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
	2104z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
5154.1	2108z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "A" Astrakhan			BR	SUN
5156.7	2109z	19 Jan	MX CW Beacon "L" St Petersburg			BR	SUN
	2105z	16 Feb	MX CW Beacon "L" St Petersburg			BR	SUN
7508.7	1154z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol		Weak	BR	SUN
	2113z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
	2107z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
7508.9	1154z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		Weak	BR	SUN
	2114z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		Fair	BR	SUN
	2107z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk			BR	SUN
7509	1155z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "C" Moscow			BR	SUN
	2115z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "C" Moscow		Weak	BR	SUN
	2109z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "C" Moscow			BR	SUN
8494.7	1150z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol		Weak	BR	SUN
	2109z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
8494.9		31 Mar	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		V.Weak	BR	SUN
		19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		Weak	BR	SUN
		16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk			BR	SUN
8495.1	2116z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "A" Astrakhan		Fair	BR	SUN
	2111z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "A" Astrakhan		Fair	BR	SUN
8497.8	1150z	12 Jan	MX CW Beacon "L" St Petersburg		V.Weak	BR	SUN
	2117z	19 Jan	MX CW Beacon "L" St Petersburg		Weak	BR	SUN
	2111z	16 Feb	MX CW Beacon "L" St Petersburg		Fair	BR	SUN
	0850z	20 Feb	MX CW Beacon "L" St Petersburg		Fair	BR	THU
10871.7	1148z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	SUN
	0849z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol			BR	THU
10871.8	1148z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "P" Kaliningrad		Fast, Good	BR	SUN
	0844z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "P" Kaliningrad		Fast, Strong	BR	THU
10871.9	2100z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		Fair	BR	SUN
	2112z	16 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk			BR	SUN
	0850z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk			BR	THU
10872	2118z	19 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "C" Moscow		Weak	BR	SUN
13527.7	0842z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol		Fair	BR	THU
13527.8	1146z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "P" Kaliningrad		Fast, Strong	BR	SUN
13527.9	1147z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		Fair	BR	SUN
	0843z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk		Fair	BR	THU
16331.7	1143z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol		V.Strong	BR	SUN
	0835z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "D" Sevastopol	Sending D D D D D T	Strong	BR	THU
16331.9	1144z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk			BR	SUN
	0838z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "S" Severomorsk			BR	THU
16332.1	1145z	12 Jan	MXI CW Beacon "A" Astrakhan		Fair	BR	TUE
	0839z	20 Feb	MXI CW Beacon "A" Astrakhan		Weak	BR	THU

20047.7	1142z	12 Jan	MXI	CW	Beacon	"D"	Sevastopol		BR	SUN
	0833z	20 Feb	MXI	CW	Beacon	"D"	Sevastopol		BR	THU
20047.9	1142z	12 Jan	MXI	CW	Beacon	"S"	Severomorsk		BR	SUN

Oddities

'The Crackle' – XC Rare Noise Station Appears in 40m Amateur Band

February saw a rare appearance of an unusual signal that has been reported for decades – originally logged & designated XC by the original ENIGMA Numbers Group. Until 2009, this signal was regularly to be found on 5500kHz or 5505kHz until abandoning these frequencies & becoming an elusive wanderer that would suddenly appear on a number of different frequencies before going silent again.

'The Crackle' was described by ENIGMA as sounding like someone dragging tin cans across the ground & that description fits the sound very well. The transmissions continue for hours on end with no variation.

This latest appearance of this transmission, first report for a number of years, was on the evening of Sunday, 02 February on 7101kHz – within the 40 metre amateur radio band. Using the system of online SDRs it was established that the transmission was heard at a good strength across Europe on receivers in Finland, Hungary, Poland & Sweden. A weak signal was heard from Switzerland while USA, Australia, Japan & S. America gave no trace of the signal.

The content of the signal reveals little to show that the transmission is anything other than random noise, yet has quite a tight bandwidth and some odd characteristics. PLdn produced a sonogram showing that, although the transmission uses amplitude modulation, the signal is predominately in the +3db portion of the envelope.

The signal was monitored throughout the evening, becoming stronger towards 2100z. By 2230z, when monitoring ceased, the signal had dropped to fair with some QSB evident.

7101kHz	2010 – 2230z	02 Feb	'The Crackle' continuous transmission	Good to fair	BR	SUN
	2037 - 2045z	02 Feb	'The Crackle'	Weak to Fair [ended monitoring at 2045]	PLdn	SUN
		02 Feb	'The Crackle'		Gert	SUN



7101kHz 2110z 02 February XC The Crackle *Courtesy BR*



7101kHz 02 February Sonogram of 'The Crackle' Signal Courtesy PLdn

'The Alarm'

4770	2122z	19 Jan	Marker Signal (The Alarm)	USB	Fair	BR	SUN
	2116z	16 Feb	Marker Signal (The Alarm)	USB	Fair	BR	SUN

S28 'The Buzzer'

4625	2123z	19 Jan	S28	'The Buzzer' Marker	USB	Fair	BR	SUN
	2035z	23 Jan	S28	'The Buzzer' Marker + music (backwards?) jamming	USB	Strong	BR	THU
	2117z	16 Feb	S28	'The Buzzer' Marker Slow, sluggish	USB	Good	BR	SUN

S30 'The Pip'

3756	2123z	19 Jan	S30	'Pip' marker (Night freq)	USB		BR	SUN
	2118z	16 Feb	S30	'Pip' marker (Night freq)	USB	Good	BR	SUN

New Additional Markers

3363	2130z	19 Jan	Pip Type Marker	Weak	USB	BR	SUN
	2121z	16 Feb	Pip Type Marker	Fair	USB	BR	SUN
5782.5	2125z	19 Jan	Buzzer Type Marker		USB	BR	SUN
6930	2128z	19 Jan	Buzzer Type Marker (Not in sync with 5782.5kHz)		USB	BR	SUN

6911 **'Stalingrad Clock'**

2111z	19 Jan	Buzzer like tone present	Weak	BR	SUN
2119z	16 Feb	Strong Ticking	Good	BR	SUN

Contributors: AB, BR, Gert, HFD, JPL, PLdn, PoSW, Hugh Stegman, *Thank you all for your logs.*

Voice, Polytone, Tones, Hybrids and FSK

E06
Jan/Feb log:

Saturday 1600z 9075kHz 1630z 6792kHz Repeats Sunday 0730z 11487kHz 0800z 9371kHz
04 & 05/01

'480' 725 44 02548 53632 54312 43057 21651 46767 47019 19462 47617 21039 80563 21028 26951 58019 29802 53230 8687? 93204 93983 74258 54839 378 6 29468 71841 36147 26743 84354 17097 36757 02529 32347 29215 92404 27434 47128 39084 67978 90346 23680 65623 15687 12309 61047 12431 725 44 00000

11 & 12/01

'480' 279 45 35708 67317 45146 20918 40904 90628 95462 61959 37354 10252 86212 07689 25671 32384 13010 97860 04275 25470 23970 57426 68478 65296 59682 71930 03943 14785 78256 92501 16848 38143 84684 76316 07697 25163 57678 04098 67950 30158 25145 69450 14270 20175 92145 08269 05612 279 45 00000

Saturday 1600z 9463kHz 1630z 6792kHz Repeats Sunday 0730z 12093khz 0800z 9412khz
08 & 09/02

'480' 567 44 48194 58243 95412 01369 84046 48783 14065 91495 94265 40817 31861 14506 69151 96102 57512 12984 92802 32613 05947 19687 02731 53649 49851 98102 08630 91413 78647 05159 96853 60898 83416 04671 19253 69608 42013 10326 68057 12070 06590 64894 76950 24975 23243 68487 567 44 00000

From Peter we receive:

Not much to report from this one, just a couple of sightings at half-past four on Saturdays in February alternating the the S06 Russian OM:-

8-Feb-25:- 1630 UTC, 6792 kHz, calling "480", DK/GC "567 567 44 44", S06 Man had been heard on 1-Feb.

22-Feb-25:- "480", DK/GC "156 156 43 43". A search for a possible first transmission at 1600 UTC on a higher frequency had proved fruitless.

E07

PoSW offers his logs, with repetition of ours below [of course]. This once busy station is now seemingly somewhat layed back in its approach, as Peter explains:

"Just two schedules left from this number station, both appearing on two days in the week and both in the UK afternoon time. A routine of alternating on a weekly basis between "message" and "no message" formats which seems to be a bit too neat and tidy to be real."

Tuesday + Friday Schedule, 1500 UTC Start:-
3-Jan-25, Friday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz, "313 313 313 000".
1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, fair signal on both transmissions.

7-Jan-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz, "313 313 313 1", message, DK/GC "419 175" x 2, weak at first, became stronger. Long message, ended before 1517z.
1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, stronger.
Nothing readable of the third sending at 1540 UTC on predicted frequency of 10375.

10-Jan-25, Friday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz, "313" and "419 175" again.
1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, good signal, nothing heard at 1540z.

14-Jan-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz and 1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, “313 313 313 000”.

17-Jan-25, Friday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz and 1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, “313 313 313 000”.

21-Jan-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz, “313 313 313 1”, message, DK/GC “2949 112” x 2.
1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, strong signal, nothing readable at 1540z.

28-Jan-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 13375 kHz and 1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, “313 313 313 000”.

31-Jan-25, Friday:- 1500 UTC. 13375 kHz, weak signal and 1520 UTC, 12175 kHz, stronger, “313 313 313 000”.

4-Feb-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 15858 kHz, “841 841 841 1”, message, DK/GC “9797 98” x 2, signal strength up and down. Ended at approx 1510:40s UTC.
1520 UTC, 14458 kHz, weak signal.
1540 UTC, 12158 kHz, stronger.

7-Feb-25, Friday:- 1500 UTC, 15858 kHz, “841” and “9797 98” again, signal strength varying.
1520 UTC, 14458 kHz, also varying in strength.
1540 UTC, 12158 kHz, stronger. Went off air at approx 1550z, came back with “841...1” call routine and then into 5Fs – I counted seventeen groups before “000 000” ending around 1553 UTC.

11-Feb-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 15858 kHz, “841 841 841 000”, weak signal.
1520 UTC,, 14458 kHz, also weak.

14-Feb-25, Friday:- 1500 UTC, 15858 kHz, weak signal, and 1520 kHz, very weak, “841 841 841 000”.

18-Feb-25, Tuesday:- 1500 UTC, 15858 kHz, “841 841 841 1”, message, DK/GC “5559 164” x 2, ended after 1516 UTC.
1520 UTC, 14458 kHz, actually nothing audible until 1521, either started late or more likely was a very weak signal for the first minute or so.
1540 UTC, 12158 kHz, signal strength varying.

Thursday + Saturday Schedule, 1410 UTC Start:-
Not much to report from this schedule in January, all three frequencies, 11593 + 10293 + 9293 kHz lie within my local RF noise interference zone of roughly 8600 to 11800 kHz where all but the strongest signals are wiped out. Only one exception:-
11-Jan-25, Saturday:- 1410 UTC, 11593 kHz, “916 916 916 000”, just about audible. Nothing at 1430z on 10293.
An improvement in February, at least with the first two sendings, as they move out of the interference zone:-
1-Feb-25, Saturday:- 1410 UTC, 13368 kHz, “745 745 745 1”, message, DK/GC “582 167” x 2, good signal with some fading, ended at 1426:20s UTC approx.
1430 UTC, 12168 kHz, good signal, occasional fading. Nothing readable at 1450 UTC on the expected third frequency, 11168.

8-Feb-24, Saturday:- 1410 UTC, 13368 kHz, “745 745 745 000”, good signal.
1430 UTC, 12168 kHz, strong.

13-Feb-25, Thursday:- 1410 UTC, 13368 kHz, “745 745 745 1”, DK/GC “162 130” x 2, good signal at first, became weaker, ended around 1423:20s UTC.
1430 UTC, 12168 kHz, strong signal, nothing readable of the third sending.

15-Feb-25, Saturday:- 1410 UTC, 13368 kHz, “745” and “162 130” again, good signal.
1430 UTC, 12168 kHz, strong, nothing readable at 1450 UTC on 11168..

20-Feb-25, Thursday:- 1410 UTC, 13368 kHz, “745 745 745 000”, fair signal.
1430 UTC, 12168 kHz, slightly weaker than usual.

Thanks PoSW and now on to others’ submitted logs:

Tuesday/Friday

January 2025

1500z	**13375kHz**	**1520z**	**12175kHz**	**1540z**	**10375kHz**			
03/01	313 000				Fair			
07/01	313 1 419 175 85472 ... 18808 000 000				Fair	BR, BRIXMIS	TUE	
10/01	313 1 419 175 85472 ... 18808 000 000				1520z Fair, 1540z Weak. 1500z Strong 20s intro only			
14/01	313 000				Good	BR	TUE	
17/01	313 000				Weak			
21/01	313 1 2949 112 75382 ...		000 000		Weak, poor copy			
24/01	313 1 2949 112 75382 ...		000 000		Weak, poor copy			
28/01	313 000				Good	BR	TUE	

February 2025

1500z 15858kHz 1520z 14458kHz 1540z 12158kHz

04/02 814 1 9797 98 01857 ... 65130 000 000 1540z Fair, rest Weak QSB3

07/02 814 1 9797 98 01857 ... 65130 000 000 Weak PLdn, Unworkable HJH FRI

11/02 841 000 Weak

14/02 841 000 1520z Weak, 1500z NRH [1500z Strong via Twente –dMHz]

18/02 841 1 5559 164 54908 ... 22943 000 000 Fair, 1500z QRN3

841 1 5559 164

54908 28068 16542 01380 03078 82428 74295 04334 70671 89313
04274 69504 91459 46316 98675 07682 18627 48116 22455 75301
28234 33306 96900 23628 68882 73022 76747 49759 46875 70453
91106 73426 38850 76759 37939 18052 41040 59892 06572 32345
42614 16752 36789 17302 79473 20942 60626 27282 91145 70295
71635 98376 54429 83590 71999 81181 65256 90331 65881 12617
43990 80979 40821 98521 63317 43477 11426 90956 14719 14490
47639 89744 08951 22837 86854 33564 65618 33710 16355 53260
66168 13437 79797 18396 54326 75174 64117 86626 87943 31434
76389 52160 13498 10245 38947 39834 45025 26664 58423 70071
22793 43077 96628 15813 54507 70409 00966 65469 77696 15438
86182 61973 46263 29876 28851 93292 78305 26862 42195 99021
12570 57081 96355 18752 41570 44253 84229 12482 47184 02390
98673 32517 19364 89787 34428 43616 71956 29256 35329 02821
50804 73968 47145 19074 40788 65715 05210 83299 46701 74322
26816 19811 76210 95158 82960 91160 57137 99545 93979 47052
90253 46604 86214 22943 000 000 *Courtesy dMHz*

21/02 841 1 5559 164 54908 ... 22943 000 000 Weak, 1540z QRM3

25/02 841 000 Weak

Thursday/Saturday

January 2025

1410z 11593kHz 1430z 10293kHz 1450z 9323kHz

02/01 916 1 169 88 57024 ... no copy Weak, 1450z QRM5

04/01 NO REPORT

09/01 916 000 1410z Fair, 1430z Weak

11/01 916 000 Good BR SAT

16/01 916 1 714 125 63113 Fair BR THU

18/01 916 1 714 125 63113 36569 01631.... Good BR SAT

23/01 Not Monitored

25/01 916 000 Good BR SAT

30/01 916 1 582 167 03718 95620 66945.... Fair BR THU

February 2025

1410z 13368kHz 1430z 12168kHz 1450z 11168kHz

01/02 745 1 582 167 03718 ... Good BR SAT [Fades BRIXMIS]

06/02 745 000 Weak BRIXMIS/PLdn, Good BR THU

08/02 745 000 Weak HJH SAT

13/02 745 1 162 130 40867 ... 31699 000 000 1410z Weak, 1430z Fair, 1450z Unworkable [Poor condx]

745 745 745 1 162 130 162 130
40867 50645 32919 35165 03524 11952 90766 09060 75826 18703
04622 31790 71767 30693 03712 88997 41030 08855 72918 19979
11353 46519 91025 81462 56169 80171 54546 01865 22921 41046
20819 06845 24843 38382 46455 60439 62539 84666 16357 14244
29207 41597 02048 52618 09976 86396 89369 25580 25025 09599
97403 13651 91378 73157 40844 38127 40249 35241 60098 62686
05654 48258 03711 76457 29809 98505 85007 23764 88712 12303

17849 64743 86552 37029 36006 38899 25249 24670 45225 17363
67009 21704 05329 40742 89016 47535 93414 49361 34363 62582
89356 02195 03169 07216 11300 29820 71306 76846 02697 51969
84666 60766 49945 56096 09151 79375 37964 32630 07540 79835
01300 37333 34896 69683 24360 69425 00013 49502 83965 50735
50395 02525 74056 58565 22982 14416 01409 43820 63219 31699
000 000 *Courtesy Ary*

15/02	745 1 162 130 40867 ... 31699 000 000	1430z Fair, rest Weak
20/02	745 000	Weak
22/02	745 000	Weak
27/02	745 1 729 119 14761 … 88941 000 000	Weak

E11

On 4th February, 2025 I intercepted the regular transmission on 13908kHz at 0745z. A null message was sent 228/00 and repeated for just over three minutes when it ended with a succinct 'OUT!'
My contemporaneous notes state: '13908 0745 04/02/25 288/00 OUT 0748z Fair, with PulssQRM3.'

I decided to look into the troublesome QRM. Looking at the first image we see the representation of a singular 228/00 plus a noise pattern.



What I heard were very rapid but regular pulses which can just be made out [The scale here represents ~18.5s of sending].
Looking into the pulse rate I make a measurement across one second of sending, from 5.5 to 6.5s from the above image, producing:



This measurement illustrated 40 pulses per second, or 1÷ 40 =0.025s or a pulse of 25ms duration.

The result here demanded a further measurement, randomly taken, of one pulse between scale points 6.165 and 6.19s :



Consulting the 'Technical Handbook for Radio Monitoring HF' [2011 Edition, Roland Proesch] page 382, leads me to a series of diagrams of Over The Horizon Radar and the varying parameters from the different types.

Picture 367 shows two pulses against a grid with the legend: 'French OTHR with 25ms pulses or 40 pulses per second [pps]. Leading me to the conclusion this QRM is caused by a French OTHR.

E11&E11a log Jan/Feb

4505kHz	1610z	01/01 [393/31 89888 83601 13873 51231 89226 84807 06552……58450 13409] Strong	RNGB	WED
	1610z	08/01 [391/00]	Ary. MG	WED
	1610z	11/01 [393/00]	Brian, Ary	SAT
	1610z	18/01 [399/00]	Gary H, MG	SAT
	1610z	22/01 [392/00] S4	Brixmis	WED
	1610z	25/01 [393/00]	Gary H	SAT
	1610z	29/01 [392/00]	Brixmis	WED
	1610z	08/02 [395/00] Weak	Brixmis	SAT
	1610z	12/02 [396/00] Weak	Brixmis, dMHz	WED

4909kHz	1300z	02/01 [313/00] Weak	Brian	THU
	1645z	05/01 [363/00] Out 1648	Brixmis, Brian	SUN
	1300z	09/01 [312/38 95929 99611 91457 34123 01588 01823 67792……23867 54790]	Brian	THU
	1645z	11/01 [368/35 21396 28404 27893 36898 66825 08333 44278 99404…….35449 85969]	Brixmis, Brian, Ary	SAT
	1300z	13/01 [311/00] Fair via Finland SDR	Brian	MON
	1300z	16/01 [312/00] Good	Brian	THU
	1645z	18/01 [369/00]	Gary H, MG	SAT
	1645z	19/01 [366/00] S3	Brixmis, Brian, PLdn	SUN
	1300z	20/01 [314/00] Fair	Brian	MON
	1645z	25/01 [364/00]	Gary H	SAT
	1645z	26/01 [365/00] Out 1648z Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1300z	30/01 [315/00] Weak	Brian	THU
	1645z	01/02 [360/32 15482 20013 21538 27373 29414 54224 20655 54224 20655……23557 01714]	Gary H	SAT
	1300z	03/02 [313/00] Good (Finland SDR)	Brian	MON
	1300z	06/02 [313/00]	Brian	THU
	1645z	09/02 [365/00] Strong	Brian, PLdn	SUN
	1645z	16/02 [367/00] Out 1648z Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1645z	23/02 [367/00] Out 1648z Fair	PLdn, MG	SUN
5082kHz	2000z	02/01 [521/00] Out 2003z	Brixmis, PLdn	THU
	1715z	03/01 [977/00] Out 1718z Weak	PLdn	FRI
	2000z	05/01 [527/00] Out 2003z Weak	PLdn	SUN
	1715z	08/01 [970/00] Out 1718z Fair	PLdn, Ary	WED
	2000z	12/01 [520/00]	Gary H, Brian	SUN
	1715z	15/01 [975/00] Out 1718z Weak	PLdn, MG	WED
	2000z	16/01 [528/36 20758 55231 85660 40148 70086 54909 70489 75387……22484 46675]	PLdn, MG	THU
	1715z	17/01 [970/00] Weak	PLdn	FRI
	2000z	19/01 [528/36 20758…….46675] Out 2010z Strong (Twente SDR)	PLdn	SUN
	2000z	23/01 [524/00] Fair	PLdn	THU
	1715z	24/01 [976/35 65473…….50143] Out 1725z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	2000z	26/01 [520/00] Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1715z	29/01 [970/00] Strong	PLdn, Brixmis	WED
	2000z	30/01 [520/00] S6	Brixmis, PLdn	THU
	1715z	31/01 [978/00] Out 1718z Strong	PLdn	FRI
	2000z	02/02 [524/00] Strong	Brian, PLdn	SUN
	1715z	07/02 [972/00] S6	Brixmis	FRI
	2000z	09/02 [522/37 74582 19224 88237 84960 19617 42769 42727 33528……79221 03969] Good	Brian	SUN
	1715z	12/02 [977/35 18343 71370 54492 02546 92119 02386 53681 32972……41352 22313] S5	Brixmis, Gary H, PLdn	WED
	2000z	13/02 [520/00] S4	Brixmis	THU
	1715z	19/02 [974/00] Out 1718z Strong	PLdn, MG	WED
	1715z	21/02 [976/00] Out 1718z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	2000z	23/02 [527/00] Out 2003z	PLdn	SUN
	1715z	28/02 [978/00] Out 1718z Fair	PLdn	FRI
5371khz	0700z	05/01 [497/00] Out 0703z S7	Brixmis, PLdn	SUN
	0700z	12/01 [492/00] S6	Brixmis, PLdn	SUN
	0700z	18/01 [498/00] Out 0703z Weak	PLdn, MG	SAT
	0700z	19/01 [496/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	0700z	26/01 [492/34 28717 11583 34543 03784 97972…] Twente SDR	MG	SUN
	0700z	01/02 [498/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	SAT
	0700z	02/02 [490/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	0700z	09/02 [495/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	0700z	15/02 [495/00] Out 0703z Weak	PLdn	SAT
	0700z	16/02 [490/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn, MG	SUN
	0700z	22/02 [495/31 19106……...87727] Out 0709z Weak	PLdn	SAT
5409khz	1530z	02/01 [268/00] Out 1533z Strong	PLdn	THU
	1530z	16/01 [264/34 26507 20398 44370 06701 74328 01983 67972 31675…….76255 28847]	Brian	THU
	1530z	23/01 [268/00] Out 1533z Fair	PLdn, MG	THU
	1530z	30/01 [266/00]	Gary H, PLdn, MG	THU
	1530z	06/02 [260/00]	Gary H	THU
	1530z	27/02 [262/00] Fair	Brian	THU
5432kHz	1605z	05/01 [231/00]	Gary H, Brian	SUN
	1605z	19/01 [232/38 60374 75747 30289 51113 34612 73149 96450 86075…….04096 14570] S6	Brixmis, Brian	SUN
	1605z	28/01 [238/00] Good	Brian, Ary	TUE
	1605z	02/02 [235/00] Out 1608z Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1605z	04/02 [232/38 00159 87803 88208 04341 46923 22164 85130 52546……22024 43961]	Gary H, PLdn	TUE
	1605z	11/02 [233/00]	Gary H, PLdn	TUE
	1605z	16/02 [233/00] Out 1608z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	1605z	18/02 [233/00] Out 1608z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	1605z	21/01 [238/00] Very weak	MG	TUE

	1605z	23/02 [233/00] Out 1608z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	1605z	25/02 [235/00] Out 1608z Weak	PLdn	TUE
6804kHz	0700z	07/01 [579/00] Out 0703z Fair, QRM3	PLdn	TUE
	0700z	10/01 [575/00]	Ary	FRI
	0700z	14/01 [579/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn, MG	TUE
	0700z	21/01 [577/33 42267……] End missed. Weak,, QSB4	PLdn	TUE
	0700z	24/01 [577/33…… (No time to copy msg)	PLdn	FRI
	0700z	28/01 [577/00]	Ary	TUE
	0700z	31/01 [573/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	0700z	04/02 [571/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	WED
	0700z	07/02 [575/00] Out 0703z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	0700z	18/02 [571/00] Out 0703z Weak	PLdn, MG	TUE
	0700z	21/02 [576/00] Out 0703z Weak	PLdn	FRI
	0700z	25/02 [577/31 12985……91313] Out 0710z Weak	PLdn	TUE
6849kHz	1900z	02/01 [649/00] Fair	Brixmis, PLdn	THU
	1815z	03/01 [921/00] Out 1818z Strong	PLdn	FRI
	1815z	05/01 [926/00] Fair	Brian	SUN
	1900z	06/01 [647/00]	MG	MON
	1815z	12/01 [927/00] Strong	Brian	SUN
	1900z	13/01 [641/00] S4	Brixmis, PLdn, MG	MON
	1815z	17/01 [929/00] Out 1818z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	1815z	19/01 [920/00] Out 1818z	PLdn	SUN
	1900z	20/01 [641/00] Out 1903z Fair	dMHz, MG	MON
	1900z	23/01 [649/00] Out 1903z Strong	PLdn	THU
	1815z	24/01 [924/39 86487……63571] Out 1826z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	1900z	30/01 [644/31 18191……61783] Out 1909z Fair	PLdn	THU
	1815z	31/01 [927/00] Out 1818z Strong	PLdn	FRI
	1815z	02/02 [924/00] S3	Brixmis, PLdn	SUN
	1900z	06/02 [648/00] S3	Gary H	THU
	1815z	07/02 [927/00] Out 1818z Strong	PLdn	FRI
	1815z	09/02 [929/00] Strong	Brian, PLdn	SUN
	1815z	14/02 [922/00] Out 1818z Strong	PLdn	FRI
	1815z	16/02 [929/00] Out 1818z Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1815z	21/02 [927/33 26937 95783 84139 10207 80198 53866 03485 01382……76666 11804] Strong	PLdn	FRI
	1815z	23/02 [927/33 26937…….11804] Out 1824z Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1900z	24/02 [643/00] Out 1903z Fair	PLdn	MON
	1815z	28/02 [920/00] Out 1818z Strong	PLdn	FRI
7469kHz	0930z	01/01 [275/00] Fair	Brian	WED
	0930z	02/01 [278/00] Out 0933z Weak	PLdn	THU
	0930z	08/01 [271/00] Good	RNGB, Brian, PLdn	WED
	0930z	09/01 [271/00] S3	Brixmis, Brian, PLdn	THU
	0930z	15/01 [276/00] Fair	Brian, PLdn	WED
	0930z	16/01 [276/00] Strong	RNGB	THU
	0930z	22/01 [271/31 44592 70891 48343 29253 83730 93844 04790 01842……77278 85264] Fair	Brian	WED
	0930z	29/01 [275/00] Weak	Brian	WED
	0930z	30/01 [279/00] Out 0933z Weak	PLdn, Brian	THU
	0930z	05/02 [275/37 88324 71889 40286 09013 79640 46640 47026…… 82708 43657] Fair	Brian	WED
	0930z	12/02 [278/00] Weak	Pldn	WED
	0930z	13/02 [273/00] Good	RNGB, Brian	THU
	0930z	19/02 [273/00] Good	RNGB, Brian	WED
	0930z	26/02 [271/00] Weak	Brian	WED
	0930z	27/02 [275/00] Weak	Brian	THU
7840kHz	0645z	02/01 [512/00] Out 0648z Strong	PLdn	THU
	0645z	07/01 [511/00] Out 0648z Strong	PLdn, MG	TUE
	0645z	09/01 [510/00] Out 0648z Strong	PLdn	THU
	0645z	14/01 [519/33 51744 60485 82892 70614 78591 20232 88596……49492 36306] Out 0654z	PLdn, MG	TUE
	0645z	21/01 [514/00] Out 0648z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	0645z	23/01 [515/00] Out 0648z Fair	PLdn	THU
	0645z	28/01 [515/00]	Ary	TUE
	0645z	30/01 [510/00] Out 0648z Strong	PLdn	THU
7850khz	0600z	05/01 [359/39 12236 05016 72105 65454 84911 45021 13168 80015……84099 69418]	Ary, PLdn	SUN
	0600z	10/01 [351/00] Out 0603z Weak	PLdn, Ary, MG	FRI
	0600z	12/01 [358/00] Out 0603z	PLdn	SUN
	0600z	24/01 [352/00] Out 0603z Weak	PLdn, MG	FRI
	0600z	26/01 [353/00] Out 0603z Weak	PLdn, MG	SUN
	0600z	31/01 [350/00] Out 0603z Fair	PLdn	FRI
	0600z	02/02 [358/00] Out 0603z Weak	PLdn	SUN

	0600z	07/02 [351/31 13190 75904 93101 09717 92650……...05958] Out 0610z Fair	MG, PLdn	FRI
	0600z	16/02 [354/00] Out 0603z Weak	PLdn, MG	SUN
	0600z	21/02 [351/00] Out 0603z Strong	PLdn, MG	FRI
	0600z	23/02 [354/00] Out 0603z Strong	PLdn	SUN
8180kHz	0720z	21/02 [438/00] Out 0723z Fair	PLdn, HfD	FRI
	0720z	27/02 [436/00] Out 0723z Fair	PLdn	THU
9079khz	1000z	03/01 [304/00] Good	Brian	FRI
	1000z	07/01 [309/00] Out 1003z Very weak	PLdn	TUE
	1000z	10/01 [304/00] Strong	Brian. Ary	FRI
	1000z	14/01 [308/28 17564 79809 27390 57315 19817 95933 18504 35665……55904 90313]	Brian	TUE
	1000z	28/01 [307/00] Fair	Brian, Ary	TUE
	1000z	04/02 [308/00] Good	Brian, Pldn	WED
	1000z	07/02 [300/00] Fair	Brian	FRI
	1000z	11/02 [306/00] Good	Brian	TUE
	1000z	21/02 [302/40 11310 96147…….63386 13641] Fair	Brian	FRI
	1000z	25/02 [300/00] Good	RNGB, Brian, PLdn	TUE
	1000z	28/02 [308/00]	Ary	FRI
10213khz	0745z	06/01 [264/00] Out 0748z Strong	PLdn	MON
	0745z	13/01 [264/34 26507 20398 44370 06701 74328 01983 67972……76255 28847]	PLdn	MON
	0745z	20/01 [267/00] Out 0748z Fair	PLdn	MON
	0745z	26/01 [269/00] Out 0748z Weak	PLdn	SUN
	0745z	03/02 [268/00] Out 0748z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	0745z	10.02 [261/35 91608 …….63469] Weak QSB3 poor copy	PLdn	MON
	0745z	24/02 [269/00] Out 1748z Fair	PLdn	MON
10448kHz	0315z	25/02 [250/00]	HfD	MON
10487kHz	1910z	05/01 [613/34 36836 11520 24806 87078 68935 48429 08296 07729……44450 40135] Fair	Brian	SUN
	1910z	12/01 [611/00]	Brian	SUN
	1910z	02/02 [612/00] Weak	Brian, PLdn	SUN
	1910z	09/02 [610/35 08104 91257 76804 61129 20069 27214 04443……46297 31099] Strong	Brian	SUN
	1910z	16/02 [612/00] Out 1913z Weak	PLdn, MG	SUN
	1910z	17/01 [614/00] Weak Twente SDR	MG	FRI
	1910z	21/02 [614/00] Out 1913z Weak	PLdn, MG	FRI
	1910z	23/02 [613/00] Out 1913z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	1910z	28/02 [614/00] Out 1913z Fair	PLdn	FRI
11104kHz	0820z	03/01 [431/37 85647 97864 12451 75077 46480 66822 36879……95860 83221] Good	RNGB	FRI
	0820z	09/01 [436/00] Strong	RNGB, Brian	THU
	0820z	10/01 [438/00]	Brian, Ary	FRI
	0820z	31/01 [430/00] Good	Brian	FRI
11559kHz	1205z	08/01 [461/00] Out 1208z	Brixmis, Brian, Ary	WED
	1205z	14/01 [469/39 10303 44161 32455 64979 49705 14765 31502 83122……56447 64359]	Brian	TUE
	1205z	22/01 [461/00] Strong	Brian	WED
	1205z	28/01 [464/00] Fair	Brian, Ary	TUE
	1205z	29/01 [466/00] Good	Brian	WED
	1205z	05/02 [463/34 61139 59531 36429 39418 26974 84875 35851……94869 76588] Weak	Brixmis, Brian	WED
	1205z	11/02 [465/00] Out 1208z Weak	PLdn	TUE
	1205z	18/02 [460/00] Out 1208z Weak	PLdn	TUE
	1205z	26/02 [466/00] Fair	Brian	WED
12067kHz	0845z	01/01 [710/00] Good	Brian	WED
	0845z	06/01 [715/00] Good	RNGB	MON
	0845z	08/01 [710/00] Good	RNGB, Brian, Ary	WED
	0845z	15/01 [713/00] S2	Brixmis, Brian	WED
	0845z	22/01 [713/31 29597 58716 89847 98862 07560 70406 99692 36518……59499 38141] Good	Brian	WED
	0845z	29/01 [715/00] Fair	Brian	WED
	0845z	02/01 [714/00] Good	RNGB	MON
	0845z	10/02 [719/00] Good	Brian	MON
	0845z	19/02 [715/35 25407 61164 46012…..] Weak (Finish SDR)	Brian	WED
	0845z	26/02 [713/00] Good	Brian	WED
12153kHz	0505z	25/02 [633?/00] Very weak, (Twente SDR)	MG	TUE
12385kHz	0645z	11/02 [514/00]	HfD	TUE
	0645z	20/02 [514/00] Good/Strong	MG	THU
	0645z	25/02 [517/00] Strong	MG	TUE

12924kHz	1745z	05/01 [240/00] Fair	Brian	SUN
	1745z	12/01 [249/40 59650 49046 38763 56702 60541 10076 09432 90631……88668 34746]	Ary	SUN
	1745z	19/01 [240/00] Out 1748z Weak	PLdn	SUN
	1745z	20/01 [248/00] Out 1748z Fair	dMHz	MON
	1745z	26/01 [242/00] Out 1748z Weak	PLdn	SUN
	1745z	02/02 [242/00] Out 1748z Strong	PLdn	SUN
	1745z	03/02 [246/00] Out 1748z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	1745z	09/02 [248/00] Weak	Brian, PLdn	SUN
	1745z	10/02 [242/00] Out 1748z Strong	PLdn	MON
	1745z	16/02 [246/00] Out 1748z Fair	PLdn	SUN
	1745z	23/02 [240/32 80123…….74331]	PLdn	SUN
	1745z	24/02 [244/00] Out 1748z Strong	PLdn	MON
13363kHz	1430z	07/01 [914/00] Strong	Brian, MG	TUE
	1430z	14/01 [918/38 22330 77801 64583 31187 21584 57819 61861 16169…… 16454 81894]	Brian, Brixmis	TUE
	1430z	21/01 [917/00] Out 1433 Weak QRM2	PLdn	TUE
	1430z	28/01 [914/00]	Ary	TUE
	1430z	01/02 [915/00] Strong	Brian	SAT
	1430z	04/02 [912/34 25841……....97895] Out 1440z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	1430z	11/02 [919/00] Out 1433z Strong	PLdn	TUE
	1430z	18/02 [918/00] Out 1433z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	1430z	25/02 [914/00] Out 1433z Weak	PLdn	TUE
13908kHz	0745z	02/01 [227/00] Good	RNGB	THU
	0745z	09/01 [223/32 51783 53773 36989 07893 37627 17867 20311…….81545 94631] S4	Brixmis	THU
	0745z	14/01 [224/00] Out 0748z Weak	PLdn	TUE
	0745z	16/01 [227/00] S4	Brixmis	THU
	0745z	21/01 [224/00] Out 0748z Fair	PLdn	TUE
	0745z	28/01 [223/00]	Ary	TUE
	0745z	04/02 [228/00] Out 0748z Fair	PLdn	WED
	0745z	06/04 [224/00] S3	Brixmis, Brian	THU
	0745z	13/02 [221/00] Fair	RNGB	THU
	0745z	18/02 [221/21 25867…….93350] Out 0754z Weak	PLdn	TUE
	0745z	25/02 [220/00] Out 0748z Fair	PLdn	TUE
14410kHz	1045z	06/01 [690/00] Out 1048z Strong	PLdn	MON
	1045z	08/01 [692/00] Strong	Brian, Ary	WED
	1045z	13/01 [693/00] Good	RNGB, PLdn, Brian	MON
	1045z	15/01 [692/00] Strong	Brian	WED
	1045z	20/01 [691/38 57369 70527....40361 88946] Fair	Brian, PLdn	MON
	1045z	29/01 [694/00] Strong	Brian	WED
	1045z	03/02 [696/34 70294 33852 00464 92228 09281 69772 59708 33688……05912 07060] Strong	Brian, PLdn	MON
	1045z	10/02 [697/00] Strong	Brian, PLdn	MON
	1045z	12/02 [692/00] Weak	Pldn	WED
	1045z	17/02 [698/00] Out 1048z Weak	PLdn	MON
	1045z	19/02 [694/00] Strong	PLdn	WED
	1045z	24/02 [692/00] Good	RNGB, PLdn	MON
	1045z	26/02 [697/00] Good	Brian	WED
14611kHz	0820z	01/01 [136/00] Good	Brian	WED
	0820z	07/01 [136/00] Good	Brian	TUE
	0820z	08/01 [134/00] Good	RNGB, Brian	WED
	0820z	15/01 [132/00] S3	Brixmis, Brian	WED
	0820z	28/01 [134/00]	Ary	TUE
	0820z	04/02 [131/00] Weak	Brixmis, Brian	TUE
	0820z	05/02 [131/00] Good	Brian	WED
	0820z	11/02 [136/35 34795 75788 59627 79526 18684 83304 89809 55198……16325 49365] Good	Brian	TUE
	0820z	18/02 [134/00] Good	RNGB	TUE
	0820z	25/02 [136/00] Weak	Brian	TUE
	0820z	26/02 [132/00] Good	PLdn	WED
14975kHz	0715z	10/01 [636/00]	Ary	FRI
	0715z	28/01 [637/00]	Ary	TUE
15915kHz	0900z	01/01 [530/00] Good	Brian	WED
	0900z	08/01 [530/34 13762 26460 76379 ... 24766 23001 05092]	Ary	WED
	0900z	13/01 [537/00] Strong	Brian	MON
	0900z	15/01 [536/00] Fair	Brian	WED
	0900z	20/01 [537/00] Good	RNGB, Brian	MON
	0900z	22/01 [533/00] Good	Brian	WED
	0900z	29/01 [534/00] Strong	Brian	WED
	0900z	03/02 [534/00] Strong	Brian	MON

	0900z	05/02 [538/00] Strong	Brian	WED
	0900z	10/02 [530/00] Fair	Brian, PLdn	MON
	0900z	12/02 [537/00] Strong	Brian, Pldn	WED
	0900z	19/02 [535/00] Strong	Brian, PLdn	WED
	0900z	24/02 [532/40 88946 78594 51571 68093 80575 87564 84756.....88857 29530] Out 0911z Fair	Brian, PLdn, RNGB	MON
17378kHz	0845z	07/01 [151/00] Strong	Brian	TUE
	0745z	08/01 [343/00] Weak	Brian, Ary	WED
	0845z	09/01 [152/00] Strong	RNGB. Brian	THU
	0745z	10/01 [346/00]	Ary	FRI
	0745z	15/01 [343/32 22082 01618 73033 97808 01564 43721 21240 45326……22510 52997]	Ary, Brixmis	WED
	0845z	28/01 [151/00]	Ary	TUE
	0845z	30/01 [154/00] Weak	Brian	THU
	0845z	04/02 [156/00] Strong	Brian, Pldn	WED
	0845z	11/02 [156/00] Fair	Brian	TUE
	0845z	13/02 [152/00] Fair	RNGB, Brian	THU
	0845z	18/02 [151/38 71378 99103 68053 00626 82615 50047 35866 88113……39793 62651] Good	RNGB	TUE
	0845z	25/02 [151/00] Weak	Brian	TUE
20167kHz	0715z	08/01 [750/34 07200 55749 09646 ... 63429 30702 48581]	Ary	WED
23004kHz	0600z	19/02 [948/00] Weak (Twente SDR)	MG	WED
23353kHz	0830z	03/01 [185/00] Weak	RNGB	FRI
	0830z	10/01 [183/00] Fair	RNGB, Ary	FRI
	0830z	31/01 [183/00] Weak	Brian	FRI
	0830z	03/02 [184/25 12509 68328 95987 32507 82359 16501 83430 77404……25255 12010] Weak	RNGB	MON
	0830z	10/02 [183/00] Weak	Brian	MON
	0830z	21/02 [188/00] Weak	Brian	FRI
	0830z	28/02 [183/00] Weak	Brian	FRI

Mirroring some of the logs above PoSW offers his logs and analysis:

4505 kHz, 1610 UTC
4-Jan-25, Sat:- "393/31", message, missed the ending.
11-Jan-25, Sat:- "393/00"
15-Jan-25, Wed:- "391/00"
18-Jan-25, Sat:- "399/00"
25-Jan-25, Sat:- "393/00"
1-Feb-25, Sat:- "395/00"
5-Feb-25, Wed:- "394/00"
8-Feb-25, Sat:- "395/00"
12-Feb-25, Wed:- "396/00"
15-Feb-25, Sat:- "393/00"
22-Feb-25, Sat:- "390/40", message, "Out" at 1621:5s UTC.

5082 kHz, 2000 UTC
16-Jan-25, Thu:- "528/36", message, weak signal, sank into noise.
19-Jan-25, Sun:- "528/36" again, still weak.
30-Jan-25, Thu:- "520/00"
2-Feb-25, Sun:- "524/00", stronger than usual.
13-Feb-25, Thu:- "520/00"
20-Feb-25, Thu:- "522/00"
23-Feb-25, Sun:- "527/00"

5371 kHz, 0700 UTC
4-Jan-25, Sat:- "498/00"
5-Jan-25, Sun:- "497/00"
12-Jan-25, Sun:- "492/00"
18-Jan-25, Sat:- "498/00"
19-Jan-25, Sun:- "496/00"
25-Jan-25, Sat:- "492/34", message, "Out" at 0710:5s UTC.
26-Jan-25, Sun, "492/34" again.
1-Feb-25, Sat:- "498/00"
2-Feb-25, Sun:- "490/00"
8-Feb-25, Sat:- "490/00"
15-Feb-25, Sat:- "495/00"
16-Feb-25, Sun:- "490/00"
22-Feb-25, Sat:- "495/31", message, "Out" at approx 0709:30s UTC.
23-Feb-25, Sun:- "495/31" again.

5409 kHz, 1530 UTC
16-Jan-25, Thu:- "264/34", message, "Out" just after 1540 UTC.
30-Jan-25, Thu:- "266/00"
13-Feb-25, Thu:- "261/35", message, "Out" at 1540:16s UTC.
20-Feb-26, Thu:- "269/00"

5432 kHz, 1605 UTC
5-Jan-25, Sun:- “231/00”. Noted a strong SSB on the HF side which turned out to be the military meteorological SSB station which normally resides on 5450 and had moved to 5435. Was still on 5435 when monitored early on the following morning but had moved back to 5450 when checked again just before 1200 UTC.
12-Jan-25, Sun:- “237/00”
14-Jan-25, Tue:- “232/38”, message, “Out” at 1615:34s UTC.
19-Jan-25, Sun:- “232/38” again.
21-Jan-25, Tue:- “238/00”
26-Jan-25, Sun:- “233/00”
4-Feb-25, Tue:- “232/38”, message, “Out” at 1615:53s UTC.
11-Feb-25, Tue:- “233/00”
18-Feb-25, Tue:- “233/00”
23-Feb-25, Sun:- “233/00”

6804 kHz, 0700 UTC
7-Jan-25, Tue:- “579/00”
10-Jan-25, Fri:- “575/00”
14-Jan-25, Tue:- “579/00”
17-Jan-25, Fri:- “573/00”
21-Jan-25, Tue:- “577/33”, message, “Out” at 0709:49s UTC.
24-Jan-25, Fri:- “577/33” again.
28-Jan-25, Tue:- “577/00”
31-Jan-25, Fri:- “573/00”
4-Feb-25, Tue:- “571/00”
7-Feb-25, Fri:- “575/00”
11-Feb-25, Tue:- “571/00”
14-Feb-25, Fri:- “576/00”

6849 kHz, 1815 UTC
5-Jan-25, Sun:- “926/00”
12-Jan-25, Sun:- “927/00”
17-Jan-25, Fri:- “929/00”
19-Jan-25, Sun:- “920/00”
24-Jan-25, Fri:- “924/00”, message, “Out” just after 1826 UTC.
2-Feb-25, Sun:- “924/00”
7-Feb-25, Fri:- “927/00”
14-Feb-25, Fri:- “922/00”
16-Feb-25, Sun:- “929/00”
23-Feb-25, Sun:- “927/33”, message, “Out” at 1824:47s UTC.

6849 kHz, 1900 UTC
6-Jan-25, Mon:- “647/00”
20-Jan-25, Mon:- “641/00”
23-Jan-25, Thu:- “649/00”
3-Feb-25, Mon:- “647/00”
6-Feb-25, Thu:- “648/00”
10-Feb-25, Mon:- “647/36”, message, “Out” at 1910:27s UTC.
17-Feb-25, Thu:- “643/00”

12067 kHz, 0845 UTC
6-Jan-25, Mon:- “715/00”
8-Jan-25, Wed:- “710/00”
15-Jan-25, Wed:- “713/00”
20-Jan-25, Mon:- “713/31”, message, “Out” at 0854:31s UTC.
22-Jan-25, Wed:- “713/31” again.
29-Jan-25, Wed:- “715/00”
5-Feb-25, Wed:- “719/00”
10-Feb-25, Mon:- “719/00”
12-Feb-25, Wed:- “714/00”
19-Feb-25, Wed:- “715/35”, message, “Out” at 0855:9s UTC.
24-Feb-25, Mon:- “716/00”
26-Feb-25, Wed:- “713/00”

13363 kHz, 1430 UTC
4-Jan-25, Sat:- “911/00”
7-Jan-25, Tue:- “914/00”
14-Jan-25, Tue:- “918/38, message, “Out” at 1440:43s UTC.
18-Jan=25, Sat:- “918/38” again.
21-Jan-25, Tue:- “917/00”
25-Jan-25, Sat:- “915/00”
28-Jan-25, Tue:- “914/00”
1-Feb-25, Sat:- “915/00”
4-Feb-25, Tue:- “912/34”, message, “Out” at 1440:5s UTC.
8-Feb-25, Sat:- “912/34” again.

13908 kHz, 0745 UTC
7-Jan-25, Tue:- “223/32”, message, “Out” at 0754:41s UTC.
14-Jan-25, Tue:- “224/00”
16-Jan-25, Thu:- “227/00”
21-Jan-25, Tue:- “224/00”
23-Jan-25, Thu:- “229/00”
28-Jan-25, Tue:- “223/00”
30-Jan-25, Thu:- “224/00”

4-Feb-25, Tue:- “228/00”
11-Feb-25, Tue:- “225/00”
13-Feb-25, Thu:- “221/00”
20-Feb-25, Thu:- “221/31”, message, “Out” at 0754:35s UTC.

15915 kHz, 0900 UTC
6-Jan-25, Mon:- “530/34”, message, “Out” at 0910:10s UTC.
8-Jan-25, Wed:- “530/34” again.
13-Jan-25, Mon:- “537/00”
15-Jan-25, Wed:- “536/00”
20-Jan-25, Mon:- “537/00”
22-Jan-25, Wed:- “533/00”
29-Jan-25, Wed:- “534/00”
3-Feb-25, Mon:- “534/00”
5-Feb-25, Wed:- “538/00”
10-Feb-25, Mon:- “530/00”
12-Feb-25, Wed:- “537/00”
19-Feb-25, Wed:- “535/00”
24-Feb-25, Mon:- “532/40”, message, “Out” at 0911:20s UTC.
26-Feb-25, Wed:- “532/40” again.

17378 kHz, 0745 UTC
8-Jan-25, Wed:- “343/00”
10-Jan-25, Fri:- “346/00”
15-Jan-25, Wed:- “343/32”, message, “Out” at 0754:36s UTC.
24-Jan-25, Fri:- “349/00”
29-Jan-25, Wed:- “340/00”
31-Jan-25, Fri:- “343/00”
5-Feb-25, Wed:- “348/00”
7-Feb-25, Fri:- “346/00”
19-Feb-25, Wed:- “346/00”
21-Feb-25, Fri:- “348/00”
26-Feb-25, Wed:- “343/36”, message, “Out” at 0755:23s UTC.

17378 kHz, 0845 UTC
I was unaware of this later schedule on 17378 until I saw it on the prediction list in the last newsletter:-
23-Jan-25, Thu:- “151/32”, message, “Out” at 0854:39s UTC.
30-Jan-25, Thu:- “154/00”
4-Feb-25, Tue:- “156/00”
11-Feb-25, Tue:- “156/00”
18-Feb-25, Tue:- “151/38”, message, “Out” at 0755:51s UTC.
20-Feb-25, Thu:- missed the start, in progress with a message when tuned in at approx 0848, presumably was the same as on the 18th.

S06

From RNGB

S06 log Jan/Feb

Wednesday 0930z 11073kHz 1030z 10212khz

08/01 ‘480’ 613 42 16123 19286 51876 42670 70797 47296 97496 24831 43640 14706 40495 73639 74092 50264 02974 75404 92078 75197 47234 84869 85141 40420 18523 02987 63717 51701 64169 74127 50879 38908 96216 61242 46867 12582 10806 71062 82137 48960 29072 14103 15256 94208 613 42 00000

29/01 ‘480’ 125 46 87065 70564 96947 59160 76054 86268 74102 36961 79486 27248 85165 95963 46365 37354 68935 06723 89040 37134 72145 84673 15063 32737 09640 61241 01890 79283 37548 19694 19720 89246 12151 70593 17493 25843 63919 96320 95314 74610 56701 49061 81367 45372 56160 68278 72698 03708 125 46 00000

Wednesday 0930z 13547kHz 1030z 12093kHz

05/02 ‘480’ 213 45 21058……..etc

12/02 ‘480’ 932 44 48236 07490 09740 21278 83482 07543 25752 95062 01401 07359 48130 86961 28567 61749 18020 67124 30793 64508 34502 76838 80287 09598 07468 87103 12345 90526 21908 48790 75852 29346 39121 81485 76021 48921 89841 20323 85181 25687 95430 92841 14807 21632 63524 04149 932 44 00000 (Thanks Ary)

Friday 2000z 7923kHz 2100z 5938khz

17/01 ‘842’ 00000 (Thanks Gert)

07/02 ‘842’ 00000 (Thanks HfD) (used 7913kHz & 5943khz)

21/02 ‘842’ 00000 (Thanks MG)

Saturday 1600z 9075kHz 1630z 6792kHz Repeats Sunday 0730z 11487kHz 0800z

04/01 ‘480’ 725 44 02548 (Thanks HfD)

18/01 ‘480’ 769 65 56982 92976 50279 67967 26715…] QRT 1612z (Thanks MG)

Saturday 1600z 9463kHz

01/02 ‘480’ 480’ 967 43 01623…….etc

15/02 ‘480’ 657 61 93717 27105 02801 37868 52175…] Twente SDR (Thanks MG)

Sunday 0730z 12093khz 0800kHz 9412kHz
02/02 ‘480’ 967 43 01623…….etc
16/02 ‘480’ 657 61 93717 27105 02801 37868 52875…] Twente SDR MG SUN

S06g
Friday 0925z 10755kHz
28/02 975 975 975 87531 (R) 810 32 53275 45733 93989 53302 06070 06119 88427 40290 76222 39107 95246 37581 47688 66689 10509 31020 52391
37045 92865 77618 69127 87773 23446 2 (25sec silence) 37337 373 (50sec silence)
975 975 975 87531 975 (R) (56sec silence)
975 975 975 87531 (R) 28719 23282 15676 67941 67791 810 32 00000

Recomposed message. Only 29 groups were sent:
975 975 975 87531 (R) 810 32 53275 45733 93989 53302 06070 06119 88427 40290 76222 39107 95246 37581 47688 66689 10509 31020 52391
37045 92865 77618 69127 87773 23446 37337 28719 23282 15676 67941 67791 810 32 00000 (Thanks to Ary)

With Peter’s observations:

First + Third Fridays in the Month Schedule:-
Continues in 2025 and surprised to find that the frequencies, and indeed the “call” are the similar in January as in January and February and also November and December of last year. The expectation was that the frequencies would be in the same parts of the short-wave spectrum as last year but there would need to be a search to find them and that the three-figure call would change.

3-Jan-25:- 2000 UTC, 7923 kHz, “842 842 842 00000”, good signal.
2100 UTC, 5943 kHz, second sending also a good signal.

17-Jan-25:- Missed first sending
2100 UTC, 5938 kHz, “842 842 842 00000”.

Moved back by one hour in February:-
7-Feb-25:- 1900 UTC, 7913 kHz, “842 842 842 00000”, strong signal.
Missed the 2000 UTC sending this evening.

21-Feb-25:- 1900 UTC, 7923 kHz, “842 842 842 00000”, strong.
2000 UTC, 5943 kHz, also strong. Tuned in early to make sure I didn't miss it, just caught pre-transmission warm-up with a single spoken “842” at approx 1938 UTC.

Saturday Schedule, Alternating with E06:-
Nothing heard on the frequencies shown in the prediction list for a Saturday schedule at 1600 + 1630 UTC but the following noted in February:-
1-Feb-25:- 1633 UTC, approx 6792 kHz:- S06 Man in progress with “480” call, DK/GC “967 967 43 43”, found while tuning around and about to give up after finding nothing on predicted frequencies of 8116 at 1600 UTC and 5410 at 1630. Good signal, ended around 1642 UTC. On the following Saturday the E06 English Man showed up on 6792.

15-Feb-25:- S06 “480”, not a strong signal, difficult copy at times, DK/GC “657 657 41 41”. Ended at 1641:45s approx. Nothing found at 1600 UTC.

S11a log Jan/Feb



S11a 11486kHz 1850z 26/02 280/00 FINIT 1853z Fair with QRM3-4 first 1m40s.

From RNGB

5371khz	0830z	05/01 [371/00] Good	RNGB, PLdn	SUN
	0830z	12/01 [373/32 21396……85969] Weak	PLdn	SUN
	0830z	18/01 [373/00] Weak	PLdn	SAT
	0830z	19/01 [373/00] Good	RNGB, PLdn	SUN
	0830z	26/01 [379/00] Twente SDR	MG	SUN
	0830z	01/02 [373/00] Fair	PLdn	SAT
	0830z	09/02 [372/00] Good	RNGB, Pldn	SUN
	0830z	22/02 [373/00] Weak	PLdn, MG	SAT
6252kHz	0915z	06/01 [480/00] Good	RNGB	MON
	0915z	10/01 [483/00] Fair	RNGB, Ary	FRI
	0915z	24/01 [483/35 38005 30152 10600 16233 65917 51494 86865……64954 21126 47535] Fair	RNGB	FRI
	0915z	31/01 [487/00] Fair	RNGB	FRI
	0915z	21/02 [485/00] Fair	RNGB	FRI

	0915z	28/02 [487/00] Weak	RNGB	FRI
9050kHz	0700z	02/01 [477/00] Good	RNGB	THU
	0700z	06/01 [475/40 4325 70449 41601 58100 44853 24104 13231……16744 29347]	Ary	MON
	0700z	13/01 [477/00] Twente SDR	MG	MON
	0700z	16/01 [476/00] Weak	PLdn	THU
	0700z	20/01 [475/00] Weak	PLdn	MON
	0700z	23/01 [476/00] Weak	PLdn	THU
	0700z	03/02 [477/00] Weak	PLdn	MON
	0700z	24/02 [471/00] Weak	Pldn, MG	MON
10448khz	1400z	24/01 [422/00]	Gary H	FRI
	1400z	28/01 [420/00]	Ary	TUE
	1400z	11/02 [426/00] Weak	PLdn	TUE
11486kHz	1850z	01/01 [285/00]	Ary	WED
	1850z	11/01 [288/00]	Ary	SAT
	1850z	01/02 [281/00] Strong	PLdn	SAT
	1850z	19/02 [286/00] Strong	PLdn, MG	WED
	1850z	22/02 [282/00] Strong	PLdn, MG	SAT
	1850z	26/02 [280/00] Fair *see sonogram above*	PLdn	WED
23486kHz	0725z	08/01 [383/38 80053 66074 16883 ... 08871 24346 72845]	Ary	WED

V06

Nil Reports

V07 [Tnx DanAR]

Sunday

January 2025

0200z 17436kHz 0220z 14636kHz 0240z 13436kHz

17436kHz 0200z 05/01 464 1 3178 79 38973 ... 29124 000 000 Weak DanAR, H-FD SUN

464 464 464 1
3178 79
38973 18191 41248 63964 12904
79355 05947 40927 57436 31923
66055 98425 88008 71027 91200
43317 14660 86618 03620 37298
66380 10311 25104 66518 09287
66422 64892 51932 34886 34040
54897 32731 99993 00113 81652
05522 86488 59288 28929 37868
52874 39272 62830 34805 32581
82097 93834 50267 23384 86494
33340 21056 29439 69479 72114
95641 45559 95611 94183 08559
61367 45566 32808 86996 71621
23739 26288 33859 95411 99227
85922 88187 14720 87604 70564
34727 47056 30632 29124
000 000 *Courtesy DanAR*

17436kHz 0200z 12/01 464 1 1223 64 83475 ... 17882 000 000 Weak DanAR SUN

464 464 464 1
1223 64
83475 02222 94474 01315 30310
67017 67835 19171 59605 44341
82079 26373 95250 41059 39656
05857 98189 51160 48601 68644
90485 00884 35320 37408 57641
38553 72502 14947 27064 73846
40351 76448 16185 08063 44070
18037 33436 43988 61963 39648
85713 50218 48810 58654 19317
09995 54664 59020 01800 13021
52098 98904 08313 29264 01494
86731 51757 47201 59237 30950
94929 12531 78103 17882
000 000 *Courtesy DanAR*

17436kHz 0200z 19/01 464 1 8042 42 17427 ... 95768 000 000 Weak DanAR SUN

464 464 464 1
8042 42
17427 66753 37264 30548 62356
10884 12854 50589 76903 68649
50860 74502 76621 00515 66961
05499 21461 71673 75491 36591
33621 75168 65050 98466 40407
92649 20810 36173 96100 17027
56384 01245 12939 35815 99089
53777 31118 01777 58417 96937
99608 95768 000 000
Courtesy DanAR

February 2025

0200z 18217kHz 0220z 16317kHz 0240z 15817kHz

15817kHz 0240z 02/02 238 1 5819 92 14463 ... 02823 000 000 QSA3 DanAR SUN

238 238 238 1
5819 92
14463 20582 97561 63762 15707
79962 51613 03774 59349 40770
08463 08039 59848 27506 28677
44000 55109 38947 56913 06025
78833 63984 04151 31291 66329
07268 39067 58372 13187 88767
38069 95943 10667 71013 66925
38881 41254 72347 62959 48101
65476 19375 23050 68064 10162
19515 09437 13871 90490 07872
78156 60391 11778 80066 96354
51604 43451 48124 93830 92042
91716 60267 38987 82047 94604
60383 43602 14991 52180 64633
37985 30822 29847 37497 85665
88891 03339 13686 05041 44239
11454 84309 91425 78363 57157
71446 42281 06838 65513 69140
54554 02823 000 000
Courtesy DanAR

18217kHz 0200z 09/02 238 1 1261 56 54927 ... 50173 000 000 QSA3 DanAR SUN

238 238 238 1
1261 56
54927 49191 93028 01826 09793
87206 94163 82247 53359 88591
07792 75862 68237 34906 63549
99950 01065 74841 21942 16218
50155 15470 41797 18547 95515
21449 40638 36934 41010 53059
62500 37517 87669 10104 64289
46851 87330 98897 16243 78911
78490 32834 81313 79276 86863
20357 58004 77687 35159 25764
61185 97105 66154 23815 48301
50173 000 000
Courtesy DanAR

18217kHz 0200z 16/02 3628 87 45098 ... 70941 000 000 QSA3 DanAR SUN

238 238 238 1
3628 87
45098 85712 94149 77347 80378
58258 36794 17972 32463 23614
76038 15462 27254 13353 21460
90729 72109 80785 08941 66752
00221 10528 03203 75120 69847
03407 32378 53434 43434 55544
25157 90272 93873 00160 17064
33684 10619 96933 30412 13643
14621 37067 90359 53086 42535
73848 34743 71042 17952 06812
15234 72921 37552 06611 89567
02272 05987 17816 38260 05806
14302 00449 67217 30587 91516
19121 19710 99468 81497 18646
53255 97305 97010 02481 33673

74578 35108 51475 74653 66286
36400 72102 10585 16817 12932
53694 70941 000 000
Courtesy DanAR

18217kHz 0200z 23/02 238 1 8510 92 34388 ... 35166 000 000 QSA3 QSB1 DanAR SUN

238 238 238 1
8510 92
34388 58492 73265 59544 32260
59855 09453 52806 50463 15732
24022 61706 29390 59868 64499
19452 91689 42295 62378 41643
62321 57170 94220 66177 22478
37643 12477 56988 84688 24276
50432 22895 85178 07051 01271
78961 31576 53409 85857 67634
90475 71892 86122 97165 07383
26256 13820 52925 72912 66317
36349 57400 89853 13541 16118
95576 00464 26309 40551 38313
15775 40938 47644 83699 17535
17028 56895 40862 44435 75693
24088 98061 57429 75428 86348
27977 20204 57004 36920 82665
72143 92811 98811 17916 70855
93862 48551 41159 50067 65217
71186 35166 000 000
Courtesy DanAR

V13 New Star Radio

V15 North Korean Intelligence via Radio Pyongyang

657, 3250, 3320, 6400kHz

V24 South Korean intelligence

Nil Reports

V26

Nil Reports

Polytones

XPA1 Wed/Fri

January2025

1310z 14852kHz 1330z 13952kHz 1350z 11552kHz

01/01 895 1 00233 00151 21536 ... 25657 1350z Weak, rest Strong

895 895 895 1 895 895 895 1 895 895 895 1

00233 00151 21536 74194 08784 08846 74763 64240 93489 53469
18015 48002 01173 03909 93987 21436 91089 44752 98059 61082
01560 68303 29831 58702 41911 95041 80583 54215 90985 99349
36964 91082 63497 28482 48839 07642 42430 62659 94749 61597
62299 39355 07660 17983 71252 49675 09072 31962 59657 79687
61015 83802 93590 38390 77187 49715 83972 12985 57069 63594

13990 25198 46631 93816

85312 36671 99759 86337 73487 23298 11724 83174 61610 77685
75428 87210 98868 08285 29611 56975 97276 78664 10289 20087
08265 78708 08092 70309 54877 56778 12157 62361 21771 03098
56911 61880 79949 99246 90802 01274 00994 58034 01500 34494
66379 47335 59481 04143 09722 45200 40869 94068 03554 77100
81765 00797 18267 79360 63502 73894 63371 51944 49297 50735
62543 80542 39566 25463

94788 66200 55940 94353 60929 44723 90812 16704 65160 76202
92126 55827 42715 03304 66585 04486 26375 73203 20288 32735
34062 60997 27455 67073 97488 25267 *Courtesy PLdn*

03/01	895 1 00233 00151 21536 ... 25657	1310z Strong, 1350z Fair, 1350z Weak
08/01	865 000 06956 00001 00000 ... 40663	1310z Weak, rest Fair, 1350z QRM3
10/01	895 000 06458 00001 00000 ... 37662	1350z Weak QRM3, rest Fair
15/01	895 1 07542 00205 48361 ... 41301	1310z Strong, 1330z Very strong, 1350z Weak QSB3

895 895 895 1 895 895 895 1 895 895 895 1

07542 00205 48361 72145 97083 94009 06289 17506 10021 35816
30628 05174 99251 68754 73625 82834 67365 96633 31899 16639
74937 16476 12346 67340 92568 92084 61130 68904 76899 00453
80041 95121 89784 54857 27866 97098 03300 14796 22926 72892
57434 69538 02885 37471 19376 45753 36135 84077 82102 12648
78279 10248 04922 63807 44853 75852 31430 85187 89807 05532
78443 72861 34837 19522

46086 69589 91817 13457 46055 54225 36835 76287 20929 47485
48408 30363 99156 82062 68600 49950 82863 52138 09838 51211
33613 20748 57740 27618 33809 87670 70933 34662 85857 93899
40114 45515 06491 53658 41126 31596 91482 54587 30558 89606
02504 83135 04074 27150 74642 51046 10290 20406 43313 45436
58101 29433 57976 26466 74026 07596 26908 15399 35231 16968
12374 25955 47949 79766

20700 02570 85619 72423 53967 91998 28479 50532 48114 58839
90125 47592 17382 81779 87597 04225 41398 94490 54960 40585
59081 01979 27396 26615 51787 69125 60608 82785 71905 65848
55265 69308 98351 88618 18331 73564 72934 78636 67739 92882
31179 65528 04209 08480 44235 09801 03176 12984 03002 82335
01503 90786 54398 57604 12871 80149 15071 31382 14987 99554
36346 05714 99565 38913

66443 21239 13676 68216 10447 08892 67690 78098 90526 92128
87773 53658 57286 31638 47676 41301 *Courtesy PLdn*

17/01	895 1 07542 00205 48361 ... 41301	1310zWeak, rest Fair
21/01	895 1 07542 00205 48361 ... 41301	1330z Fair, rest Weak
24/01	895 1 07542 00205 48361 ... 41301	1350z Weak, rest Fair
29/01	895 1 00401 00132 83562 … 27730	1350z Unworkable, rest Fair

895 895 895 1 895 895 895 1 895 895 895 1

00401 00132 83562 42217 86031 97213 81599 85099 42158 54305
01221 32247 20957 43671 26496 72390 03933 29064 26813 82314
97340 63666 86570 44882 35849 75426 30425 05464 79395 10624
57364 24716 58599 41731 80914 62468 37287 09086 23853 65762
55940 05115 38162 39294 97323 02275 85877 63773 68938 87125
36516 04470 75373 29709 60113 63515 91488 23098 98727 44355
79292 78968 66360 73800

92515 68780 77898 68791 29667 12376 24087 25048 20291 10195
55882 77635 68845 25748 96244 19133 80392 52237 33303 82319
15465 63595 30386 40560 77941 56724 01736 61348 92152 17678
73829 89717 01301 57428 52917 37712 19904 43142 81322 85234
60178 61608 16256 47704 32147 20655 28751 08176 19575 05792
28519 29486 63473 27482 32544 16307 78909 22519 17649 35444
29405 12899 90485 04162

63332 62819 42725 28967 56955 47280 27730 *Courtesy PLdn*

31/01	895 1 00401 00132 83562 … 27730	13/01 Weak QSB3/4, 1330z Strong, 1350z Unworkable

February 2025

1310z 14374kHz 1330z 13374kHz 1350z 11474kHz

05/02 334 1 00401 00132 83562 ... 27730 1310z Strong, rest Weak

12/02 334 1 00491 00147 53722 ... 55510 1330z Strong, rest Fair, 1350z QRM2

334 334 334 1 334 334 334 1 334 334 334 1

00491 00147 53722 21394 62354 59098 01475 96441 93468 93771
29020 16854 32108 38686 20653 53151 32287 74233 48715 07181
57858 75168 96416 90054 40422 88380 30376 75660 43464 29998
79657 29160 87517 42347 81565 32971 46337 43618 89799 80553
63991 06145 14349 83641 14789 72000 21594 58834 38761 79719
45906 58080 17001 48042 71186 41926 81827 39181 11008 12667
83903 23534 21769 05647
.
23458 73334 06897 55575 26179 21634 09750 08929 25813 31494
61125 02798 91424 59572 25924 91490 02817 78948 14140 54433
07151 58847 74278 75029 35444 23282 70644 36808 69891 02503
51044 57798 11463 50394 41959 97779 04107 34081 54710 12904
50104 89777 00097 24607 87463 77125 48400 78723 88447 86246
50875 94992 06116 03131 64506 20560 68522 44525 95655 38298
95880 70955 20851 04819

07284 59117 92523 41007 16573 22300 29056 91939 11520 06772
28518 91093 42398 88141 02275 31905 40861 59896 70137 00771
80885 55510 *Courtesy PLdn*

14/02 334 1 00491 00147 53722 ... 55510 Weak, 1350z

19/02 334 1 00719 00099 90436 ... 11230 1350z Unworkable, rest Weak

21/02 334 1 00719 00099 90436 ... 11230 Weak, 1350z QRM3

334 334 334 1 334 334 334 1 334 334 334 1

00719 00099 90436 06543 74341 55054 54007 00140 47711 50537
98779 12402 51427 17432 66186 51312 46783 85970 49842 13751
95306 10256 89141 39632 79893 45672 68357 55339 84105 40880
86232 12857 13161 93434 31733 30116 50589 58845 91427 87757
27666 71844 05254 75564 33660 23534 37369 70149 76256 17103
04986 11404 51853 34142 62557 19548 57875 31844 53237 48868
77563 01743 37330 84070

15219 17556 79986 00241 42697 02138 54351 56523 47463 87900
37648 08942 32617 46595 88446 95147 43276 44612 73619 01992
51426 73322 43205 88232 11638 63467 68151 42132 20884 16012
76958 63382 52199 35608 93468 02598 05906 11230
Courtesy PLdn

26/02 334 1 00792 00153 92773 ... 40564 Weak, 1350z QRM3

334 334 334 1 334 334 334 1 334 334 334 1

00792 00153 92773 29864 52940 23374 62684 28282 52361 19652
25408 36274 97291 78245 96469 51871 98653 11171 62309 49093
01051 64322 85496 41974 58536 44321 52676 48562 21134 27464
05725 76857 59735 01152 79947 40467 31351 29420 87877 64595
16988 10975 72310 47049 58730 19220 78576 62549 06831 17678
46813 39259 11772 09885 11824 03551 21948 75349 94554 10151
59178 00777 61871 59644

30864 54135 29751 36793 26381 95502 03211 40491 66459 95083
35007 97813 07351 96422 05765 97882 48421 35765 67690 64336
49621 62299 68880 69845 20150 34964 85018 51921 06341 19765
69961 10321 97003 18657 05251 43282 14689 82322 24593 41390
17562 10477 91156 19002 06512 44227 12217 72367 62808 88310
29008 06707 27780 80527 27515 61603 85700 64992 99006 66884
24325 38139 31317 29648

52010 72963 39749 35368 61402 23339 00610 90721 48831 35831
39676 44811 21770 51466 59905 72114 03279 96276 76530 27782
54377 17422 04548 41475 49023 94264 53672 40564
Courtesy PLdn

28/02 334 1 00792 00153 92773 ... 40564 Fair, 1350z Weak

XPA2 Mon/Wed [p]

January 2025

0800z 11493kHz 0820z 13393kHz 0840z 13993kHz

01/01 00517 00156 14499 ... 64326 0800z Strong, rest Very strong

00517 00156 14499 30652 51253 01052 76102 52425 87648 48051
49627 71931 60079 24076 66671 57939 34259 81089 19506 08211
32608 61541 73240 48331 41617 13082 93748 27627 62405 02022
62858 54216 88186 05490 13786 67695 62970 00034 42169 56652
28504 48187 09080 22665 56510 79273 07117 71932 31847 36102
64842 20769 04590 73873 79854 58510 70748 90510 42473 59250
25796 90768 83660 96190 64802 42964 17284 34336 48505 45793
19654 96782 82446 64213 15550 04281 34996 62104 56279 29907
56202 24429 99963 86362 50787 04847 00199 51850 45009 60041
87715 06275 25492 09021 62414 71639 49160 79890 68679 93603
30495 04666 01921 61125 60376 50196 22284 59825 15750 25176
01625 92744 31949 75285 29754 64929 99153 32080 55812 18416
04438 97939 94411 24952 93534 16276 59048 49240 51272 07813
09327 86376 01398 29273 56298 73118 83801 57893 02163 20582
98784 71091 07150 59710 89728 72425 75940 39360 97771 00961
44838 64760 93203 03030 72412 82192 61994 24670 64326
Courtesy PLdn

06/01 00517 00156 14499 ... 64326 Very strong

08/01 00517 00156 14499 ... 64326 Very strong

13/01 09909 00001 00000 ... 42261 Very strong

15/01 07838 00001 00000 ... 41262 0840z Very stromg, rest Strong

20/01 04979 00001 00000 ... 42263 0800z Strong, rest Very strong

22/01 04172 00001 00000 ... 32663 Very strong



13393kHz 0820z 27/01/2025 1m33s Intro only.

27/01 06664 00213 17550 ... 47540 Weak, 0820z 1m33s Intro only

06664 00213 17550 21242 90248 74491 55094 13348 38779 07598
40787 45150 26026 99629 86653 85791 37879 48271 27890 26342
61899 57258 48061 18420 37287 55430 43550 86746 18219 60180
40716 04353 10684 53893 88557 30642 43545 40406 62922 42319
31773 00098 45761 37257 56885 07627 26419 81198 52886 41578
23976 26938 59400 01210 87028 57809 18030 11040 53032 90919
07618 81176 41069 99726 06007 71839 78661 75416 49695 85085
44017 92674 66072 40299 94042 26252 82326 91765 53620 73418
94380 91740 33088 06914 51815 04244 67505 10090 49980 16835
37043 63059 73926 49161 60879 54736 15751 30360 23310 51771
38916 93273 73362 98233 50451 09928 66726 85708 97831 50250
54828 33879 07310 08304 82612 96918 20372 99951 57038 70616
34904 31881 11709 13961 04282 80847 26311 65149 93236 77973
73751 51951 62949 26525 03143 55058 21626 57062 85336 58732
25495 37896 02448 90358 65382 75586 38055 09735 61877 92268
65249 08638 72649 12229 93262 36417 56631 18721 33472 23902
88616 88672 72998 36139 70269 31535 25072 38359 62062 83288
78900 92274 56415 52386 69196 18440 83903 51689 95599 89156
59422 69720 39210 02573 74483 45228 04040 05333 62687 60117
99000 54338 20692 60299 08407 85443 25294 82126 73004 41375
35915 28108 16390 84258 88096 32113 23235 25329 58069 63237
48260 41831 83758 44910 27570 36637 47540 *Courtesy PLdn*

29/01 06664 00213 17550 ... 47540 0840z Very strong, rest Strong

February 2025

0800z 13387kHz 0820z 13887kHz 0840z 14787kHz

Mon 03.02.2025 0800Z 13387 msg, XPA2p
Mon 03.02.2025 0820Z 13887 msg, XPA2p
Mon 03.02.2025 0840Z 14787 msg, XPA2p

05/02	06664 00213 17550 ... 47540	Very strong
07/02	LIGHTNING, not monitored	
10/02	05799 00001 00000 … 41266	0840z Fair, rest Strong
12/02	09213 00001 00000 … 33662	Very strong
17/02	07474 00001 00000 ... 35266	Very strong
19/02	02353 00001 00000 ... 34257	Very strong
24/02	06392 00001 00000 ... 33667	Very strong
26/02	01316 00001 00000 ... 35652	Very strong

XPA2 Mon/Sat

January 2025

1600z 9317kHz 1620z 8117kHz 1640z 7517kHz

04/01	00488 Rest no copy, poor sigs	
06/01	05747 00001 00000 ... 35264	1620z QRM5, rest Weak
11/01	05314 00001 00000 ... 34656	Weak, 1620z QRM5
13/01	04489 00153 37044 ... 22112	1600z Unworkable, rest Weak. 1620z QRM4

04489 00153 37044 61692 48619 45593 81915 25081 38744 53630
85302 25232 37765 10251 35669 85566 85090 54668 13601 17028
16524 78183 66356 78351 70236 11478 70592 33562 91755 04587
64630 72150 48775 03103 97035 22504 73516 85425 20887 95775
50619 15569 61682 21487 21988 63472 28811 07682 33214 02689
76984 99873 63231 10803 98059 68139 67394 64221 87341 30160
59170 66820 73011 35950 33517 23084 02446 84740 81727 39650
46725 88449 94965 71914 33011 70242 42928 89810 96698 01018
68650 12112 00979 80617 39781 23567 04310 97803 08820 13452
51155 58258 17733 69067 22719 00097 06005 37664 52477 17130
69644 37360 12772 39090 90680 63314 67076 24190 75802 05914
09224 44287 18038 22956 51879 57568 42557 66236 64847 63921
43747 19478 68289 10618 10134 47177 77582 12543 61184 98052
59657 20149 63264 93600 80416 74000 14857 54920 99433 74880
98299 77956 09720 05976 59429 91192 59016 27988 29918 62867
73869 75345 73863 09182 13761 22112 *Courtesy PLdn*

18/01	04489 00153 37044 ... 22112	Weak, 1620z QRM4
20/01	03246 00001 00000 ... 35257	Weak
25/01	05234 00001 00000 ... 34270	1600z Unworkable, rest Weak
27/01	Not Monitored – Lightning strikes nearby	

February 2025

1600z 11461kHz 1620z 10261kHz 1640z 9161kHz

01/02	00156 00182 70933 ... 33341	Weak
03/02	04231 00001 00000 ... 32657	Weak
08/02	NOT MONITORED, off watch	
10/02	00850 00179 35156 ... 74321	1600z Very weak, rest Weak
15/02	00850 00179 35156 ... 74321	Weak

17/02	06229 00001 00000 ... 36660	1600z Unworkable, rest Fair
22/02	09164 00001 00000 ... 33667	1620z Weak, rest Fair
24/02	00469 00140 09640 ... 27720 [*Interesting relationship between first and third group and possibly between second and last. Intended message or dummy*]?	Weak

XPA2 Tue/Fri *[Reception in Southern England difficult]*

January 2025

1100z	**10231kHz**	**1120z**	**9331kHz**	**1140z**	**8131kHz**	
03/01	1100z Unworkable, rest NRH					[These freqs totally scuppered by ADSL QRM]
07/01	1100z Unworkable, rest NRH					
10/01	1100z Unworkable, rest NRH					
14/01	Msg 2m36s lg					1120z NRH, rest Unworkable
17/01	NRH					
21/01	NRH					
24/01	Null Msg					1120z NRH QRM5, rest Unworkable
28/01	NOT MONITORED					
31/01	1100z Unworkable, rest NRH					

February 2025

1100z	**12147kHz**	**1120z**	**10347kHz**	**1140z**	**9247kHz**	
04/02	1100z 60s of intro [weak] then LOS, rest Unworkable					
07/02	1100z Unworkable Null Msg, rest NRH					
11/02	00320 00098 77750 ... 73233					1100z Weak 1120z Unworkable, 1140z NRH
14/02	00320 00098 77750 ... 73233					1100z Weak, rest NRH
18/02	00320 00098 77750 ... 73233					1100z Weak, rest NRH
21/02	00320 00098 77750 ... 73233					1100z Weak, rest NRH
25/02	09777 00001 00000 ... 40270					1100z Weak, rest NRH
28/02	07989 00001 00000 ... 4n267					1100z Weak QSB3 rest NRH

Other Polytones

Via H-FD

1B XPA2

Wed 01.01.2025 0910Z 14977 msg
Wed 01.01.2025 0930Z 13971 msg
Wed 01.01.2025 0950Z 13371 msg

Wed 01.01.2025 1100Z 13384 msg
Wed 01.01.2025 1120Z 12184 msg
Wed 01.01.2025 1140Z 10984 msg

Wed 01.01.2025 1200Z 13878 msg
Wed 01.01.2025 1220Z 14978 msg
Wed 01.01.2025 1240Z 16278 msg

Thu 02.01.2025 1600Z 10465 msg
Thu 02.01.2025 1620Z 9165 msg
Thu 02.01.2025 1640Z 8065 msg

Sat 04.01.2025 0910Z 14794 msg
Sat 04.01.2025 0930Z 13994 msg
Sat 04.01.2025 0950Z 12194 msg

Mon 06.01.2025 0800Z 11493 msg, XPA2p
Mon 06.01.2024 0820Z 13393 msg, XPA2p
Mon 06.01.2025 0840Z 13993 msg, XPA2p

Tue 07.01.2025 1100Z 10231 msg
Tue 07.01.2025 1120Z 9331 msg
Tue 07.01.2025 1140Z 8131 msg

XPA2

16146	13-02-2025 0910 XPA2	MFSK-16/20Bd	09796 00001 00000 37672	Ary	THU
15846	13-02-2025 0930 XPA2	MFSK-16/20Bd	09796 00001 00000 37672	Ary	THU
14446	13-02-2025 0950 XPA2	MFSK-16/20Bd	09796 00001 00000 37672	Ary	THU

13967	13-02-2025 1110 XPA2	MFSK-16/20Bd	02687 00001 00000 37662	Ary	THU
13367	13-02-2025 1120 XPA2	MFSK-16/20Bd	02687 00001 00000 37662	Ary	THU
11567	13-02-2025 1140 XPA2	MFSK-16/20Bd	02687 00001 00000 37662	Ary	THU

1B XPA2 from H-FD

Sat 01.02.2025 0910Z 16146 msg
Sat 01.02.2025 0930Z 15846 msg
Sat 01.02.2025 0950Z 14446 msg

Mon 03.02.2025 0910Z 16102 msg
Mon 03.02.2025 0930Z 14951 msg
Mon 03.02.2025 0950Z 13991 msg

Wed 05.02.2025 1100Z 13967 msg
Wed 05.02.2025 1120Z 13367 msg
Wed 05.02.2025 1140Z 11567 msg

Wed 05.02.2026 1200Z 14956 msg
Wed 05.02.2025 1220Z 16356 msg
Wed 05.02.2025 1240Z 17456 msg

Tue 11.02.2025 1600Z 12173 msg
Tue 11.02.2025 1620Z 10373 msg
Tue 11.02.2025 1640Z 9373 msg

XPB1

Wed/Sat

January 2025

15925kHz	1200z	01/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
14825kHz	1210z	01/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
13425kHz	1220z	01/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
12125kHz	1230z	01/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
10425kHz	1240z	01/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
9325kHz	1250z	01/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED

15925kHz	1200z	04/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
14825kHz	1210z	04/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
13425kHz	1220z	04/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
12125kHz	1230z	04/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
10425kHz	1240z	04/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
9325kHz	1250z	04/01	NRH		PLdn	SAT

15925kHz	1200z	08/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
14825kHz	1210z	08/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
13425kHz	1220z	08/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
12125kHz	1230z	08/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	WED
10425kHz	1240z	08/01	NRH		PLdn	WED
9325kHz	1250z	08/01	NRH		PLdn	WED

15925kHz	1200z	11/01	Strong	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
14825kHz	1210z	11/01	Strong	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
13425kHz	1220z	11/01	Strong	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
12125kHz	1230z	11/01	Fair	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
10425kHz	1240z	11/01	NRH		PLdn	SAT
9325kHz	1250z	11/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	SAT

15925kHz 1200z	15/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
14825kHz 1210z	15/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
13425kHz 1220z	15/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
12125kHz 1230z	15/01	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
10425kHz 1240z	15/01	V.weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
9325kHz 1250z	15/01	V.weak	4m28s	PLdn	WED
15925kHz 1200z	18/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
14825kHz 1210z	18/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
13425kHz 1220z	18/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
12125kHz 1230z	18/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
10425kHz 1240z	18/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
9325kHz 1250z	18/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
15925kHz 1200z	22/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
14825kHz 1210z	22/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
13425kHz 1220z	22/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
12125kHz 1230z	22/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
10425kHz 1240z	22/01	NRH		PLdn	WED
9325kHz 1250z	22/01	NRH		PLdn	WED
15925kHz 1200z	25/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
14825kHz 1210z	25/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
13425kHz 1220z	25/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
12125kHz 1230z	25/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
10425kHz 1240z	25/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
9325kHz 1250z	25/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	SAT
15925kHz 1200z	29/01	Fair	2m15s	PLdn	WED
14825kHz 1210z	29/01	Fair	2m15s	PLdn	WED
13425kHz 1220z	29/01	Fair	2m15s	PLdn	WED
12125kHz 1230z	29/01	Fair	2m15s	PLdn	WED
10425kHz 1240z	29/01	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
9325kHz 1250z	29/01	NRH		PLdn	WED

February 2025

14873kHz 1200z	01/02	Weak	2m50s	PLdn	SAT
14373kHz 1210z	01/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	SAT
13873kHz 1220z	01/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	SAT
13373kHz 1230z	01/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	SAT
12173kHz 1240z	01/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	SAT
11173kHz 1250z	01/02	Weak	2m50s	PLdn	SAT
14873kHz 1200z	05/02	Strong	2m50s	PLdn	WED
14373kHz 1210z	05/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	WED
13873kHz 1220z	05/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	WED
13373kHz 1230z	05/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	WED
12173kHz 1240z	05/02	Fair	2m50s	PLdn	WED
11173kHz 1250z	05/02	Fair	2m50s QRM2	PLdn	WED
08/02	NOT MONITORED, off watch			PLdn	SAT
14873kHz 1200z	12/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
14373kHz 1210z	12/02	Missed		PLdn	WED
13873kHz 1220z	12/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
13373kHz 1230z	12/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
12173kHz 1240z	12/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
11173kHz 1250z	12/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
14873kHz 1200z	15/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	SAT
14373kHz 1210z	15/02	Missed		PLdn	SAT
13873kHz 1220z	15/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	SAT
13373kHz 1230z	15/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	SAT
12173kHz 1240z	15/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	SAT
11173kHz 1250z	15/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	SAT
14873kHz 1200z	19/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
14373kHz 1210z	19/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
13873kHz 1220z	19/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
13373kHz 1230z	19/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
12173kHz 1240z	19/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
11173kHz 1250z	19/02	Weak	3m07s	PLdn	WED
14873kHz 1200z	22/02	Strong	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
14373kHz 1210z	22/02	Strong	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
13873kHz 1220z	22/02	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
13373kHz 1230z	22/02	Strong	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
12173kHz 1240z	22/02	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	SAT
11173kHz 1250z	22/02	Weak	4m28s	PLdn	SAT

14873kHz 1200z	26/02	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
14373kHz 1210z	26/02	MISSED		PLdn	WED
13873kHz 1220z	26/02	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
13373kHz 1230z	26/02	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
12173kHz 1240z	26/02	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED
11173kHz 1250z	26/02	Weak	2m15s	PLdn	WED

Other XPB1 [H-FD]

Wed 01.01.2025 1200Z 15925 MFSK-16 4:31
Wed 01.01.2025 1210Z 14825 MFSK-16
Wed 01.01.2025 1220Z 13425 MFSK-16
Wed 01.01.2025 1230Z 12125 MFSK-16
Wed 01.01.2025 1240Z 10425 MFSK-16
Wed 01.01.2025 1250Z 9325 MFSK-16

Fri 03.01.2025 1300Z 20069 MFSK-16 4:30
Fri 03.01.2025 1310Z 19369 MFSK-16
Fri 03.01.2025 1320Z 18269 MFSK-16
Fri 03.01.2025 1330Z 17469 MFSK-16
Fri 03.01.2025 1340Z 16269 MFSK-16
Fri 03.01.2025 1350Z 15969 MFSK-16

Tue 07.01.2025 0600Z 19343 MFSK-16 4:32 x12187via KiwiSDR RUS
Tue 07.01.2025 0610Z 18243 MFSK-16 x13387 via KiwiSDR RUS
Tue 07.01.2025 0620Z 17443 MFSK-16 x13887 via KiwiSDR RUS
Tue 07.01.2025 0630Z 16243 MFSK-16 x14487 via KiwiSDR RUS
Tue 07.01.2025 0643Z 15843 MFSK-16 x14987 via KiwiSDR RUS
Tue 07.01.2025 0653Z 14443 MFSK-16 x15887 via KiwiSDR RUS

Mon 03.02.2025 0600Z 19521 MFSK-16 1:41 x13443
Mon 03.02.2025 0610Z 19121 MFSK-16 x13943
Mon 03.02.2025 0620Z 18221 MFSK-16 x14443
Mon 03.02.2025 0630Z 17421 MFSK-16 x14943
Mon 03.02.2025 0640Z 16321 MFSK-16 x15843
Mon 03.02.2025 0650Z 15821 MFSK-16 x16343

Fri 07.02.2025 1300Z 20035 MFSK-16 1:40
Fri 07.02.2025 1310Z 19235 MFSK-16
Fri 07.02.2025 1320Z 18335 MFSK-16
Fri 07.02.2025 1330Z 17435 MFSK-16
Fri 07.02.2025 1340Z 16235 MFSK-16
Fri 07.02.2025 1353Z 15835 MFSK-16
Tnx H-FD

FSK/PSK series

Courtesy H-FD

1A F01

Tue 07.01.2025 1015Z 11079 FSK 200/500 7:40 via KiwiSDR BLR
Tue 07.01.2025 1021Z 9162 FSK 200/500 via KiwiSDR POL
Tue 07.01.2025 1031Z 7509 FSK 200/500 via KiwiSDR POLweak, QRM by MX'

Courtesy Ary :

4181	10-01-2025 0530 P023	PSK		Polish intel.
4181	10-01-2025 0535 P023	PSK		Polish intel.
11531	10-01-2025 0800 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
11531	10-01-2025 0805 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
25060	10-01-2025 0810 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
25060	10-01-2025 0815 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
15905	10-01-2025 0850 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
15905	10-01-2025 0855 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
6304	10-01-2025 0930 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
6304	10-01-2025 0935 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
6480	10-01-2025 0945 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.
6480	10-01-2025 0950 F03l	FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp		Polish intel.

5815 10-01-2025 1100 P03 PSK Polish intel.
5815 10-01-2025 1105 P03 PSK Polish intel.

Ary remarks, "No Polish 11 stations during the rest of the day. Maintenance or technical issues??? "and folllows on with: "The outage started after the transmission at 1105z on January 10th and lasted until January 11th 1610z."

5831 11-01-2025 1730 P03k BPSK 100Bd/480bp Polish intel.
5831 11-01-2025 1735 P03k BPSK 100Bd/480bp Polish intel.

F01

12184 13-02-2025 1015 F01 FSK 200/500 Messages 65 and 66
10169 13-02-2025 1025 F01 FSK 200/500 Messages 65 and 66
8079 14-02-2025 1035 F01 FSK 200/500 Messages 65 and 66

37192 44145 92899 70711 75389 29052 34600 02838 43114 47951
54595 50912 27022 00309 56148 35921 30360 68930 61174 81862
20271 00254 30447 10546 70514 61688 69058 62649 35536 55699
15578 37243 16811 95312 38333 66952 07425 70734 87258 70955
25805 61772 74747 53001 74553 75745 83952 36630 85312 15568
27952 54792 35604 07697 08244 36049 48582 44629 45990 54542
11628 21645 84450 35919 74731 72463 86045 36404 14599 33521
72491 37203 75418 91551 81429 21426 22221 94147 38006 25714
67779 28002 64824 83764 58981 94514 78717 03940 33605 37443
47775 65091 00000

95676 27477 31672 87897 16780 82525 55626 56611 31917 50335
26693 28963 63429 79998 52217 26118 14383 48052 95919 46846
54379 56281 10639 49934 25379 29607 71546 39046 59741 75020
14544 73460 27657 87479 09529 53117 56153 13731 23200 51431
86882 09957 51108 94284 64860 54233 23637 08656 75344 99687
15584 89313 71056 79332 14053 57011 56913 98487 24333 06627
24468 75743 18453 68680 53252 18392 56092 32669 21190 43272
32555 05650 91283 78961 33473 04526 66768 10250 00936 05448
31893 66081 00000 +++++ +++++ +++++

F03l

17120 13-02-2025 0835 F03l FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp Polish intel.
17120 13-02-2025 0840 F03l FSK-2 100Bd/200Hz/448bp Polish intel.

F03j

5946 13-02-2025 0915 F03j FSK-4 100Bd/400Hz/448bp Polish intel.
5946 13-02-2025 0920 F03j FSK-4 100Bd/400Hz/448bp Polish intel.

F06

11164 13-02-2025 1200 F06 FSK 200/1000 11166 70202 25846 12057 01179 and 11166 70202 36851 12058 02239
9164 13-02-2025 1210 F06 FSK 200/1000 11166 70202 25846 12057 01179 and 11166 70202 36851 12058 02239
7617 13-02-2025 1220 F06 FSK 200/1000 11166 70202 25846 12057 01179 and 11166 70202 36851 12058 02239

19237 13-02-2025 1330 F06 FSK 200/1000 11166 80214 89562 12066 00049 00000 00000 00000 00000 (wrong date)
14979 13-02-2025 1340 F06 FSK 200/1000 11166 80214 89562 12066 00049 00000 00000 00000 00000 (wrong date)
12205 13-02-2025 1350 F06 FSK 200/1000 11166 80214 89562 12066 00049 00000 00000 00000 00000 (wrong date)

X06 Mazielka (1c) logs section

Date	Day	UTC	Freq	Scale	Monitor	Comments
20250101	Wed	0709	11493	1--6--	Andrew/SE	X06b before XPA2
20250101	**Wed**	**1124**	**14978**	**16--11**	**Schorschi**	**X06b**
20250101	**Wed**	**1127**	**14978**	**1--6--**	**Schorschi**	**X06b with buzz**
20250102	**Thu**	**0808**	**12194**	**1--6--**	**Andrew**	**X06b before XPA2**
20250106	**Mon**	**0700**	**10231**	**1--6--**	**Schorschi**	**X06b before XPA2**
20250106	**Mon**	**1503**	**7517**	**1--6--**	**tiNG**	**X06b before XPA2**
20250107	**Tue**	**1658**	**5318**	**1--6--**	**tiNG**	**X06b**
20250110	**Fri**	**0638**	**11350**	**1-----**	**Andrew**	**X06d**
20250110	**Fri**	**0935-0943**	**10653**	**356412**	**Andrew**	**TX to Berlin, G126**
20250113	**Mon**	**0924-0928**	**16117**	**463125**	**Ary, Andrew**	**TX to Rabat, G77**
20250114	**Tue**	**0809-0811**	**17523**	**542136**	**Ary, Dave/AU**	**TX to Beijing, G88**

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20250114 Tue 1012-1016 14970 216354 Ary, Andrew    TX to Chennai, G388
20250115 Wed 1310-1313 18245 231654 Andrew         TX to Abuja, G423
20250116 Thu 0703-0710 19511 314265 Dave           TX to Antananarivo, G178
20250116 Thu 0737-0741 19405 352416 Ary, Andrew    TX to Dar es Salaam, G179
20250116 Thu 0754-0758 17534 351264 Ary, Andrew    TX to Abu Dhabi, G435
20250116 Thu 0924-0929 18197 645321 Ary, Dave      TX to Ho Chi Minh City, G417
20250116 Thu 1332-1354 17468 436512 Dave           TX to Harare, G180(1)
20250117 Fri 0835-0839 13954 213546 Ary, Andrew    TX to Islamabad, G390
20250117 Fri 1339-1341 16320 241563 Ary, Rycat     TX to Karachi, G187
20250120 Mon 0830-0833 14377 432516 Dave           TX to Bern, G341
20250121 Tue 0740-0745 14615 125643 Dave           TX to Ulanbatar, G383
20250121 Tue 0848-0903 18523 325614 Ary, Andrew    TX to Nairobi, G400
20250121 Tue 0904-0909 17350 1--2-3 Ary, Andrew    X06b test
20250121 Tue 0929      13401 154263 Ary            TX to Rome, G148(2)
20250121 Tue 1127-1243 19300 1--2-3 Ary, Rycat     Very long X06b test
20250121 Tue 1130?     15969 161-61 Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1135?     16269 161-61 Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1140?     17469 161-61 Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1145?     18269 161-61 Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1150?     19369 161-61 Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1155?     20069 161-61 Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1200?     15969 1--6-- Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1205?     16269 1--6-- Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1210?     17469 1--6-- Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1220?     18269 1--6-- Ary            X06b
20250121 Tue 1224      19369 1--6-- Ary            X06b
20250122 Wed 0824-0826 13369 412356 Andrew         TX to Budapest, G243
20250122 Wed 0851-0853 16116 134265 Dave           TX to Tunis, G90
20250122 Wed 1040      10984 161616 tiNG           X06a before XPA2(3)
20250123 Thu 0752      12126 521634 Dave           TX to Bucharest, G261
20250123 Thu 0811-0813 14550 153624 Ary, Dave      TX to Damascus, G249
20250123 Thu 1135-1221 19300 111222 Schorschi,
                                    Radio-Fan      Another very long X06b test
20250123 Thu 1222-1239 20300 111222 Schorschi,
                                    Anon61981      X06b, moved from 19300 kHz
20250124 Fri 0954-0957 20605 256134 Andrew         TX to Abidjan, G270
20250126 Sun 0917-0919 16060 261453 Andrew         TX to Cairo, G285
20250127 Mon 0821-0829 17475 156234 Ary, Andrew    TX to Kampala, G203
20250127 Mon 0842      14450 123456 Ary            X06c
20250127 Mon 0937-0943 19235 463125 Ary, Dave      TX to Rabat, G222
20250128 Tue 0725       5318 1--6-- Schorschi      X06b
20250128 Tue 0731      12100 123456 Ary            X06c
20250128 Tue 0804-0805 11545 534216 Andrew         TX to Bagdad, G232
20250128 Tue 0806-0812 16257 542136 Kingwing/PL,
                                    Ary, Andrew    TX to Beijing, G88
20250128 Tue 1026-1028 20813 216354 Dave           TX to Chennai, G228
20250128 Tue 1224-1227 12213 615243 Rycat          TX to Geneva, R
20250203 Mon 0754-0758 12122 165324 Dave           Alert2 (TX to Vienna, G1) 1
20250203 Mon 0758-0801 13452 165324 Dave           2.2 (end time estimated)
20250204 Tue 0754-0757 19874 125643 Dave           TX to Ulanbatar, G317
20250205 Wed 0744-0746 15819 256341 Dave           TX to Beirut, G311
20250205 Wed 0917-0921 17445 362154 Andrew         TX to Athens, G32
20250205 Wed 1013      12173 1--6-- tiNG           X06b before XPB1
20250206 Thu 0813      14445 3-456- Ary            X06b test
20250206 Thu 0919-0923 18197 645321 Dave           TX to Ho Chi Minh City, G410
20250206 Thu 1407      18575 352416 Ary            TX to Dar es Salaam, G43
20250207 Fri 0904-0912 12094 324615 Ary, Scarach   Alert2 (TX to Madrid, G52) 1
20250207 Fri 0912-0930 16219 324615 Ary, Andrew    2.2
20250207 Fri 1021-1041 14824 625413 Ary, Andrew    Alert2 (TX to Tel Aviv, G56) 1
20250207 Fri 1046      12194 625413 Ary            2.2
20250208 Sat 1218-1230 16103 645321 Rycat          Alert2 (Ho Chi Minh City, G445)1
20250208 Sat 1229-1240 18197 645321 Schorschi,
                                    Andrew, Rycat  2.2(4)(5)
20250209 Sun 0916-0932 14865 261453 Andrew,
                                    RadiotehnikaT  Alert2 (TX to Cairo, G138) 1(6)
20250209 Sun 0932-0940 16060 261453 Andrew, Dave   2.2(7)
20250210 Mon 0927-0931 16117 463125 Andrew         TX to Rabat, G77
20250211 Tue 0753-0756 11545 534216 Ary, Dave      TX to Bagdad, G87
20250211 Tue 1011-1013 17470 216354 Dave           TX to Chennai, G388
20250212 Wed 0823-0826 13369 412356 Ary, Dave      TX to Budapest, G97
20250212 Wed 0902-0905 11153 465132 Ary, Dave      TX to Sofia, G100
20250214 Fri 0841-0845 12213 615243 Ary, Andrew    TX to Geneva, G127
20250214 Fri 0927-0929 12177 356412 Andrew         TX to Berlin, G126
20250217 Mon 0737-0746 13452 165324 Ary, Dave      TX to Vienna, G145
20250217 Mon 0826-0829 14377 432516 Ary, Dave      TX to Bern, G341(8)
```

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20250217 Mon 0900-0904 14392 532614 Ary, Andrew    TX to Paris, G147
20250218 Tue 0907-0913 18523 325614 Andrew         TX to Nairobi, G400
20250218 Tue 0937-0940 13401 154263 Andrew         TX to Rome, G148
20250219 Wed 0918-0919 18197 645321 Andrew         TX to Ho Chi Minh City, G407
20250219 Wed 1053-1058 14650 215346 Dave           Alert2 (TX to Mumbai, G167) 1
20250219 Wed 1059-1100 16115 215346 Dave           2.2
20250219 Wed 1226      18245 231654 Rycat          Alert7 (TX to Abuja, G423) 1
20250219 Wed 1237-1238 18245 231654 Dave           7.2
20250219 Wed 1240      20374 231654 Rycat          7.3
20250220 Thu 0754-0804 17534 351264 Dave, Ary      TX to Abu Dhabi, G435
20250220 Thu 1458      18575 352416 Ary            TX to Dar es Salaam, G179
20250220 Thu 1522      15866 436512 Ary            TX to Harare, G180
20250221 Fri 1016-1020 14824 625413 Ary, Dave      TX to Tel Aviv, G193
20250221 Fri 1309      16320 241563 Ary            TX to Karachi, G187
20250222 Sat 1259      11168 1-6-16 Schorschi      X06b before E07
20250222 Sat 1303      11168 6--1-- Schorschi      X06b before E07
20250224 Mon 0827-0831 17475 156234 Ary, Andrew    TX to Kampala, G203
20250224 Mon 0932      16117 463125 Ary, Anon11319 TX to Rabat, G222
20250225 Tue 0805-0806 17523 542136 Dave           TX to Beijing, G88
20250225 Tue 1007-1011 20813 216354 Andrew         TX to Chennai, G228
20250226 Wed 0829-0832 11483 412356 Dave           TX to Budapest, G243
20250226 Wed 0851-0855 16116 134265 Dave           TX to Tunis, G90
20250226 Wed 0904-0905 11153 465132 Dave           TX to Sofia, G246
20250226 Wed 1307       6750 6--1-- Schorschi      Very short X06b (only 3 rounds)
20250228 Fri 0947-0954 12177 356412 Ary, Andrew    TX to Berlin, G271(9)
20250228 Fri 1007-1011 20605 256134 Andrew         TX to Abidjan, G270
```

1) Break between 1346 and 1347 UTC
2) 0921 UTC: M42, 0923-25: MFSK-66
3) QSA4 QRM1 QRN1 QSB1
4) G445: new
5) With break at 1230 UTC
6) Break at 0926 UTC, then mix with fast PSK 2400 bursts
7) Followed by PSK2400, which ran till 0953 UTC
8) Off after a few seconds and back at 0828 UTC
9) 0937-0938 UTC: MFSK-66

Many thanks to all contributors. Great stuff as usual!

So good-bye till the next issue. We'll stay safe and democratic in these turbulent times!

Very nice regards from Jochen Schäfer, Numbers-, X06 Database and Teamkopf

[*Thanks to Jochen and his group*]

Hybrids : HM01

As PoSW states " ……..HM01 seems to have gone for the time being at least, nothing heard for several months."

Gizza Job


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WORTH A CLOSER LOOK

PART 3: POLISH STATE SECURITY FIGHTS BACK (UNTIL THEIR WORLD COLLAPSES): NUMBERS STATIONS FROM THE POLISH ARCHIVES bv TOMASZ CHOPIN

Another interesting article appeared in 2012 in the journal Crypto/Og/a written by Jan Bury our former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and who now works at a university here in Warsaw.

It explores Polish State Security (UB/SB) operations to counter American spies during the Cold War. He used a few declassified Top Secret counter-intelligence reports found in the Institute of National Remembrance (which holds the State Security archive). It provides a further (but very limited) view of the covert world of espionage communications.
I provide some parts of it likely of interest to ENIGMA 2000 readers and a few observations.

Few papers were available to Jan on this topic which deal with Polish/GDR SIGINT operations to counter American communications which were used for espionage in Poland. It was a major struggle for us to counter the advanced technology of our then adversary (and now a key ally; how times change!)
Operation LOTOS was the Polish cover name for an operation to do radio reconnaissance of the American embassy in Warsaw from 1983-84 with the help of the GDR's Stasi. Its purpose was to target American DSCS X-band satellite communications which had been installed in the US compound in 1981 - a unique facility behind the Iron Curtain.
State Security could not intercept or decode these signals and no receivers or processors were available to us. American SIGINT was certainly used against our government's VHF/UHF communications in Warsaw such as surveillance nets used by the security forces.

Our monitoring revealed the existence of UHF agent channels used by the US to support its operations in the city. When the GDR team left in 1984 Poland did not have the equipment to continue its operations so LOTOS ended. The USSR did not seem to provide any capability despite Poland being a top intelligence target.

The project was started again in 1985 using equipment we bought and ran until the communist regime fell in 1989. This was known by cover name KALINA.

After the departure of the Stasi in 1984 our SIGINT service remained in touch with the GDR and Havana concerning covert US agent communications in the microwave band. They had experience of this activity. The KGB had detected burst communications from Moscow to American satellites and burst transmissions from parks and forests near the US embassy linked to American diplomatic personnel who were in the area.

In March 1983 an American diplomat was arrested in a park in Moscow testing a set and a satellite radio was found concealed in the bottom of his briefcase.
This was named a RS-804 and was closely examined.



RT-804 transceiver unit; CPK-804 Remote Controller; CK-42 coder, BS-804 Battery pack and Mains Power Pack

It allowed covert worldwide communications of messages of 1596 characters via the American MARISAT and FLTSATCOM UHF satellite systems. The RS-804 measured 198mm x186mm x19mm and broadcast on a pre-set frequency of 311.15MHz.
lt connected with an encryption device containing a key pad which allowed 4-5 second bursts. There was also a battery unit, remote control unit and a 310mm copper antenna. At 2.3kg it was easy to hide and could be operated with short training.

Cuba knew about this and also the American CBS-501 device which was CIA equipment allowing for short range line of sight UHF broadcasts. Cuban intelligence had picked up 4-5 of these transmissions daily near the US office in Havana allowing agents to pass data to the building or a case officer outside.

A similar device was used by our Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, deputy commander of the Polish Army General Staff Operations Directorate, a very important CIA agent who defected to the West in November 1981. He had problems with his device though which was called DISCUS. State Security concluded that what
happened in Havana could also be happening in Warsaw.

In July 1985 our SlGINT service asked the Interior Ministry to approve strengthened communications interception around the American embassy in Warsaw. It wanted 6-8 not manned intercept stations to be placed near the building and linked to SIGlNT HQ at Miedzeszyn, Warsaw or a fonNard command base.

They wanted the intercept equipment installed in the homes of intelligence personnel or in government flats and tuned to known frequencies used for US short-range agent communications.

If a CDS-501 was used in a nearby park (such as Ujazdowski in the embassy district) or a street then it could be detected. SlGINT needed good equipment and a Rohde and Schwarz ESVP receiver and AOR AR2001 (classic and expensive at the time with a sticky front!) wideband scanning receiver with a HA 74/3 antenna had to be obtained. Recorders and aerials were also bought with the R&S receiver being acquired covertly by Polish intelligence in Austria.

This intercept operation was known as KALINA and launched in 1986 with Polish SlGINT Section IV doing the VHF/UHF monitoring. We had been worried by the US diplomat being caught in Moscow and Cuba/GDR intelligence having 24-28 MARISAT intercepts of agent communications per week. There was a lot of spying going on!

The five intercept posts near the embassy picked up signals from a mystery asset and the posts were linked to surveillance units. Each location used 50cm ground plane aerials on the roof or close to windows facing the embassy. It also had a Yaesu 9600 receiver (remember them - good for military airband!**) but not a good scanner.

The post was connected to SlGINT HQ by telephone. Surveillance people would be alerted if anything was heard. TV surveillance was installed round the embassy to record anyone who might be transmitting a covert signal; daylight only perhaps? No direction finding was available so 100 cameras
were needed and expensive flats in the centre. Over $1 million was spent on the operation (at a time when we were poor) but no results feature in the files. It looks as though no assets were identified after so much spending.

The last file entry was for 1989 when SlGINT base Gdansk picked up the covert burst of an American asset on the Baltic coast of northern Poland. There is no mention if they tried to find them.

In the summer of 1989 communism fell in Poland (no comment!) but the operation continued to monitor the American and British embassy for VHF/UHF broadcasts until 1990.

There is no mention of KALINA's result or when it finally ceased. Only a small amount of papers were available to Jan Bury but his article shows the limits of
Eastern Bloc SIGlNT when dealing with advanced western espionage technology and techniques. It also shows the amount we spent on security even when the economy was bust in those hard days; no expense too much for state security as the shops were bare.

Radio interception and video of suspects might identify a numbers station recipient if they transmitted near an embassy before dark. There are no results listed though so they likely survived.
After 1989 the state system was dying so there was little interest in going after western spies. The Party wanted to protect itself and its interests as it lost power.

Moscow would not help (invade) and would soon sink in addition. We joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.

Why spy on the West and its collaborators if we would soon join them? Our enemies could soon talk to intelligence and military people who worked closely with Moscow and there was probable access to Soviet personnel and information here before they departed.

How many people switched sides before going home? The West could get access to state files and assets given up by our outgoing government so it was an opportunity! Money and a better life in the West could motivate people regardless of risk - they had little to lose. Many people had to find a place in the new world order rather than chasing western moles who were undermining our rotten system.

Western covert activity could likely go unopposed and not detected so a great opportunity. But I wonder how many die hard agents the USSR left behind in our country and what happened to our overseas assets - were they passed to Moscow or retired?

The whole covert project seems to have been expensive and useless. I wonder what became of the radios -stolen and sold probably. Some DXer might have them now sitting in their shack and not knowing their secret past!

SIGINT also lacked data storage and processing ability for satellite intercepts so even if intercepts were done they could not generate useful data for examination.

The operation generated miles of magnetic tape for nothing and the system was not workable. Even when data processing was grown in the late 1980's it was too late.

The number recipients probably survived but it is ironic that our government and communist system died. The numbers live on however.....73. T.C.

******** *Used by yours truly as an Intercept base, plus ELF Rx 10 to 200kHz to investigate and develop countermeasures [TEMPEST] to remote intercept from Screens and PC's. Project name was 'DATASEC.'*

Chart Section Index

Predictions

M01 Schedule

Family III

Polytones, XPA1, XPA2

En147

March 2025

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	UTC	wk	Stn	Fam	Mar kHz, ID, ...	Apr kHz, ID, ...
x		x					0315		E11	03	11420 25# **check**	11420 25#
x	x	x	x	x			0400/0420		S06	01A	11616/ 9322 480	11616/ 9322 480
	x		x				0445		S11A	03	10728 79#	10728 79#
x							0450		E11	03	12385 41# **search**	12385 41#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0455		HM01	18	10860	10860
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0500		V13	0		11430
x	x						0500/0510/0520 0530/0540/0550		XPB1	01B		13527/13927/14727 14927/15827/16327 **search**
x	x	x	x	x			0500/0520		M14	01A	12211/10243 952	12211/10243 952
x		x					0510		S11A	03	23004 65#	23004 65#
	x			x			0530		M01A	14	9441 751	9441 751
		x	x				0530		M01A	14	9129 or 9192 498	9129 or 9192 498
		x	x				0540		M01A	14	7692 536	7692 536
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0555		HM01	18	10345	10345
x		x					0600		E11	03	19515 94#	19515 94#
				x		x	0600		E11	03	8680 35#	8680 35#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0600		V13	0		11430
x	x						0600/0610/0620 0630/0640/0650		XPB1	01B	13562/14362/14862 15962/16262/17462 **search**	
		x			x		0600/0620/0640		M12	01B		11468/12168/13368 413
	x			x			0620		M01A	14	10233 or 10235 354/458	10233 or 10235 354/458
		x	x				0620		M01A	14	9421 135	9421 135
	x			x			0630		M01A	14	9447 143/796	9447 143/796
		x	x				0630		M01A	14	8111 902/536	8111 902/536
	x		x				0645		E11	03	8423 51# **check**	8423 51#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0655		HM01	18	13435	13435
x			x				0700		S11A	03	8597 47#	8597 47#
	x			x			0700		E11	03	8180 57#	8180 57#
					x	x	0700		E11	03	9079 49#	9079 49#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0700		V13	0		15250
						x	0700		M01	01B	6510 463	6510 463
x		x					0700/0720/0740		XPA2	01B		11409/12209/13409

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	UTC	wk	Stn	Fam	Mar kHz, ID, ...	Apr kHz, ID, ...
	x			x			0710		M01A	14	10651 297/358	10651 297/358
		x	x				0710		M01A	14	9175 146/208	9175 146/208
x		x					0715		E11	03	19515 75#	19515 75#
	x			x			0715		E11	03	15720 63#	15720 63#
					x	x	0715		M01	14	475 **search(7115?)**	475 **search(7115?)**
			x	x			**0720**		E11	03	9150 43# **check**	9150 43#
	x			x			0720		M01A	14	9151 728	9151 728
		x		x			0725		S11A	03	21854 38#	21854 38#
						x	0730/0800		E06 S06	01A	12093/10212 480 **check**	13945/11128 480 **check**
x							0745		E11	03	10213 26#	10213 26#
	x		x				0745		E11	03	14865 22#	14865 22#
		x		x			0745		E11	03	17410 34#	17410 34#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0800		V13	0		15250
		x					0800/0820/0840		XPA2	01B	13931/14831/16131	
	x	x					0820		E11	03	19184 13#	19184 13#
x				x			0830		E11	03	20170 18#	20170 18#
					x	x	0830		S11A	03	6433 37#	6433 37#
x		x					0845		E11	03	12202 71#	12202 71#
	x		x				0845		E11	03	18168 15#	18168 15#
x		x					0900		E11	03	13117 53#	13117 53#
x		x					0910/0930/0950		XPA2	01B	18333/16345/14838	18038/17474/16286
			x		x		0910/0930/0950		XPA2	01B	16261/15961/14861	15849/14659/13459
x				x			0915		S11A	03	6480 48#	6480 48#
		x	x				0930		E11	03	6940 27#	6940 27#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0930		M14	01A	17458 10.&25. 15994 11.&26. when msg	17458 10.&25. 15994 11.&26. when msg
		x					0930/1030		S06	01A	12188/10463 480 **check**	13547/12093 480 **check**
	x			x			1000		E11	03	9951 30#	9951 30#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1000		V13	0	19052/20025/20095	19052/20025/20095
x	x	x	x	x			1015/1025/1035		F01	01A	10861/ 8076/ 6974	10177/ 8076/ 6974
x		x					1045		E11	03	12385 69#	12385 69#

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	UTC	wk	Stn	Fam	Mar kHz, ID, ...	Apr kHz, ID, ...
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1100		V13	0	19052/20025/20095	19052/20025/20095
		x			x		1100/1110/1110 1130/1140/1150		XPB1	01B		13562/12162/11562 11162/10562/10262
	x						1100/1120/1140		M12	01B	11519/12194/13407 289	11519/12194/13407 289
	x			x			1100/1120/1140		XPA2	01B	14639/13539/12139	16341/14841/13941
		x	x				1100/1120/1140		XPA2	01B	15861/14431/13431	17426/16326/14926
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1200		V13	0	13974/14944/15388 19052	13974/14944/15388 19052
		x			x		1200/1210/1210 1230/1240/1250		XPB1	01B	14621/13921/13421 12121/11121/10421	
		x		x			1200/1220/1240		XPA2	01B	14956/16356/17456	
	x	x					1205		E11	03	9399 46#	9399 46#
		x		x			1210/1230/1250		XPA1	01B		13368/12168/11168
	x		x				1230		E11	03	12530 33#	12530 33#
x			x				1300		E11	03	5371 31#	5371 31#
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1300		V13	0	11430/14944/15388 19052	11430/14944/15388 19052
	x			x			1300/1310/1310 1330/1340/1350		XPB1	01B	20072/19572/18372 17472/16272/14972	20038/19538/18268 17468/16268/15868
		x		x			1310/1330/1350		XPA1	01B	14451/13451/12151 441	
	x	x	x				1325/1425 sporadic	spo- radic	S06	01A	15643/12176 583	
	x			x			1400		S11A	03	11420 42#	11420 42#
			x		x		1410/1430/1450		E07	01B	16284/14854/13384 328	16331/15831/14831 893
	x				x		1430		E11	03	14972 91#	14972 91#
					x		1500		M01	14	6260 463	6260 463
	x	x	x				1500/1600 sporadic	spo- radic	S06	01A	14913/10387 387	
	x			x			1500/1520/1540		E07	01B	14571/15851/17451 584	16257/18257/19157 221
					x		1500/1520/1540		XPA2	01B		15881/14481/13381
			x				1530		E11	03	10330 26#	10330 26#
					x		1600/1620/1640		XPA2	01B	12163/10863/ 9363	
	x		x				1600/1620/1640		XPA2	01B	13994/13494/12194	15819/14919/13919
					x		1600/1630		E06 S06	01A	9463/ 7353 480 **check**	11487/ 9412 480 **check**
	x					x	1605		E11	03	5176 23#	5176 23#
		x			x		1610		E11	03	4181 39#	4181 39#
					x	x	1645		E11	03	4505 36#	4505 36#

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	UTC	wk	Stn	Fam	Mar kHz, ID, ...	Apr kHz, ID, ...
		x		x			1715		E11	03	6923 97#	6923 97#
			x				1730		E11	03	12385 41# **check**	12385 41#
x						x	1745		E11	03	13470 24#	13470 24#
	x		x				1800		M01	14	5475 463	5475 463
		x		x			1800/1820/1840		XPA2	01B		15872/14972/13872
			x				1800/1820/1840		M12	01B	11435/10598/ 9327 938	11435/10598/ 9327 938
				x		x	1815		E11	03	11116 92#	11116 92#
		x			x		1850		S11A	03	10213 28#	10213 28#
x			x				1900		E11	03	7317 64#	7317 64#
		x					1900/1920/1940		M12	01B	8047/ 6802/ 5788 463	8047/ 6802/ 5788 463
		x		x			1900/1920/1940		M12	01B		13564/12164/11164 511
				x			1900/2000	1/3	S06	01A		9925/ 7495 842
				x		x	1910		E11	03	8530 61#	8530 61#
			x			x	2000		E11	03	5737 52#	5737 52#

M01 FREQUENCY LIST

Frequencies may vary by a few kHz

JAN FEB NOV DEC M01/1 197

DAY	TIME UTC	FREQ kHz
TUE / THU	1800	5320
TUE / THU	2000	4490
SAT	1500	5810
SUN	0700	5465

MAR APRIL SEPT OCT M01/2 463

DAY	TIME UTC	FREQ kHz
TUE / THU	1800	5475
TUE / THU	2000	5020
SAT	1500	6260
SUN	0700	6510

MAY JUNE JULY AUG M01/3 025

DAY	TIME UTC	FREQ kHz
TUE / THU	1800	5280
TUE / THU	2000	4905
SAT	1500	6435
SUN	0700	6780

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	UTC	wk	Stn	Fam	Jan kHz, ID, ...	Feb kHz, ID, ...	Mar kHz, ID, ...	Apr kHz, ID, ...	Remarks
x		x					0315		E11	03	12089 25#	**10448** 25#	11420 25# **check**	11420 25#	since 01/14, last log 02/25
	x		x				0445		S11A	03	11559 79#	11559 79#	10728 79#	10728 79#	since 05/22, last log 02/25
x							0450		E11	03	x14753 41# **search**	x14753 41# **search**	12385 41# **search**	12385 41#	since 02/10, **last log 12/24** 2nd transmission Thu 1730z
	x		x				0505		E11	03	12153 33#	12153 33#			since 10/11, last log 02/25 Mar/Apr/Sep/Oct at 1230z, Mai-Aug at 1645z
x		x					0510		S11A	03	21906 65#	21906 65#	23004 65#	23004 65#	since 08/19, last log 02/25
x		x					0600		E11	03	23004 94#	23004 94#	19515 94#	19515 94#	since 07/17, last log 02/25
				x		x	0600		E11	03	7850 35#	7850 35#	8680 35#	8680 35#	since 04/15, last log 02/25
	x		x				0645		E11	03	7840 51#	**12385** 51#	8423 51# **check**	8423 51#	since 07/09, last log 02/25
x			x				0700		S11A	03	9050 47#	9050 47#	8597 47#	8597 47#	since 04/10, last log 02/25
	x			x			0700		E11	03	6804 57#	6804 57#	8180 57#	8180 57#	since 01/12, last log 02/25
					x	x	0700		E11	03	5371 49#	5371 49#	9079 49#	9079 49#	since 07/15, last log 02/25
x		x					0715		E11	03	20167 75#	20167 75#	19515 75#	19515 75#	since 06/21, last log 02/25
	x			x			0715		E11	03	14975 63#	14975 63#	15720 63#	15720 63#	since 02/11, last log 02/25
			x	x			**0720**		E11	03	11104 43#	**8180** **43#**	9150 43# **check**	9150 43#	since 10/09, last log 02/25 **time and frequency change in 02/25**
		x		x			0725		S11A	03	23486 38#	23486 38#	21854 38#	21854 38#	since 05/14, last log 02/25 **missing since 14.02.25**
x							0745		E11	03	10213 26#	10213 26#	10213 26#	10213 26#	since 03/14, last log 0/25 2nd transmission Thu 1530z
	x		x				0745		E11	03	13908 22#	13908 22#	14865 22#	14865 22#	since 01/20, last log 02/25
		x		x			0745		E11	03	17378 34#	17378 34#	17410 34#	17410 34#	since 06/17, last log 02/25
	x	x					0820		E11	03	14611 13#	14611 13#	19184 13#	19184 13#	since 12/18, last log 02/25
x				x			0830		E11	03	23353 18#	23353 18#	20170 18#	20170 18#	since 07/15, last log 02/25
					x	x	0830		S11A	03	5371 37#	5371 37#	6433 37#	6433 37#	since 02/14, last log 02/25
x		x					0845		E11	03	12067 71#	12067 71#	12202 71#	12202 71#	since 09/10, last log 02/25
	x		x				0845		E11	03	17378 15#	17378 15#	18168 15#	18168 15#	since 07/17, last log 02/25
x		x					0900		E11	03	15915 53#	15915 53#	13117 53#	13117 53#	since 10/05, last log 02/25
x				x			0915		S11A	03	6252 48#	6252 48#	6480 48#	6480 48#	since 04/19, last log 02/25
		x	x				0930		E11	03	7469 27#	7469 27#	6940 27#	6940 27#	since 02/14, last log 02/25
	x			x			1000		E11	03	9079 30#	9079 30#	9951 30#	9951 30#	since 11/16, last log 02/25
x		x					1045		E11	03	14410 69#	14410 69#	12385 69#	12385 69#	since 03/18, last log 02/25
	x	x					1205		E11	03	11559 46#	11559 46#	9399 46#	9399 46#	since 03/10, last log 02/25 2nd transmission Mon 0450z
	x		x				1230		E11	03			12530 33#	12530 33#	since 10/11, last log 10/24 May-Aug at 1645z, Nov-Feb at 0505z
x			x				1300		E11	03	4909 31#	4909 31#	5371 31#	5371 31#	since 07/14, last log 02/25
	x			x			1400	spo-radic	S11A	03	10448 42#	10448 42#	11420 42#	11420 42#	since 02/10, last log 02/25
	x				x		1430	spo-radic	E11	03	13363 91#	13363 91#	14972 91#	14972 91#	since 10/15, last log 02/25
			x				1530		E11	03	5409 26#	5409 26#	10330 26#	10330 26#	since 06/14, last log 0/25 2nd transmission Mon 0745z
	x					x	1605		E11	03	5432 23#	5432 23#	5176 23#	5176 23#	since 11/15, last log 02/25
		x			x		1610		E11	03	4505 39#	4505 39#	4181 39#	4181 39#	since 02/14, last log 02/25
	x		x				1645		E11	03					since 10/11, last log 08/24 Mar/Apr/Sep/Oct at 1230z, Nov-Feb at 0505z
					x	x	1645		E11	03	4909 36#	4909 36#	4505 36#	4505 36#	since 03/14, last log 02/25 2nd transmission Thu 1530z
		x		x			1715		E11	03	5082 97#	5082 97#	6923 97#	6923 97#	since 02/15, last log 02/25
			x				1730		E11	03	x5779 41# **search**	x5779 41# **search**	12385 41# **check**	12385 41#	since 03/10, **last log 10/24** 2nd transmission Mon 0450z
x						x	1745		E11	03	12924 24#	12924 24#	13470 24#	13470 24#	since 04/18, last log 02/25
				x		x	1815		E11	03	6849 92#	6849 92#	11116 92#	11116 92#	since 05/16, last log 02/25
		x			x		1850		S11A	03	11486 28#	11486 28#	10213 28#	10213 28#	since 06/17, last log 02/25
x			x				1900		E11	03	6849 64#	6849 64#	7317 64#	7317 64#	since 05/16, last log 02/25
				x		x	1910		E11	03	10487 61#	10487 61#	8530 61#	8530 61#	since 04/17, last log 02/25
			x			x	2000		E11	03	5082 52#	5082 52#	5737 52#	5737 52#	since 05/15, last log 02/25

XPA1 Wednesday/Friday schedule

Zulu > / Month v	XPA1 Wed/Fri Schedule H+10 1210 / 1310z	H+30	H+50
Jan	14852	13952	11552
Feb	14374	13374	11474
Mar	14451	13451	12151
Apr	13368	12168	11168
May	13419	12219	11419
June	13545	12145	11145
July	13368	12168	11168
Aug	13491	12191	10691
Sept	12137	11137	10237
Oct	14564	13564	11464
Nov	13875	13375	10875
Dec	13465	12165	10265

XPA2 p Schedule [Mon/Wed]

Zulu > / Month v	XPA2 Sched p Monday/Wednesday H 00 0700 / 0800z	H+20	H+40
Jan	11493	13393	13993
Feb	13387	13887	14787
Mar	13931	14831	16131
Apr	11409	12209	13409
May	12148	13448	13948
June	12148	13448	13948
July	12148	13448	13948
Aug	12152	13552	13952
Sept	12152	13552	13952
Oct	13372	14672	15872
Nov	11529	13429	13929
Dec	11493	13393	13993

SPECIAL MATTERS

Thanks to all our contributors: Ary, BR, BRIXMIS, dMHz, DanAR, Gert, H-FD, HJH, JPL, MG, PLdn, PoSW, RNGB

MESSAGES:

E: Thanks for Stuff; some used next time. Hope all going well?

RELEVANT WEBSITES

ENIGMA 2000 Website: http://www.enigma2000.org

Time zone information: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/

Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security http://www.faqs.org/espionage/



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